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Abstract 
 
The recent intense focus upon Islam in the UK comes at a time when the religion is in 
a state of flux, with the traditions followed by older generations slowly giving way to 
new forms of religious expression. New interpretations are very gradually emerging at 
precisely the same time as suspicions are on the increase about Islam undermining 
national identity and respect for the liberal democratic division between public and 
private spheres. Against this tense backdrop, this thesis seeks to explore debates about 
religious interpretation and the relationship between Islam and liberalism that are 
ongoing among Britain’s Muslims. It draws upon data collected from a variety of new 
initiatives (focusing upon three in particular) that are involved in disseminating Islamic 
knowledge and discussing Islamic norms. Using this data, it examines the arguments of 
a wide variety of Islamic scholars, clerics and activists and highlights some of the ways 
in which Islam is being related to the British context.  
 
Of particular concern in the thesis are the implications these debates have for liberal 
traditions in the UK. It considers the effects of conventions of public discourse that 
seek to stifle the expression of religious ideas upon the possible future flourishing of 
British society and politics. The thesis argues against liberal political philosophies that 
aim to restrict public speech so that only “public” or “secular” reasons are offered in 
political debates, arguing that to do this is to risk mutual isolation between the UK’s 
many religious and secular moral traditions. It uses debates among Muslims in the UK 
on subjects such as national identity, political participation and civil and Islamic law to 
illustrate and give weight to this argument. 
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Notes on transliteration and style 
 
For transliteration of Arabic words I have attempted to follow a simple system based 
on that of the International Journal of Middle East Studies as closely as possible. The system 
uses the following conventions: 
 
• No diacritical marks are used 
• The letter ‘ayn is indicated by ‘, and hamza is indicated by ’, but only when it 
comes in the middle of the word 
• The plurals of Arabic words are written with an s, except the plural of ‘alim, 
which is given as ‘ulama 
• Doubled vowels in the middle of words are indicated by –iyya or –uwwa 
• Diphthongs are indicated by –aw or –ay 
• Al- is prefixed the first time an Arabic name is used, but omitted later 
 
This does not eliminate all confusion, as many Arabic terms are spelled in various ways 
by Muslims living and writing in the UK. An Islamic seminary may be described as a 
darul uloom, a darul ulum, a dar ul-ulum or (the style I use in the thesis) a dar al-ulum. When 
quoting essays that use Arabic words I have amended transliterations on occasion to 
keep the style consistent throughout. Of course, errors or inconsistencies in 
transliteration are my responsibility alone. 
 
Quotations from the Qur’an are taken from M. A. S. Abdel Haleem’s new translation, 
published by Oxford University Press. 
 
All dates are based upon the Gregorian calendar. 
 
All italicised words in quotations are presented that way in the original text unless I 
explicitly state (in the endnotes) that the emphasis has been altered. 
 
I should stress also that Yahya Birt is the same person as Jonathan Birt, and Abdal-
Hakim Murad is the same person as Tim J. Winter. Both are converts to Islam and 
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publish under both names depending upon whether they are writing qua academic or 
qua theologian. This means that the endnotes and bibliography refer, rather confusingly, 
to the same people by two different names. 
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Describing Islam 
 
The English language comes ready loaded with a cargo of concepts and assumptions 
that can make talking about Islamic history extremely difficult. Words such as “faith,” 
“God,” “religion,” “secular,” “modern,” “traditional” and “medieval” carry specific 
connotations as a result of Europe’s Christian history and its subsequent conflicts over 
and attempts to rationalise religious belief. To describe something as “medieval,” for 
example, is to imply that it is barbarous, yet the medieval period in Islamic history 
witnessed several periods of cultural flowering. Various scholars recently have tried to 
highlight how some of the most reactionary movements in Islam have been in many 
ways quite “modern.” As they search for the right terminology one can almost see the 
English language creaking beneath the strain. Recent neologisms such as “Islamism” 
have tended to confuse things further, collapsing a host of different movements into 
one undifferentiated category. To write about Islam is to become ever more aware of 
the wisdom of Michel Foucault’s claim that language is “a violence which we do to 
things, or ... a practice which we impose upon them.”1 
 
Although I do describe Islam as a “religion” and even at times as a “faith” my preferred 
way of describing it is as a tradition, by which I mean simply an acquired habit, a way of 
understanding, a chain of memory. That term is far from perfect, though, for two main 
reasons. Firstly, the strong opposition in the English language between the traditional 
and the modern means one can give the impression that a “tradition” will always be ill 
at ease in the “modern” West, where people seem constantly to be in search of novelty 
and ready to cast off the old way of doing things. (That, paradoxically, is one of the 
dominant traditions within British and Western culture.) Secondly, using the word 
“traditional” to describe a Muslim’s perspective can sometimes give the impression that 
it is authentic or faithful. There is no way round these problems, and over the chapters 
I do struggle to use the right terminology in the right way. Yet it is worth highlighting 
that when I describe an Islamic theologian as “traditional” usually I mean to imply that 
his or her perspective draws strongly from the classical period rather than being based 
only upon the Qur’an and the sayings of Muhammad. When using the term “classical” I 
mean to indicate the system of Islamic legal scholarship that was developed primarily 
between the tenth and the thirteenth centuries. 
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Similar problems occur when using the words “theology” and “liberal” too of course, 
but I explore these in Chapter 1. I also explain the meanings of the majority of Arabic 
words used in the text, though a glossary can also be found in Appendix 1. The one 
other word I use in the thesis that might cause confusion is “expressivism.” By this 
term I mean to indicate a broad family of philosophical traditions that places emphasis 
on the realisation of an inner core or self.  
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This thesis has been three to four years in preparation, but its origins can be traced 
further back than that, to a little under ten years ago. It grew out of my efforts while 
still an undergraduate to make sense of what was being said about Islam following the 
events of September 11th 2001. What I had been trying to fathom then, and what I am 
still trying to fathom now to an extent, was the depth of suspicion towards Islam; the 
roots of this new hostility seemed to sink deep. This can be said of other forms of 
prejudice, of course. Scholars such as Zygmunt Bauman and Paul Gilroy have shown in 
great detail how negative European attitudes to other “races” can be traced to some of 
the key thinkers of the Enlightenment.2 Yet the way Islam was depicted as a threat 
during that period seemed to me different. It used to be the case that European racism 
was supported by various conceptual struts, such as the notion that there are discrete 
races that have different capacities. Now, though, these struts have all been almost all 
knocked away; condescension toward individuals with a different skin pigment is now 
rightly seen as just a visceral reaction whose roots lie in nothing more than confusion 
and fear. The same cannot be said about Islam. Although it is widely acknowledged that 
in Europe there is—and has been for a long time—virulent prejudice toward Islam, 
some of the struts still remain stubbornly intact. It seems, in truth, far more difficult to 
cut through them. Islam exists as a body of ideas and as a way of interpreting the 
ultimate ends of human existence. For that reason it is not so easy to write all criticism 
of it off; one cannot just assume that negative talk about Islam is always prejudiced talk 
in the same way that one can for talk of “races.” 
 
Between 2003 and 2005 I had been studying some of the writings on Islam by far-Right 
figures such as Robert Spencer, alongside some of what was being said about the 
tradition in the media.3 As I did, it seemed to me that a change was taking place. Other 
writers, Gilroy perhaps foremost among them, had already highlighted a shift in the 
language employed in public deliberations from talk of “races” to talk of “cultures.” But 
now the language appeared to alter again: the focus of criticism by the far-Right, and 
much of the centre-Right, was not a type of person or even a culture; it was Islam as a 
way of thinking, as a moral system. People’s opposition to Islam was based upon it 
being (supposedly) intolerant, unreasonable and oppressive to women. This has not 
gone away: today groups like the English Defence League (EDL) and Stop Islamisation 
of Europe [sic] are careful to stress, it is Islam as idea that is the problem. “Racism is the 
lowest form of human stupidity,” stresses the latter, “but Islamophobia is the height of 
15 
 
common sense.”4 Of course, most of this is just a ruse, simply racism dressing itself up 
as religious criticism. Most is not worth taking at all seriously (even if one has to admit 
the problem presented by the popularity of these organisations is extremely serious 
indeed). Even so, I could not—and still cannot—in all honesty say that there are not 
issues here worth having a debate about.  
 
At the time, this left me more than a little concerned, a concern that might be clarified 
by drawing a simple contrast. Imagine someone argues black people are constitutionally 
incapable of governing themselves. This is not something that anyone would consider 
talking about, such is the silliness of the notion. Now imagine someone maintains that 
Islam is based upon questionable claims on truth; that it stifles the human spirit and 
tends toward a dour view of life; that its joyless view of life often leads to restrictions 
on women, whose sexualities are repressed; that its ultimate vision of a good society 
implies unacceptable limits upon creative expression. Today I feel just about able to put 
together an argument against these positions; but it is complicated argument, about 
which I have numerous doubts. I could not claim that it is not a valid topic for debate 
any more than I could claim that entering into debates about truth, gender relations or 
the good life are not all worthwhile activities.  
 
This shift from criticism of races and cultures to criticism of theological ideas has, I 
feel, wrong-footed a large number of people, particularly those aligned politically with 
anti-racism, liberalism and the Left. However much of a problem racism may still be 
within the UK, it has been marginalised and denied a place in significant political 
discussions because it has been shown to be groundless, devoid of any link to serious 
biological and sociological inquiry. Some areas of society—sport, say, or modelling—
may be racially coded, and institutional racism still remains a significant problem, but 
no-one in a mainstream publication will claim that black or Asian people are a threat to 
liberal democracy and political life. This does, though, happen in relation to Islam. 
Conservatives see it as a threat to British cultural traditions; liberals see it as a threat to 
free expression; Leftists see it as a backward, conservative way of thinking inimical to 
progressive ideas; rationalists lump it in with other branches of theism, all of which are 
considered to be dangerous delusions. Not all of these people can be described as 
simply prejudiced toward outsiders; I do not agree with, say, Richard Dawkins, but it 
would be a bit much to compare him to Enoch Powell. Yet no-one appears to know 
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where to draw a line between prejudice and criticism, and so it has become possible for 
people to countenance restrictions on Muslims’ freedom of worship that we would 
never tolerate for any other religious group. The problem, I think, can be summed up in 
this way: racism, including anti-Semitism, has to mask itself today because the battle of 
ideas at the highest level has been won. However, the quality of public debate about 
religious belief and the Islamic tradition is so lamentable that massive misconceptions 
have become common even among the élite.5 These misunderstandings are sustaining 
the kind of anti-Muslim sentiment that an ostensibly literate and open society should be 
able to recognise and develop a response to. 
 
How is the situation going to improve? The response among well-meaning people has 
usually been to emphasise two things: first, that Islam is diverse; and second, that the 
influence of religious ideas has been exaggerated.6 These are both necessary points, but 
on their own they are insufficient. Something more needs to change in the way that 
religious belief is publicly debated. I do not think that it is ever going to be possible to 
simply knock the struts away in the same way that theories of race have been gradually 
discredited. But I do think that it is possible to learn to talk a bit better about religion, 
and particularly about Islam. There is one specific aspect of our public conversation 
that is ripe for improvement. What many people in politics, journalism and even 
academia seem wholly unable to tolerate is the notion that a Muslim might want to 
influence society in accordance with his or her beliefs, or make the world that bit more 
“Islamic.” Right-wingers such as Melanie Phillips and Daniel Pipes constantly search 
the writings of ostensibly “moderate” Muslims for some kind of aspiration to shape 
society and, when they find something that seems to fit the bill, claim that really they 
are “stealth Islamists”7 who think that “Muslims living in the West should do nothing 
to alienate the indigenous society, but should impose Shari‘a by a process akin to the 
Trotskyite long march through the institutions.”8 This is then enough to see them 
placed in the same pile of dangerous individuals as Bin Laden, Abu Hamza and others; 
the only difference, they say, is the means. Most people, of course, refrain from going 
this far in what they say. Nevertheless, there are very few people who have tried to 
think this question through, and many people who are just as wary about Islam having 
any influence, even if they are more restrained.  
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The simple desire to change society in accordance with one’s conception of the good 
life does not in itself, of course, make one a danger to liberal democracy. Quite the 
contrary: liberalism relies on these hopes. I would prefer it if asylum seekers were not 
treated so terribly in the UK, and if I did not have to put up with women in states of 
undress covering the UK’s newspapers. That does not make me illiberal, even though 
one could argue that a state in which my wishes were honoured would be a more 
“Islamic” state. Only if I used certain means—coercion or violence, say—would I be a 
danger to liberal democracy. Where even the most brilliant of liberal thinkers struggle, 
though, is in getting to grips with the justifications used, or with the terms in which desires 
are expressed. If it is suspected that the ultimate basis for one’s interests is some 
conception of God’s will for humans—which in Islam is generally expressed in terms 
of God’s path, the Shari‘a—then one is often viewed by many liberals as not fit for 
public consumption, as it were. In my view, this tendency has to be thought through 
much more carefully to clear up the current confusion. 
 
There is one further thing that might help too, that being an improvement in the ability 
of public conversations to negotiate moral differences. Obviously people can (and 
generally do) exaggerate the tension between Islamic norms and the mores that are 
dominant in Western Europe, but it seems naïve to claim that there are no differences, 
or that these differences have no bearing.9 Part of this just means learning to live a little 
better with many different ways of understanding the nature and purpose of life, and to 
agree to disagree and tolerate others. Yet this can only ever result in a partial solution, 
with what John Rawls used to call a modus vivendi being worked out rather than a more 
durable “overlapping consensus.”10 It has, therefore, to mean something more: not only 
the willingness to try and win people round when one believes that they have 
something wrong, but also the willingness to take seriously the interests and beliefs of 
those one disagrees with. It has to mean the willingness to not only convey what it is 
one values to others, or even to articulate the underlying reasoning behind what one 
values, but also to understand undistortively the terms in which other people think 
about the ends and goals of life. There is a paragraph in one of Charles Taylor’s essays 
that captures this sentiment superbly: 
 
Understanding the other undistortively, without being led to deprecate or to 
relativise the goods one still subscribes to: this can confer [an] important 
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benefit. Most of the great religions or secular world views are bound up with a 
depreciatory view of others in contrast to which they define themselves. 
Christianity relative to Judaism as “merely” a religion of law, or relative to 
Buddhism or Hinduism as religions unconcerned for the world—depreciatory 
stories abound. These stories provide some of the support system for faith 
everywhere. The contrasts are real; and so to come to understand the view 
against which one’s own is defined, and hence to see its spiritual force, must 
bring about a profound change. The depreciatory story is no longer credible; 
this prop to faith is knocked away. Where the faith was nourished exclusively 
by the story, it will wither. But where not, it will be free to nourish itself on 
better food, on something like the intrinsic power of whatever the faith or 
vision points us toward. In this sense, understanding lets our own faith be too. 
It liberates ourselves along with the other.11 
 
This passage captures one of the main motivations behind this thesis. The details of it I 
shall explain later, but suffice it to say for now that it represents my modest attempt to 
consider in a little more detail how the Islamic tradition might be brought into a 
conversation in the UK, and to try and speak about it undistortively—that is, without 
refraining from criticism, but also trying to get as far as I can into the core language of 
the tradition, given my own limitations. I should perhaps mention that I come to this 
topic from an Anglican background, although I tend to classify myself as an agnostic. (I 
say more about this at the end of the thesis.) I have no biographical roots in the Islamic 
tradition and my two main academic fields of interest are sociology and moral 
philosophy. This has meant that getting to grips with the subject has been a challenge, 
but ultimately one well worth undertaking.  
 
The process of completing this study has been lengthy and occasionally laborious, and I 
have benefited a great deal from the assistance and support, both academic and 
personal, of a large number people and institutions, not all of whom can be named 
here. Firstly, I must express my thanks to the Economic and Social Research Council, 
whose studentship (pta-031-2005-00210) made the research for the thesis possible. I 
also would like to thank the Department of Sociology at Goldsmiths, University of 
London, for giving me the space to work. 
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1. Introduction 
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1.1.   The changing character of Islam in Britain 
 
It may not be obvious from the media commentary on Islam, which unfortunately 
tends to portray the tradition as a homogenous mass, but recent decades have seen 
fascinating and potentially important changes taking place among the UK’s Muslims. 
The more peripheral aspects of ethnic identity appear to be gradually eroding. A wide 
variety of academic studies have indicated that faith identification is increasingly being 
regarded by younger South Asian Muslims as distinct from, and more significant than, 
ethnic background.12 The religious tradition itself is also changing. The varieties of 
Islam that the first generations of Muslim migrants identified with, and that were 
imported into many of Britain’s mosques, have run into difficulties, with younger 
generations complaining that they feel alienated by them.13 The Islamic educational 
institutions established by these migrants are finding it hard to transmit their religious 
teachings unaltered to an often sceptical young audience.14 The Islamic tradition is in 
transition, in short; and as this transition has slowly progressed the question of what the 
faith’s relationship with British society ought to be has become more and more 
pressing—not least because it has emerged against a backdrop of intense media 
scrutiny, driven in large part by suspicion of Muslims.15 
 
Given this, it is perhaps not surprising that a wide variety of novel initiatives, 
theologians and activists have surfaced, a number of which have sought to circumvent 
older institutions and producers of Islamic knowledge, offering information that is not 
easily accessible via the more established routes. Spurred on by challenging political 
developments, Muslims in the UK have engaged in discussions about the public good 
in open debate, contributing to the flourishing of what Armando Salvatore has called 
the “emerging Euro-Islamic public sphere.”16 This process has, though, been plagued 
by troubles and uncertainties. Hostility toward Islam, for a long time present in Britain 
but largely dormant, has swelled up over the last decade. Islam in the UK is now only 
barely being tolerated. Recent surveys have indicated that more than half of the UK 
population would be “strongly opposed” to a mosque being constructed in their 
neighbourhood, and only a quarter feel positive toward Muslims.17 In February 2007 a 
columnist for a centre-Right UK broadsheet drew up a “wish list” that offers a 
worrying indication of what numerous British citizens would like to see happening: 
monitor all mosques; control and monitor all imams visiting prisons; monitor all 
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madrasas; spend far more money monitoring young dual-passport Britons’ trips to 
Pakistan; censor the violent Islamist recruitment sites on the Internet, including, the 
author says, “insidious hip-hop and rap sites.”18 
 
Part of this hostility can be traced to the perception that Islam is incongruous because it 
(allegedly) ignores the split between public and private, sacred and secular.19 It is seen 
by many as a threat to liberalism, refusing to conform to accepted standards. This has 
resulted in a rather awkward double-bind. On the one hand, there are a large number of 
areas of confusion about the tradition and its doctrines. Adherence to Islam is thought 
by many to involve holding views at variance with democratic society and firmly at odds 
with the UK’s social mores. Muslims are regularly asked to demonstrate their firm 
commitment to the British nation. Yet on the other, public articulation and deliberation 
of Islamic principles can be viewed as improper. The place of religion in public life is a 
constant theme of debate in the UK, as indeed it is elsewhere. There are those who 
prefer there to be little or no links between religious traditions and states whose 
foundations should really be secular. Traditional liberals often claim it is best for 
debates in democratic polities to be conducted in “secular terms” or, as some say, in 
accordance with the norms of “public reason.” It can therefore appear that exactly the 
thing people in Britain are demanding of believing Muslims—that they show how their 
beliefs can inform national political commitment—raises suspicions about Islam being 
unable to remain in the appropriate (read: private) sphere. In such a context, how can 
Islam be clarified, alterations to it worked out, and a relationship with the social and 
political traditions and institutions in the UK be negotiated?  
 
 
1.2.   A debate lacking in content 
 
In this thesis I present a study of these emerging deliberations and the initiatives that 
provide a forum for them. Over the chapters that follow I explore the speeches and 
opinions of, and debates between, Muslim clerics, scholars and activists operating in a 
variety of organisations in the UK. The thesis draws from three initiatives in particular, 
but gives details of others where needed. By doing so I try to offer a window into the 
ongoing internal Muslim debates about the relationship between liberalism and Islam in 
Britain—which, in turn, links to a more general argument about the relationship 
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between religiously grounded moral orientations (and religious organisations) and 
liberal democratic politics within the UK.  
 
I have two main motivations for undertaking this project. One is my discomfort with 
the growing hostility toward Islam, and more specifically with the ways in which in 
recent years “liberalism” and “secularism” have been often used as weapons with which 
the tradition is attacked.20 To be a liberal secularist is, it often seems, to be in conflict 
with the Islamic tradition; some, such as the columnist cited above, even seem willing 
to kill off liberalism to save it. Given that I consider myself both a liberal (of a certain 
type) and a secularist (again, of a certain type, and perhaps an unusual type), I have felt 
the need to clarify what the political philosophies associated with these terms actually 
advocate and consider where they might need revising. This is part of the reason why, 
although this is a sociological study, the discussion will refer regularly to ideas and 
debates from political theory. 
 
The second, and the more fundamental, motivation for undertaking this project is the 
way that Islam has been talked about of late. I do not mean by this simply that 
discussions in the media in the UK and elsewhere have been dangerously ill-informed, 
true though that certainly is. Rather, my concern is that scholars and social researchers 
have tended to be reticent about Islam, not often trying to examine the theological, 
moral or interpretive aspects of the tradition. There is relatively little in the academic 
sphere that can give one a sense of the differences in religious interpretation that are 
present within Britain’s Muslim communities, even despite the fact that there has been 
a deluge of commentary on Muslims in the UK. Part of the problem is that, barring a 
few exceptions,21 academic studies have not really allowed the non-Muslim public to get 
a sense for the anguished and passionate intra-Muslim debates taking place in the UK. 
For example, a large number of studies have provided interested readers with 
fascinating descriptions of the nature and development of Muslim legal pluralism in 
Britain (which I look into in Chapter 6).22 Yet as Samia Bano has correctly highlighted, 
these accounts have paid “insufficient attention to internal contestation and change 
within Muslim communities,” which ultimately does very little to challenge persistent 
stereotypes of Muslim homogeneity.23 
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Yet the issue is not just a lack of focus on internal debates. The problem, in my view, is 
a more general lack of attention to religious ideas. To give another example, Sophie 
Gilliat-Ray has pointed out that while readers can enjoy studies of Muslim community 
formation and Muslim identity, as well as scholarly treatment of particular issues and 
debates such as women and the media, few scholars have attempted to document the 
origins and curricula of Islamic centres of learning.24 In this particular case, the lacuna 
can be partly explained by difficulties gaining access.25 Yet it also, I suspect, is rooted in 
a general reluctance to examine religious discussions. When researchers begin to get 
close to the normative content of the Islamic tradition they frequently seem to hesitate, 
as if the issue were of little or no importance.26  
 
My contention is that this has made sociologists less able to accurately articulate the 
contours of Muslim identity in Britain, and has weakened academic discussions of the 
pressing religio-political questions that haunt UK public life. A large amount of ink has 
been spilled in recent decades in debates about the ability of the polities in Europe and 
North America to incorporate, or otherwise come to terms with, moral diversity.27 One 
of the main points of focus in political theory has been how different moral traditions 
can be brought into some kind of agreement, or at least talk to one another. Islam, as a 
moral tradition, will always be ultimately theological, so if scholars find it hard to talk 
about Islam in these terms, or are unwilling to look into how Islam is debated or 
worked out, political difficulties will surely be likely. 
 
My hope is that this thesis will go some way to filling the gap. What I have tried to do 
in it is examine three sites of flourishing debate about Islam within the UK. I chose 
them partly because each one concentrates on producing and/or disseminating Islamic 
knowledge to a broad audience, and regularly provides a platform to some of the more 
innovative Muslim thinkers in the UK. I place them in context in the earlier chapters, 
and then in the later chapters offer an account of the debates to which they have made 
contributions. Ultimately, my aim is to show how significant these debates are, to 
Muslims and to Britain as a whole. It is also to carry through a polemic about the best 
manner in which to discuss religious traditions. 
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1.3.   Theology and liberalism: some preliminary descriptions 
 
In the title of the thesis, and already at various points in this chapter, I have referred to 
liberalism and Islamic theology. Both of these terms are ambiguous enough to require a 
short description so that it is clear what I mean by them and what the thesis will be 
concentrating on and discussing. Islamic theology, in particular, is a slightly awkward 
term. Theology, of course, is a Greek word that has a very specific place in Christian 
history. Members of other religious traditions—including some prominent Muslim 
intellectuals—do not like to use it.28 More significantly, it implies arcane and (today) 
usually not particularly influential discussions that take place in underfunded divinity 
departments in remote universities. Ideally, it might have been better to use the neutral 
term preferred by Peter Berger: “religious ideation.”29 But that, sadly, would not make 
for a particularly snappy title or flowing discussion. Suffice to say that when I use the 
term I mean to imply “God talk in all its forms.”30 Specifically, I mean any 
interpretation of what it is good to be and right to do (or what can be called, following 
John Rawls, a “conception of the good”) that draws upon a theistic tradition, and in 
particular any interpretation of the good that refers to such a tradition for its ultimate 
basis. This is as broad an interpretation of theology as one is likely to find; it covers not 
just high-level academic theology and very simple forms of religious interpretation, but 
a good portion of “secular” moral articulation too, much of which draws in some way 
from Christian and other theistic traditions (even if that is not known or is denied). 
Even so, this broad definition suits my aims well.  
 
Using the terms “liberalism” and “Islamic theology” together is particularly risky. The 
term “liberal” tends to imply a set of dispositions and is often associated with a certain 
form of moral individualism. It also appears to imply that what I am trying to do is 
identify a “liberal Islam,” an effort that tends to entail making mistaken assumptions 
about the tradition (see Chapter 5) and, at worst, just trying to find an Islam that fits a 
lengthy list of moral stances. I take my understanding of the term from a common 
contemporary definition that claims the goal of a state is to give equal consideration to 
each person’s conception of the good life. This definition incorporates a number of 
conflicting views concerning distributive justice, gender relations and the different 
routes to human flourishing.31 For that reason, it would be wrong to assume it can be 
aligned easily with one moral viewpoint. I do favour what is known as a “political” 
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form of liberalism, although I remain critical of some influential political liberals, such 
as Rawls and Stephen Macedo. For now, though, discussion of this term can be left to 
one side. What I am interested in is how, having defined liberalism in this way, one 
should approach theological conceptions. What does it mean to respect theological goods 
alongside other moral traditions? For example, liberals tend to emphasise the 
importance of deliberation in political life: politics, or public life, is seen as a collective 
process of working out what shape society should take, what rights people should be 
given and what the state should encourage. How should theological conceptions be 
included in these deliberations, if at all? Rawls and Macedo, and many others, think that 
while it is important to leave space for different forms of belief and observance it is 
best to remain reticent about fundamental beliefs, to not articulate them in political 
discussions about society’s basic shape. The position I will defend, as I have already 
indicated, differs from this. In my own view, if one takes this definition seriously then 
one has a warrant—maybe even an obligation—to give consideration and open space 
to the different ways in which the good life and society are understood by different 
people, and this means leaving public space open for the expression of all religious and 
secular ideas. My concern is that favouring reticence in public debate encourages a 
truncated understanding of the good and even, in my view, makes it harder to build 
bridges across moral traditions. I take up this issue directly in a critique of Rawls in the 
next chapter, but it is an argument that I attempt to illustrate and build upon in the 
following chapters looking at Islam in the UK.  
 
 
1.4.   Possible reasons for reticence 
 
This brings me back to the widespread reluctance that one finds, among sociologists 
and political theorists, to try and engage meaningfully with Islam as a way of thinking 
about the way one should live. I have already mentioned that I think this reticence is 
not always helpful, but I ought to acknowledge also that there are various reasons—
some good, some not so good—why academics might be reluctant to stray into this 
particular area and into these debates. It is only possible to conjecture about the exact 
reasons why there may be reticence when it comes to Islam and religion, but all of the 
following have, I believe, some influence. 
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First of all, and perhaps most forgivably, talking about religious interpretations requires 
a level of religious literacy that not many people have. Even though Islam has filled 
newspapers over the last decade it still remains the case that the majority of people 
know next to nothing of its language. Strangely, the word processor on which I am 
typing this essay now recognises jihad, fatwa, and al-Qaeda as terms one might often use 
in an essay in English. Terms such as shahada, sawm, salat, zakat, iman and tawhid are all 
flagged up as spelling errors, despite the fact that these words relate to the absolute 
basics of the Islamic tradition, the stuff of secondary level religious education. This 
hints at a distorted understanding of Islam that is not going to be easy to rectify, for 
reasons Grace Davie has ably spelled out:  
 
British society (just like its European neighbours) finds itself in an 
embarrassing situation. On the one hand, religion—for a whole variety of 
reasons—has re-entered the public square and demands a response. On the 
other, a largely unchurched population has difficulty dealing with these issues: 
British people have lost the concepts, knowledge and vocabulary that are 
necessary to talk about religion. This is one reason for the lamentable standard 
of public debate in this field. Can anything be done?32 
 
This ignorance is a problem, particularly when people feel that they can hold forth on 
the topic without knowing what they are talking about. It makes public debates far 
harder to conduct in amicable terms. Nevertheless, one can understand why a person 
might consider it better to remain silent simply because they might make a serious error 
of judgement. This is a difficulty of which I am personally only too aware, not being a 
formally trained Islamic theologian myself. 
 
Second, even if one is familiar with the inner language of the Islamic tradition this does 
not mean that one will be able to successfully explain how different religious ideas are 
popularised, influencing society. I know of only two books that attempt to 
systematically think through theology’s relationship with society, both by the same 
author, both now thirty-five years old.33 It is difficult to explain how theological ideas 
influenced societies that existed many centuries ago; it is even more demanding when 
one is talking about a contemporary society, and one that is, moreover, incredibly 
religiously diverse as the UK unquestionably is. There is also a serious risk in discussing 
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theology’s role in society. Giving theological explanations for issues that really have 
mainly economic or material causes can ultimately contribute to misunderstandings 
about, and suspicions of, Muslims and Islam.  
 
Third, many individuals, and particularly those people on the liberal Left who (if I am 
being honest) predominate in academia, are frequently very uncomfortable with some 
of the goods justified in theological terms. Abrahamic traditions are, not entirely 
without reason, associated with opposition to abortion under any circumstances, gender 
discrimination and homophobia. There are undeniable moral differences, and these can 
be linked to deeper tensions between the antinomian tendencies of much liberal- and 
Left-leaning criticism and the nomocentric traditions encountered in Islam. Such moral 
differences have recently been used, by people like the late Pim Fortuyn, to justify 
deeply illiberal measures such as selective restrictions upon immigration and even 
restrictions upon freedom of worship. At the moment it is only too easy for those who 
are carefully critical of Islam to get caught up in a storm of anti-Muslim feeling. On the 
one hand, then, there may be a reluctance to defend a moral tradition some of whose 
central tenets one strongly disagrees with. Yet on the other, there may be an equal 
reluctance to question a tradition that is under attack. In such a context, silence can 
easily appear to be the most sensible option. 
 
Fourth, there is a problem of philosophical incommensurability. Consider as an 
example currently fashionable poststructuralist approaches, which have been popular 
for some years within sociology and other areas, particularly in post-colonial theory. 
This philosophical tradition, which has been influenced strongly by Nietzsche through 
figures such as Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, tends to be deeply sceptical about 
universal truth-claims and the existence of a transcendent subject. Philosophically 
speaking, such an outlook is not easy to square with the theism that is at the core of the 
Islamic tradition.34 Looking at Islam as a way of thinking seems to imply a strong 
challenge to these core convictions about the human subject and people’s abilities to 
perceive and to coherently articulate truth. Given this—combined with problem no. 3 
mentioned just above—it is perhaps unsurprising that post-colonial theories tend not to 
focus upon Islam, but rather Western prejudices toward Islam. Following Edward Said, 
poststructuralist analyses generally concentrate on how European philosophical and 
political traditions constructed Islam in order to give Europeans a sense of who they were 
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and are.35 The focus falls on how Europe made an enemy out of Islam,36 or how, in 
Bobby S. Sayyid’s words, “[s]ecularism as a discursive regime ... generates the Muslims 
as a permanently transgressive subject.”37 These are all important points, but they often 
actually say little about Islam itself.38 
 
The fifth reason links to all these and is, I think, the most interesting. Sometimes 
reticence in relation to religion seems like appropriate conduct. That is to say, when one 
is not a member of a religious tradition it can seem like one has no right to speak on 
matters of interpretation. If one does not ultimately believe Muhammad received divine 
guidance it can seem that one cannot talk about how the Qur’an should be read. One 
might argue from a distance, perhaps saying that Islam matters on a cultural, political or 
identitarian level. But, as both journalists and are academics often keen to stress,39 
theological interest is different. To speak about whether Islam enjoins x or y one needs, 
it seems, to speak as a Muslim. This is an interesting matter because, obviously, one 
does not have to be a Muslim to learn from the Islamic tradition any more than one 
must be a Christian to appreciate the parable of the Good Samaritan. Ghandi once 
described Muhammad’s sayings as “among the treasures of mankind.”40 Yet to step 
over that line and breach that protocol appears to risk undermining the internal debates 
of religious traditions. It also appears to invite not just appreciation of religious beliefs 
but also the inverse: open acknowledgement of fundamental differences, which in turn 
implies more open, visceral conflicts. This, as we shall see, is one of the primary reasons 
for Rawls’s advocacy of reticence, and indeed one of the main reasons why the 
sociology of religion aspires to neutral description. 
 
 
1.5.   Theology and the multicultural question 
 
One is presented, then, with a whole host of practical challenges when considering 
offering a sociological discussion of theology. Not only that, one also has to contend 
with the risk of dredging up irreconcilable philosophical and moral differences and 
breaking down an uneasy modus vivendi that stifles discussion of core beliefs so people 
can coexist relatively amicably. There are clearly a number of good reasons to be 
cautious about conversing on the subject. This means one has to come up with some 
compelling reasons to support doing so. The thesis I shall advance in this study is then 
31 
 
that, even given these problems, there are still good reasons to open the vents and 
publicly air such perspectives. To indicate where my argument is coming from, it may 
help to situate it within current debates about nationalism, multiculturalism and ethnic 
and religious diversity in Britain. Debates on these matters have been running for many 
years, but recently, and particularly since the London bombings of 2005, they have 
become increasingly fractious. In these disputes the conservative Right in Britain has 
tended to stress more strongly the value of a single national culture, while the Left has 
traditionally adopted a pluralist ethic. Recently, though, ferocious criticisms of the idea 
of multiculturalism have caused confusion. It has been blamed for, in the words of one 
influential report, generating the conditions in which “[s]eparate educational 
arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, 
language, social and cultural networks, means that many communities operate on the 
basis of a series of parallel lives.”41 A growing number of individuals who previously 
identified with the idea have deserted it. 
 
Some longstanding advocates of multiculturalism have argued that, in truth, the ethic 
cannot be reasonably be held responsible for all that it has been accused of, in particular 
the London bombings themselves. For example, Tariq Modood, arguably the most 
prominent advocate of multiculturalism in the UK, recently contended that 
multiculturalism has always been a form of integration; it just insists upon integration 
on equal terms.42 Anne Phillips has made a similar defence. Phillips, however, does 
acknowledge one thing: that the language of multiculturalism has not always helped. 
Multiculturalists have never viewed segregation as a worthwhile aim, but, as Zygmunt 
Bauman has said, the term invites confusion 
 
because it suggests not just cultural variety, but variety of cultures. More exactly, 
it suggests cultural systems or totalities—each more or less complete or self-
sustained, each to some degree self-contained and “integrated”—so that all its 
ingredients, like cultural norms, values and precepts, are interdependent. The 
term conjures up a vision of relatively enclosed cultural worlds living next to 
each other.43 
 
One of the main problems, Phillips argues, is that “culture” has become a euphemism 
for many different things. As she explains: 
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Culture is now widely employed ... as the acceptable way of referring to race, 
such that people ... talk about their being many cultural minorities when really 
they mean many people who are black. Some of this is camouflage, with 
people concealing their racism behind a language of culture. But much of it 
reflects an uncertainty about the term race, and a perception that any use of it 
could be seen as racist. This can lead to an exaggeration of cultural difference 
where cultural classification is not really the point.... In the United States, 
multiculturalism became a way of talking—but not really talking—about racial 
disadvantage and inequality, which then got refracted through the prism of 
cultural difference....44  
 
Although Phillips is not explicit about this point, I would argue that a similar comment 
can be made about religion and theology. Uncomfortable about discussing theology, 
scholars talk in terms of community, culture and identity instead. There may be some 
good reasons for this, but there are drawbacks too. To illustrate, consider Modood’s 
multiculturalism. It begins with what he calls “the fact of negative difference”: the fact 
that some groups—ethnic and religious—are stigmatised, disadvantaged and denigrated 
in many different spheres of life.45 He accordingly advocates remedial measures such as 
the monitoring of religion and ethnicity in employment to prevent discrimination46 and 
allowances for non-Christian religious holidays.47 He also recognises that stigmatised 
groups may need to mobilise to counter prejudices and entrenched disadvantages—and 
because religious groups can be stigmatised on religious grounds, multicultural societies 
ought to recognise religious mobilisations as legitimate. Indeed, Modood criticises Will 
Kymlicka’s multiculturalism (which is based on the Canadian case)48 for paying too little 
attention to the claims of religious minorities.49 
 
Beyond this point, though, certain weaknesses emerge in Modood’s argument. One of 
the main points he makes is that religious identities (such as Muslim, Jew or Hindu) can 
be viewed as comparable to ethnic, gender or class identities (such as black, woman or 
proletarian), and ought to be treated in a similar way. Those who make a claim upon 
Muslim identity in public life should be treated in the same manner as those who make 
a claim upon female, black or working class identity: they should not be unquestioningly 
respected, but nor should they be vilipended.50 Muslims may have distinctive needs (for 
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prayer spaces, or occasional breaks from work), but so also do women (for maternity 
leave, or more flexible working hours). Indeed, Modood stresses that recognition and 
inclusion of Muslims qua Muslims need not mean the promotion of religious leaders or 
the privileging of a religious tradition because the “sense of feeling that one must speak 
up as a Muslim is ... nothing necessarily to do with religiosity.”51 One does not need, he 
notes, to have any interest in the Islamic tradition to be stigmatised, disadvantaged and 
denigrated for being a Muslim. (This is why discrimination law in the UK covers both 
religion and perceived religion.) Nor does one have to be interested in Islam to feel a 
sense of frustration at the plight of Muslims elsewhere in the world who have been 
subjected to abuse or colonial interference. Modood advocates a “moderate” secularism 
and thus maintains that “[r]eligious discourses are legitimate civic discourses,”52 but he 
generally prefers to discuss Muslims in terms of identity, culture and community. The 
following quote illustrates his approach well:  
 
As Peter Jones says, “the recognition that is demanded is the recognition of a 
group of people rather than at a system of belief ... [e.g.] ... what the majority is 
called upon to recognise is not Islam but Muslims—not a religious faith but 
those that subscribe to it.”53 Even “subscribe” is probably too strong; or at 
least it doesn’t mark where religion begins, for that is (in the present case) not 
those who subscribe to a faith but those who identify with the Muslim family 
of communities.54 
 
Modood’s point here is, of course, sensible: one doesn’t have to subscribe to a religion 
to “belong” to it. (Over the last couple of decades church attendance in the UK has 
hovered around the ten percent mark,55 yet over seventy percent of people claimed to 
be Christian in the 2001 census.)56 Even so, there are risks to this approach. Modood is 
quite right to say that Muslim identity goes beyond religious belief, but religious belief is 
also more than just a matter of identity. A person may not choose their Muslim identity, 
in just the same way as a person from a working class background may not choose their 
working class identity. However, just as Marxism exists as a body of ideas that shapes 
identities and social formations and that needs to be incorporated into public, political 
discussion, so too does the Islamic tradition. The politics of Marxism is not just the 
politics of working class people’s backgrounds, and the politics of Islam is not just the 
politics of Muslim people’s backgrounds. Modood is right about the need to allow for 
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mobilisations against prejudice and entrenched disadvantage, but there is also a need to 
consider how Islam relates to questions about the good life and the good society, and 
he does not explore these in as much depth. 
 
To see why such an in-depth exploration might be necessary, it is useful to recall what I 
mentioned at the start of the chapter: that Islam in the UK has been changing, and that 
this process has engendered a certain amount of dissonance between older and younger 
generations. (I go into much greater detail about this in Chapter 4.) Recent interview 
and ethnographic research offers numerous instances of younger Muslims arguing that 
the older generation “gets religion and culture mixed up.”57 Richard Gale and Therese 
O’Toole cite the following example of a young Turkish woman living in France, which 
can act as a brief but striking illustration: 
 
When I discovered my religious sources ... I realised that Islam gave me rights 
my father had forbidden me: studies, my assent for choosing a husband who 
was not necessarily Turkish, etc.... I proved to my parents they had confused 
the traditions of their little village with the religion.58 
 
In this case, as with the others, the younger individual does not identify with the form 
of Islam that prevails in Modood’s “Muslim family of communities.” On the contrary, 
an alternative interpretation of the Islamic tradition is offered as a way of opposing and 
trying to alter the dominant norms within Europe’s Muslim communities. Modood’s 
critics, who tend to be less sympathetic toward religious beliefs, have frequently accused 
him of supporting a model of politics that gives undue influence to religious elders or 
to self-styled “community representatives.”59 In truth, these criticisms tend to distort his 
argument, and some seem to be based upon a general dislike of religious argumentation. 
Yet it is easy enough to see how the emphasis Modood places upon identification with 
a community, rather than a religious orientation, could lead to this problem. A liberal 
political ethic, even one that does not rule out formal recognition of people’s social 
identities and group interests, thus has to be able to give consideration to differences in 
religious understanding, whether these relate to marital norms, faith schools, legal 
pluralism or any other significant matter. I cannot see how this can be done without at 
least some attention being paid to theology—that is to say, not just acknowledgement 
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of religious identities, but consideration of the different theological stances that people 
of faith identify with. As Maleiha Malik argues: 
 
If all positions are granted “equal respect” without any enquiry into what they 
are or why they are valued, then—arguably—this is a “hollow” version of 
recognition. The respect and recognition sought—and the argument that there 
should be better understanding of faith-based arguments—require some 
attention to the claim by insiders that these have value.60 
 
 
1.6.    Marginalising theological conceptions 
 
Yet as I have been suggesting, this is where one encounters reluctance. Instead of this 
kind of careful attention, one frequently comes across attempts to talk around, not 
about, commitments that have a link to theology. One finds this problem, for instance, 
in the spirited defence of multiculturalism put forward by Anthony Giddens. Like 
Modood, Giddens resists the claim that multicultural policies have been responsible for 
greater ethnic segregation and violent Islamic radicalism. He observes that, contrary to 
popular assumptions, Britain is actually becoming more mixed in ethnic terms, not 
segregated.61 He argues the vast majority of troubles witnessed recently in which Islam 
appears to have played a significant role have normally had larger structural causes: 
most can be explained, he contends, either by international geopolitical upheavals or by 
the forms of personal distress engendered by the trauma of migration and settling in a 
new country across generations.62 Finally, he maintains that, contrary to what many 
newspapers may report, most Muslims both in the UK and in other European states 
feel little or no contradiction between their faith and their nationality—partly because, 
and Giddens is particularly careful to highlight this, many of the Muslims that currently 
live in Britain are not actually very religious at all.63 
 
Giddens’s arguments are all perfectly sensible by and large, and all his statements have a 
decent basis in evidence.64 The problem, however, is that he rebuts all these stereotypes 
by arguing that Islam is not the issue.65 The Islamic tradition is pictured as insignificant, 
even trivial. Of course, this is a perfectly sensible line of defence against some charges, 
particularly given that it has become common to see “Islam” being cited sans phrase as 
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an explanation for everything from rioting youths to economic failure and political 
violence. However, it leaves frustratingly unanswered the objection that while the 
majority of Muslims (as an ethno-religious group) are decent citizens, Islam (the moral 
tradition) still remains irrational, backward, patriarchal and so on. It leaves the faint 
impression that the UK’s Muslims will fit in within British society only when they 
remain loosely connected to Islam—meaning, of course, that the more committed a 
person is to the tradition the more likely he or she is to struggle to settle or to cause 
problems. This does not seem sufficient given sociological evidence indicating increased 
emphasis upon religious identity among some Muslims.66 Nor does it get to the really 
significant question concerning how Islam (as a moral tradition) and the UK (as a locus 
of public values) should relate. Giddens’s account does not consider how to bring Islam 
into what Rawls calls an “overlapping consensus.” 
 
 
1.7.   The structure of the thesis 
 
This gives an initial indication of the argument that I shall advance in the chapters that 
make up this thesis, which are set out in the following way. I begin in Chapter 2 with an 
extended critique of Rawls’s conception of public reason. This chapter is almost entirely 
theoretical, although I should emphasise that my interest in it is not simply abstract and 
in one philosopher. The chapter’s main purpose is to examine the proposition that 
talking about religion in public is not conducive to a well-functioning polity in which 
respect is given to each person’s conception of the good. I argue against this idea, but in 
doing so I also try to show that the opposition between liberalism and religion is not as 
strong as many people seem to think. I consider how public reason might be re-cast, at 
the same time arguing indirectly against the idea that religion is inherently irrational, and 
suggest possible benefits of using religious reasons in public. While this chapter does 
differ clearly from the others, it sets out an argument the later chapters, particularly 
those toward the end, provide support for. 
 
The remainder of the thesis is more straightforwardly “sociological” in tenor. In 
Chapter 3 I set out the details of the research on which it is based, explaining in more 
detail the reasons behind my choice of research focus. This chapter also considers the 
difficulties involved in determining the role theology plays in society. Its main concern 
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is with debates about Islam in the UK, and how they have been often based upon an 
abstract and stereotyped picture of the faith that tends to lead to gross exaggerations of 
its influence within different societies. The chapter also considers the limitations of the 
approach used in the thesis, focusing especially on the problems of drawing on clerics, 
scholars and activists as a source of material. 
 
The core of the thesis, from Chapter 4 to Chapter 7, articulates the emergence of new 
centres of Islamic knowledge production and debate, and endeavours to place them in 
wider public, political discussions. Chapter 4 has the central task of providing a brief 
description of Islam in Britain and explaining the background against which new 
initiatives and interpretations have emerged. It begins by giving details of the changes to 
the Islamic tradition in Britain that have taken place in recent decades and of tensions 
between older and younger generations. It then goes on to explain how, in response to 
these (and other) tensions, a number of Islamic activists, civil society practitioners and 
intellectuals have stepped out of their “comfort zones” and begun to explore new ways 
of disseminating Islamic knowledge. In doing so this chapter introduces the three 
organisations I focus on and some key thinkers. 
 
Chapter 5 begins to explore the ways that the more innovative intellectuals that one 
finds in these new initiatives relate to Islamic authority, primarily in Britain but also, 
necessarily, elsewhere too. I explore some of the ways in which different Muslim 
intellectuals understand issues of national belonging and participation and consider how 
their arguments make use of, and in some cases unsettle or challenge, dominant 
traditions and forms of Islamic authority. This requires a discussion of the character of 
authority in Islam and its differences from Christianity, and also a brief description of 
the recent “crisis” in traditional Islamic authority.  
 
Chapter 6 alters the focus slightly to concentrate directly upon debates between Muslim 
scholars and organisations, using the organisations I study as a window onto debates 
about the tradition in the UK. It explains how different forms of Islamic theology 
contribute to debates about Islamic law, and particularly the relationship between 
Islamic and civil law in Britain. In this chapter I outline the character of the legal 
tribunals operating in the UK and the reasons why there were established in the 1980s. 
I then go on to articulate the details of disputes going on within, between and beyond 
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them. The chapter shows that many voices contribute to these debates, and links this to 
my earlier argument about public reason.  
 
Chapter 7 concentrates upon debates over the relationship of the government in the 
UK to Islamic organisations. It provides a description of how the most influential 
Muslim representative organisations came into being, and the role of both Labour and 
Conservative governments in the process. It examines the ambivalence that Muslim 
scholars and activists demonstrate toward support of Islamic groups by government, 
and uses the discussion to examine questions about the pros and cons of formal links 
between religion and state. This discussion is of great importance to the emergence of 
new Islamic theologies because, as I explain, the state in the UK has taken a keen 
interest in fostering a distinctive “British Islam.” 
 
In Chapter 8, the concluding chapter of the thesis, I recapitulate some key details 
uncovered over the course of the previous four chapters and relate these back to the 
arguments outlined in this chapter and in Chapter 2. I argue that open expression of the 
full range of religious and secular worldviews offers the best way to develop a 
productive and durable overlapping consensus. I also contend, returning to debates 
over multiculturalism and nationalism, that such openness to a diversity of religious and 
secular traditions can be used to move past the often unproductive conflict between 
cultural pluralism and national identity. The thesis ends with a call, directed not just at 
the wider public sphere but to scholars too, to engage more carefully with the diversity 
of goods in which people are interested. This is based upon my worry that even many 
scholars tend to do one of two things: either give respect to religious identities without 
paying attention to religious traditions, or caricature any moral conceptions that seem to 
be associated in some way with religious belief. I argue for an attitude toward religious 
belief similar to that advocated by the Christian historian Stephen Tomkins, who has 
said the following of his own convictions: 
 
Unlike some protesters, the respect I want from my beliefs is not that people 
should be nice about them even if they’re dangerously wrong, but that they 
should listen to and engage and argue with them.67 
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2. Religious talk in public 
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2.1.   The many meanings of “secularism” 
 
Few words in English engender greater confusion than the term secularism. It seems to 
mean very different things for different people, and in consequence tends to provoke 
wildly different responses. For some, the word implies a positive ideology, a vision of 
the world and humanity’s place in it. For others, it indicates something vacant, a neutral 
space where different people may meet. Some view it as opposed to religion, others as 
essentially indifferent to religion, and still others as needed by religion, something 
without which religions will never flourish. A good example of a negative interpretation 
is offered by Talal Asad in his book Formations of the Secular, in which he says the 
following on the subject:   
 
From the point of view of secularism, religion has the option either of 
confining itself to private belief and worship or of engaging in public talk that 
makes no demands on life.... So the attempt by Muslim activists to ameliorate 
social conditions—through, say, the establishment of clinics or schools in 
underserviced areas—must seriously risk provoking the charge of political 
illegitimacy and being classified Islamist.68  
 
Asad pictures secularism as a stifling, even an oppressive thing. Such is the scope and 
ambition of the modern state—it regulates, he says, “all aspects of individual life,” even 
the “most intimate, such as birth and death”—that it is inevitably a barrier to anyone 
who wishes to reform life. Yet the religious believer cannot make any efforts to change 
things without being viewed as a problem. Religious people who draw on their faith to 
make an argument are, according the principles of secularism, violating norms, failing to 
abide by the rules. They must therefore bracket—even annihilate—their sentiments. If 
they do not they risk being viewed as a political threat, especially, Asad implies, if they 
happen to be Muslims.  
 
But, of course, there are those who see it the other way around, as liberating—and not 
only atheists and agnostics seeking to get away from what they consider to be 
threatening religious organisations, but religionists too. The American Muslim legal 
scholar Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, for example, has not only written a defence of 
secularism, but has gone so far as to argue that only when living in a secular context can 
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one fully be a Muslim.69 In a different religious context, the theologian Jonathan 
Chaplin has formulated a “Christian secularism.”70 That Chaplin does not view this as a 
contradiction in terms should offer a reminder that what one person means by the 
word may not be the same as everyone else.  
 
In fact, given that the word seems to point in many different directions at once, 
signifying many different things, it can be tempting whenever anyone uses the term to 
prompt him or her to specify what precisely they mean by it, or even to give up on it as 
hopelessly overburdened. Yet it is worth noting that, even despite the fact that they 
have very different views of secularism, both Asad and An-Na’im refer to roughly the 
same principle or norm, namely, that in liberal democracies there must be certain 
contexts in which claims upon religious traditions, or religious truth, are not made, are 
deemed inappropriate. Secularism is about where one can refer to one’s religious (or 
even non-religious) beliefs, and in what manner. The question may not be, then, what it 
means, but where and to whom it applies. Those subtle differences in application are what 
I want to concentrate on in this chapter. 
 
 
2.2.  Clarifying liberalism and religion 
 
My reasons for wanting to talk about this topic should be fairly clear from what I said 
in the previous chapter. To repeat what I said there, my main aim in this thesis is to 
document some of the ways in which Islam is being worked out in the UK, how it is 
being discussed or negotiated. Yet as Asad intimates in the passage above, even talk 
about religion can be seen as inappropriate, particularly when that talk moves out of 
places of worship and into other domains. I also indicated that part of this process of 
“working out” might involve developing some kind of relationship with the UK, but 
should there even be any “relationship” between religious traditions and ostensibly 
secular polities, and if so what kind exactly? 
 
That is the reason why, to restate my aims in a bit more detail, I want here to clarify and 
critically discuss what liberals have had to say on where and when religious claims 
should be considered inappropriate or divisive. My main point of focus will be on 
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forms of liberal philosophy that have advocated reticence about religion in public, with 
my analysis concentrating on John Rawls, probably the most influential liberal 
philosopher over the last fifty or so years. Rawls, along similar lines to others such as 
Thomas Nagel and Bruce Ackerman, maintains that ideally talk in public should be 
conducted in terms of “public reason” alone. What is meant by this? It seems to imply 
that the goal of a liberal state is to remove references to religion from open forums. Is 
that what he really advocates, and if so why? 
 
This chapter will be largely theoretical, its examples, although not hypothetical, not 
related to concrete settings. Part of what I will be doing in this chapter is clarifying what 
Rawls and others argue, partly because their arguments are often misread, both by 
people sympathetic and hostile to religion. In particular, people tend to see Rawls as 
more hostile to religion than he is, which does little to correct stubborn stereotypes 
about liberalism and religion being old enemies. In addition, I will be making some 
criticisms of Rawls’s advocacy of public reason, for I do not find it convincing. I argue 
that encouraging reserve about religious convictions and beliefs is, while sensible in 
some contexts, unwise as a general rule. (As we shall see, this will involve identifying 
flaws in Rawlsian liberalism as such.) My worry is that this norm is making it harder to 
think sensibly about Islam in the UK, even making it seem like Islam is not something 
it is wise to have anything to do with. I argue that there may be, in fact, something to be 
gained by talking openly about religion: that religion needs to be articulated for a 
modern, plural polity to flourish and cohere. 
 
Nevertheless, my interest in this chapter is not simply in setting out a political 
philosophy I support and criticising those I don’t. In addition to making a general case 
about liberal political philosophy, my hope is this chapter will mutually support the 
sociological study that follows. In following chapters I look at spaces where religious 
figures meet to debate with lawyers and academics. I offer a sketch of some of the ways 
in which debate about Islam is moving out of traditional spaces such as mosques and 
centres of religious learning and into other non-traditional spaces, sometimes new 
media, at other times meeting halls. In Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 particularly I start to 
focus on discussions among Muslims in the UK about such things as civil and religious 
law, and relationships between religious scholars and the state. These chapters will, I 
43 
 
hope, give weight to what I have to say here, offering more detail backing up this 
theoretical argument about “talking God.”  
 
 
2.3.  The settlement and the paradox 
 
When talking about secularism, the obvious place to begin is with the state. It is now 
majority opinion in the UK that the state should not make religious claims because it is 
not possible, in a pluralistic context, to establish a popular government which has as its 
basis any specific worldview. No matter what worldview one chooses, there will always 
be some who do not adhere to it. Making one conception the basis of political 
legitimacy easily therefore leads, it is said, to unfairness, and perhaps even forms of 
coercion and repression, with, say, adherence to a particular dogma being made into a 
prerequisite for basic rights. Examples of this kind of thing spring all too easily to mind. 
One thinks of post-Reconquista Spain, for example, where all Jews and Muslims were 
forced to recant their faith or face punishment. One can easily find examples from the 
UK as well. Until the late eighteenth century only people who subscribed to the Thirty 
Nine Articles could go to university; the first English university to challenge this, 
University College London, was initially denied a charter.71 One way to express this, 
which Rawls prefers, is to say that it is unhelpful and unjust for a state to make a claim 
on truth: the “insistence upon the whole truth in politics [is] incompatible with 
democratic citizenship and the idea of legitimate law.”72 
 
What liberals consequently aim at is some variation of the settlement found in the US, 
where everyone is permitted the free exercise of their faith with the proviso that no 
particular faith should be established. Public institutions should not make a claim upon 
ultimate truth to enable everyone to, within a limited sphere, believe as they wish. An-
Na’im, in his affirmation of the secular state, views this as vital to any kind of Islamic 
belief. In his view, only when the state does not impose upon citizens a specific 
interpretation of Islam can one be a Muslim by conviction and free choice—and since 
that is the only way to authentically be a Muslim, one cannot flourish as a Muslim in a 
state that is not secular. This is not a view all Muslims in all parts of the world hold, of 
course; Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, An-Na’im’s teacher, was executed in 1985 by the 
Sudanese government for advocating similar ideas. But as an aside, it is perhaps worth 
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mentioning that the idea that inner conviction is a prerequisite for true belief, and that 
law has no bearing on this, has a long history in Islam. Consider the following example 
from Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111):  
 
The jurist speaks about what is correct and corrupt in islam ... but in this he 
pays no attention to anything but the tongue. As for the heart, that is outside 
the jurist’s authority [wilayat al-faqih].73 
 
These ideas, of course, are familiar and accepted by the majority of people, not just in 
the US and Europe but many other areas. The fact that they are now customary can, 
though, lead people to assume that the issue is more straightforward that it actually is. 
On the one hand, it can appear as though truth is not actually relevant to a modern, 
secular state. Even if atheism is entirely “true,” it would still be unjust to deny rights to 
religious people on that basis, the clearest example of this being the Terror in France, 
which saw clergy deported and executed. Young Earth creationists, who are wrong, still 
need to have a degree of freedom, and should not be persecuted if they refuse to admit 
that theories of evolution are correct. It seems, then, that there cannot be any 
conception of truth at the heart of political life, whether that is theistic, atheistic, non-
theistic, Marxist or whatever else. However, the state is, as Asad correctly observes 
above, inescapably an ethical institution. Just because it chooses not to publicly affirm a 
specific comprehensive worldview this does not mean that it can be entirely neutral on 
questions about the good or truth. Obviously, a public education system cannot be 
neutral regarding the teaching of science. In the area of law, too, the state determines 
the legitimate taking of life and decides when and with whom one may get married. So 
if a government must make these decisions, on what conceptions of truth and life 
should they be based? In the case of abortion, for example, the state decides on when a 
foetus counts as a human with ethical significance. Even the fundamental principle that 
it is not right for a state to affirm a specific conception of truth needs justification: it 
seems to rely on the claim that treating a person with dignity involves allowing him or 
her to discover, explore and commit individually, and reject the counterclaim that to 
treat someone in a dignified way is to treat him or her in the way a truly good or a truly 
wise person would wish to be treated.74 There appears to be a tension between the 
neutral state and the ethical state, in short. This may help explain why the history of 
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liberalism is full of paradoxical images, such as George Washington placing his hand on 
a Bible and swearing to uphold a Godless constitution. 
 
 
2.4.  Pluralism and political liberalism 
 
This tension sits right at the heart of Rawls’s work, and in my view he never found a 
way of dealing with it adequately (although in fairness, I’m not sure that anyone has). 
Rawls made his name in the 1970s with his book A Theory of Justice, which tried to spell 
out a fair way of distributing goods, rewards and opportunities within a society (or what 
is formally known as a theory of distributive justice).75 His theory was developed using a 
now-famous thought experiment in which he asked what society everyone would give 
their assent to if they were all placed behind a “veil of ignorance” that made them 
unaware of their respective social positions. The people behind the veil of ignorance 
have no knowledge of their status (man or woman, master or slave) or their abilities 
(clever or foolish, fast or slow), so they should, Rawls reasoned, be able to reach 
agreement on society’s organisation fairly easily. 
 
However, Rawls did not just eliminate physical attributes and roles but also people’s 
“conceptions of the good”: their fundamental beliefs and what the ends are that they 
will want to pursue. This, of course, raises the question of how a person will be able to 
decide how society should be arranged if they have jettisoned their understanding of the 
good life. As an answer to this, Rawls suggested that even without a conception of the 
good people will still retain “primary goods,” or things that a “rational man wants 
irrespective of whatever else he wants.”76 He stripped down the human subject to what 
he considered to be its “original position.” Behind all our religious beliefs and other 
commitments, he implied, lies a universal subject who sees things a certain way. This 
led Rawls to the conclusion that everyone in the original position will want the same 
basic system of justice. One can, he said, “view the agreement in the original position 
from the standpoint of one person selected at random.”77 From many different types of 
person, he distilled one conception of justice. 
 
After the publication of A Theory of Justice, however, Rawls became dissatisfied with his 
approach. A number of powerful critiques of it were published that showed how 
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Rawls’s original position excluded people for whom some role or commitment (being 
Christian,  Sikh or  woman) is so fundamental to them that they would not be able to 
understand their goals without it.78 Rawls de-linked the nature of the person from the 
aims that he or she has. Yet for many people a different conception of human nature 
informs quite different ideas about human flourishing. Rawls came to concede that not 
all those who disagreed could simply be seen as irrational. As he observed in his later 
book Political Liberalism, “a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive 
doctrines is the normal result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of 
the free institutions of a constitutional democratic regime.”79 He conceded also that if 
his theory, with its conception of human nature, was used to legitimate a state’s actions 
it would be in effect imposing his view.80 Rawls, being a liberal, decided that this would 
not be a just outcome, and so concluded that his conception of justice needed to be 
“re-cast” because, he acknowledged, “it is inconsistent with realising its own principles 
under the best of foreseeable conditions.”81  
 
Instead, he devised an unusual—if not novel82—alternative. Justice, Rawls now stressed, 
should be viewed as “political not metaphysical.”83 By “political” he meant that a 
conception of justice should not base itself on any worldview, should remain on the 
surface, philosophically speaking. Political institutions should be entirely “free-
standing,” with no basis in a conception of truth, and be acceptable to all the major 
religious, philosophical and moral traditions. He contrasted this “political” form of 
liberalism with other “comprehensive” forms, and this terminology has now become 
common in Anglophone political theory. 
 
To explain this distinction, it is useful to refer to the liberalism advocated by J. S. Mill. 
Mill’s liberalism was “comprehensive” in the sense that it was based upon a conception 
of a well-lived life, a conception rooted in the idea that without critical reflection 
people’s innate natures are stifled. For a good illustration, consider this passage from 
the third chapter of his essay On Liberty: 
 
He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for 
him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He 
who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. He must use 
observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather 
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materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, 
firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision. And these qualities 
he requires and exercises exactly in proportion as the part of his conduct 
which he determines according to his own judgment and feelings is a large 
one. It is possible that he might be guided in some good path, and kept out of 
harm’s way, without any of these things. But what will be his comparative 
worth as a human being?84  
 
Mill’s famous argument in On Liberty that “the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others”85 is based partly on this argument: people should not be just 
told what to do even if it is right, because the good life is encountered in the process of 
pondering alternatives and making choices. Mill’s argument recognises the need for 
religious liberty, of course, but it also implies that it may be acceptable for the state to 
use its persuasive apparatus to wean people away from religions based upon a system of 
piety or the unquestioning respect of elders.86 According to Rawls’s political liberalism, 
this is going too far and using state power for the wrong ends. Political liberalism 
should seek the consent of all reasonable (more on this term later) comprehensive 
doctrines by asking them to accept some basic political values, such as citizen equality, 
but not make any claims about the purpose or nature of life. It is not given legitimacy 
by any one philosophical argument but instead seeks to develop an “overlapping 
consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines.”  
 
 
2.5.   False tensions between liberalism and religion  
 
Supporters of Rawlsian political liberalism are often at pains to show that political 
liberalism takes a more moderate position in relation to religion than comprehensive 
liberalism does, and they do have some grounds for this.87 Political liberalism rejects in 
no uncertain terms what Rowan Williams calls a “programmatic” secularism that seeks 
to gain control and establish a “secular creed” like Millian individualism.88 In addition to 
this, Stephen Macedo has argued that the approach supported by political liberalism is 
less drastic in its way of dealing with everyday public decisions. For example, public 
education, rather than inculcating critical autonomy of the sort Mill affirmed, will aim to 
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simply teach what a person needs to know to get by in a democratic society, such as the 
different ideas and concepts that one is likely encounter.89 Perhaps most significantly of 
all, political legitimacy is based upon the overlapping consensus of the many rather than 
a theory of rights grounded in one specific worldview, so it appears that a space is left 
open for all philosophical conceptions, religious and non-religious, to relate to, invest in 
and judge the state on their own terms.  
 
This appearance is arguably a little deceptive, though, for Rawls, Macedo and other 
political liberals stress the need to only to employ “public reasons” when entering into 
debates over political decisions.90 In public, Rawls seems to suggest, religious discourse 
has no place. This may be the most contentious aspect of Rawls’s later work, and a 
number of critics, such as Stephen L. Carter and Michael Perry in the US, and Chaplin 
and Veit Bader in Europe, have raised objections to it, at times in uncompromising 
language.91 Stephen Prothero, a historian of religion, has said of Rawls that he insists 
“religion restrict itself to the individual heart, the pious home, and the religious 
congregation; religion is a private matter that will contaminate civil society if not 
quarantined from public life.”92 Political Liberalism has even been characterised as the 
work of a “secular fundamentalist”93 whose author regards religion as “presumptively 
irrational” and therefore in need of “containment.”94 
 
As I have already indicated, this chapter is not going to be a defence of Rawls’s 
argument regarding public reason; I believe it is flawed. Even so, it is necessary to begin 
by pointing out that, with the exception of Bader, these critics tend to distort his stance 
when making their objections to it. As Kwame Anthony Appiah has commented, “the 
adherents of ‘political liberalism’ have never been quite so coercively monistic as their 
critics often represent them.”95 By painting him as akin to polemicists such as Richard 
Dawkins and A. C. Grayling, they not just misrepresent Rawls’s theories, but probably 
also Rawls the person: he did, after all, consider a career in the clergy and wrote about 
the meaning of sin and faith when younger.96 The main problem is his critics often fail 
to grasp what Rawls means by “public” and “public reason.” This leads to distortions 
of his stance and a needlessly hostile argument that ultimately makes liberalism appear 
much more oppositional than it really is. 
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Take the notion of the “public,” first of all. As Jürgen Habermas emphasises in The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, one should always be careful to differentiate 
between, on the one hand, public spaces where people discuss what is good and bad 
about the society in which they live and, on the other, the apparatuses of state.97 Both 
of these are “public” domains, but they are not the same, and ruling out religious 
speech in one is a very different thing to ruling it out in the other. If religious discourse 
were to be restricted or barred within the institutions of state it could be conceivably 
defended as being necessary to ensure “non-establishment” of a particular religion. If, 
however, religious discourse was prohibited within wider civil society that would 
seriously restrict religious freedom.  
 
In his most detailed statement on the subject,98 Rawls is quite clear that when he talks 
about the need to limit religious speech in public settings he primarily has in mind three 
specific contexts: first, judges in office; second, legislators enacting laws; and third, any 
candidates for political office. He distinguishes between these contexts and what he 
refers to as the “background culture,” by which he means not only places of worship 
but clubs, teams, societies, educational institutions and the media—civil society, in 
short.99 He argues also, in my view correctly, that many critics of his argument about 
restricting religious discourse in public assume he is talking about civil society when he 
is not; he certainly does not argue that religious discourse should be banned in civil 
society, as that would be incompatible with freedom of speech.100 This is not necessarily 
to say, of course, that a complete restriction on religious discourse in public 
institutions—the contexts that Rawls identifies—is wise: there may be a good case for 
saying that sometimes candidates for office should be allowed to employ religious 
rhetoric, or that debates in parliament might on occasion carefully use moral 
justifications from religious traditions. Even so, it is worth spelling out Rawls’s position 
to lessen the risk of talking at cross-purposes. 
 
 
2.6.   The justification for public reason 
 
Having said that, Rawls still claims that in an ideal situation citizens in a liberal state will 
not baldly state their comprehensive doctrines while debating with one another, but will 
act “as if they were legislators.”101 While he is careful to stress that this should only ever be a 
50 
 
moral rather than a legal obligation, he nevertheless thinks reticence about one’s 
religious convictions is generally for the best. (This is the claim I am going be 
concentrating on in this chapter.) The reason for this is Rawls sees it as beneficial, 
maybe even vital, to conduct debates in terms that everyone can agree on, or that 
everyone can share.102 In this, Rawls comes very close to the position of Richard Rorty 
who, despite adhering to a philosophy very much at odds with Rawls’s, was perhaps 
even more sceptical about religious discourse. Rorty memorably characterised religion 
as a “conversation stopper,” responding to Carter’s argument that religious debate in 
public life is healthy with the following: 
 
Saying [that you oppose abortion based on God’s will] is far more likely to end 
a conversation than to start an argument. The same goes for telling the group, 
“I would never have an abortion” or, “Reading pornography is about the only 
pleasure I get out of life these days.” In these examples … the ensuing silence 
masks the group’s inclination to say, “So what? We weren’t discussing your 
private life; we were discussing public policy. Don’t bother us with matters 
that are not our concern.”103 
 
The only appropriate response to such a claim, Rorty goes on to argue, is, “OK, but 
since I don’t think there is such a thing as the will of God, and since I doubt that we’ll 
get anywhere arguing theism vs. atheism, let’s see if we have some shared premises on 
the basis of which to continue.”104 In Political Liberalism Rawls advocates a very similar 
position, emphasising the need for reciprocity, which means avoiding contested ideas 
on the grounds that others see things differently. Rawls’s stance has been summarised 
clearly by Chaplin in the following list: 
 
1. A liberal democracy is based on the principle of political equality; 
2. Political equality means that citizens should adopt a duty of respect towards 
one another in political debate; 
3. The duty of respect requires that citizens only offer reasons for the public 
policies they advocate that everyone equally can find intelligible and acceptable 
in principle; 
4. Religious reasons can only be found intelligible and acceptable by some 
citizens, and indeed are repudiated by many; 
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5. Therefore, religious reasons should not be employed to justify public 
policies, and; 
6. To employ religious reasons to justify a policy—to seek “justification by 
faith alone”—is disrespectful and inadmissible.105 
 
This means there are only limited circumstances when revealing or explaining one’s 
core beliefs is appropriate. Rawls supports two types of religious speech. The first is 
what he calls a “declaration,” where a person conveys details of his beliefs in order to 
demonstrate, without expecting everyone to agree with those beliefs, how they can 
support political liberalism. The second form of speech he applauds he describes as 
“conjecture,” by which he means an instance where a person explains his convictions to 
convey his intentions and motivations and to correct common misunderstandings and 
remedy any suspicions.106 The importance of these forms of speech should not be 
underestimated: after all, today Muslims are constantly suspected of not supporting 
liberal democracy on account of assumptions about the nature and character of Islam 
and the legal traditions associated with it. If someone said that “Muslims shouldn’t be 
allowed to establish religious institutions in Britain because Islamic law fails to respect 
the basic political division between public life and private worship,” Rawls would see 
nothing wrong with someone retorting with: “In actual fact, most forms of Islamic law 
have stressed the need to respect people’s privacy, have a strong tradition of the public 
good [maslaha], and have maintained a separation between worship [ibadat] and civil 
relations [mu‘amalat].”107 Nevertheless, articulating a disagreement in a public debate by 
making reference to one’s religious convictions is frowned upon, and could possibly 
lead to one’s position being regarded as improper or inadmissible, or what Rawls 
prefers just to describe as “unreasonable.” 
 
 
2.7.  Secular reason and public reason 
 
At this point one ought to ask an obvious and really important question: What does it 
actually mean to just argue using “public reasons”? Again, Rawls’s argument on this is 
frequently misunderstood—although to be honest, one can make a decent argument 
that any confusion is partly Rawls’s fault. To get to the heart of it, it is helpful to look at 
the similar position of another liberal philosopher, Robert Audi. On the face of it, 
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Rawls and Audi seem to make very similar arguments about legitimate justifications in 
public debate: both suggest that religious reasons may be offered at any time in a public 
debate if they are accompanied by a public reason (in Rawls’s case) or a secular reason 
(in Audi’s). But what Audi appears to mean by a secular reason, at least going by the 
definition given in some of his essays, is very different to what Rawls understands by a 
public reason. A secular reason, Audi says, is 
 
roughly one whose normative force does not evidentially depend on the 
existence of God or on theological considerations, or on the pronouncements 
of a person or institution qua religious authority.108 
 
This definition, although ambiguous, seems to privilege some forms of justification 
over others. If one adopts this definition and then follows Audi’s argument then it 
would be legitimate to refer in a public debate to a non-religious comprehensive 
doctrine but not to a religious comprehensive doctrine.109 To put this more clearly, the 
argument, “We must all respect one another because we are God’s creatures” would be 
seen as inadmissible while the argument, “We must respect one another because we are 
all autonomous agents capable of rational reflection” would not. Or, to give another 
example, in a debate in parliament I would be, if I were an MP, allowed to say that 
“Abortions should be legal because the soul doesn’t exist,” but not “Abortion is against 
God’s law.” Such religious justifications would only be allowed into a debate if they 
were “chaperoned” by a secular reason.110 
 
Although his critics rarely acknowledge it,111 Rawls thinks this is unfair. One cannot 
claim that believers have no right to base their views on their religious faith whereas 
atheists have every right to base theirs on Enlightenment philosophy. This creates a 
disparity, with the non-believer’s conception of the good being given greater respect 
that the believer’s. If one is going to be fair one must exclude judgements based both on 
the existence of God and those based on the non-existence of God. Elsewhere, Audi 
gives a longer definition that differs slightly: 
 
I am taking a secular reason as roughly one whose normative force does not 
evidentially depend on the existence of God (or on denying it) or on 
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theological considerations, or on the pronouncements of a person or 
institution qua religious authority.112 
 
This is much closer to what Rawls means by public reason. According to Rawls’s norm 
of public reason one should not be encouraged to make the argument that “Abortion 
should not be allowed because there is no such thing as a human soul” any more than 
one should be to argue that “Abortion should be banned because a soul enters into a 
foetus at conception.” To try and make the point completely clear, Rawls states that 
“one must distinguish public reason from what is sometimes referred to as secular 
reason or secular values.”113 Citizens should be reticent not just about religious beliefs, 
but about all their ultimate convictions; people should attempt to avoid referring to 
what Rorty calls their “final vocabularies.”114  
 
By public reason, then, Rawls means reasons that refer only to “political values,” to 
values that do not involve a claim upon any contested doctrines or truths. Just as 
political liberalism should, according to Rawls, be intelligible and acceptable to all 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines, so too should all political values be intelligible to 
every reasonable person. Both political liberalism and political values remain on the 
philosophical surface. Indeed, debating in the terms of public reason entails not even 
disputing the veracity of the comprehensive doctrines that one doubts. “Central to the 
idea of public reason,” Rawls emphasises, “is that it neither criticises nor attacks any 
comprehensive doctrine, religious or non-religious, except insofar as it is incompatible 
with the essentials of public reason and a democratic polity.”115 So just as atheists can 
legitimately complain about evangelists who argue that unbelief inevitably leads to 
immorality, so too can theists legitimately object to “New Atheists” who portray faith 
as a little more than a form of madness. 
 
Now, one might think having a debate (which, after all, implies disagreement) is not 
likely to be very useful if everyone must be able to accept all the values that are going to 
be appealed to in the dispute. Rawls, however, disagrees, and goes to great lengths to 
try and demonstrate that significant debates—even those over religious issues—can be 
conducted making reference only to political values. He refers to a famous debate 
between Founding Fathers Patrick Henry (1736-1799) and James Madison (1751-1836) 
over the establishment of the Anglican Church in Virginia, where the men invoked not 
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the “risen Christ,” but instead debated whether or not knowledge of the Christian 
tradition transmitted through an established church was necessary in order for a 
peaceful society to be maintained. Debate, Rawls thus emphasises, can be conducted 
speaking only of good and bad, order and peace, without referring to the grander claims 
to truth that seem only to divide people. 
 
 
2.8.  The incoherence of free-standing justifications 
 
There is an immensely important question that should be asked of Rawls’s argument 
regarding public reason at this point. Does Rawls believe that there is no necessary link 
between political values (that relate to political institutions and that everyone can 
understand and accept) and comprehensive doctrines (that are deeply contested), and if 
so is he correct? On this question, Rawls’s position is not always clear,116 and this is why 
it is rather easy to misread his argument. Yet at points he very clearly indicates that 
political values should be seen as completely independent of comprehensive doctrines, 
and need not rely on any kind of philosophical grounding.117 This is clearest when he 
contends that all political values should be complete. “Political values,” Rawls maintains 
(in an unusually expressive paragraph), “are not puppets manipulated from behind the 
scenes by comprehensive doctrines.”118 As we have already seen, a polity in a modern 
state should be “free-standing” according to Rawls, and should not be in any way 
connected to or founded upon any comprehensive worldview or claim to truth. This 
“completeness requirement” (as Bader terms it)119 seems to imply that Rawls thinks that 
justifications can also be “free-standing,” referring only to the “political conception 
alone.” One can see this in the second of Audi’s definitions too: it implies one can make 
an argument that does not depend upon fundamental beliefs, including belief in God. 
This is where I want to introduce a first major disagreement, because I do not believe 
this argument stands up to scrutiny. 
 
At a superficial level, of course, arguments seem to be able to proceed without having 
need of comprehensive doctrines. Certainly, the majority of arguments I have had in my 
lifetime have not needed to make any explicit claims about ultimate reality, and only a 
few academic texts I have read do, with only a minority of those feeling the need to 
make a claim about God’s existence.120 One can be a Hindu, a Christian or an atheist 
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and argue about, say, the welfare state and most of the time being a Hindu, a Christian 
or an atheist will seem irrelevant. This gives a surface plausibility to the claim that 
justifications can be free-standing. 
 
Difficulties begin to emerge, however, when one looks beneath the surface. Let’s take 
two arguments from Rawls as examples: 
 
• Rawls argues that government should not have any interest in a particular 
form of family life, except insofar as that affects the “orderly reproduction 
of society over time.” This means he sees objections to same-sex marriage 
per se as reflecting comprehensive doctrines, and therefore improper. Due 
to family life being a personal affair, public reasons based on political 
values do not discuss such questions. He concedes, though, that one could 
argue that same-sex marriages are “destructive to the raising and educating 
of children.” (That is to say, the argument would be “political”; this does 
not mean Rawls agrees with it himself.)121 
• In the example of the establishment of the Church in Virginia, Rawls cites 
Henry, the pro-Establishment party in the dispute, claiming that “Christian 
knowledge hath a natural tendency to correct the morals of men, restrain 
their vices, and preserve the peace of society, which cannot be effected 
without the competent provision of learned teachers.”122 These are all 
acceptable for they refer only, Rawls argues (with a caveat about “vices”), 
to “basic political values, namely, the good and peaceable conduct of 
citizens,” not the truth of Christianity.123 
 
We have, then, certain values that should be regarded as “political” and that therefore 
one may use in debates about public life. One can refer to “the orderly reproduction of 
society over time,” to things that are “destructive to the raising and educating of 
children,” or to “good conduct” that makes possible “peaceful relations.” These are all 
political values because their principles apply only to “political and social institutions 
(the basic structure of society).”124 Yet this effort to neatly divide between political and 
non-political values fails. First of all, it tends to involve re-casting all arguments in 
instrumental terms. Rawls applauds Henry because he does not argue “for Christian 
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knowledge as a good in itself but rather as an effective way to achieve basic political 
values.”125 Public reason seems to require citizens to distance themselves from whatever 
doctrine they support, so the Christian no longer cares about Christianity per se, but only 
what Christian knowledge does for society. This, surely, will be fairly taxing for a 
devoted Christian (or a devoted atheist) to do, and virtually invites disingenuous 
arguments—a point that is particularly worth noting given that Rawls also argues that 
sincerity is of great significance to public reason.126 Arguing about whether or not same-
sex couples can adopt only in terms of social reproduction narrows discussion of the 
moral worth of same-sex relationships too. It might stop overt attacks on the private 
acts of same-sex couples, but it also places barriers in front of them if they want to 
argue that their love should be recognised as a good.  
 
The biggest problem with all the political values above, though, is that, as Bader has 
observed, they are all under-determined: they can be interpreted and applied in a variety of 
different ways.127 To illustrate, take one further example: dividing on gender lines in 
school. Education is, of course, part of what Rawls calls the “basic structure of society.” 
It plays a fundamental role in the “orderly reproduction of society.” Yet one can 
advocate very different systems of education while employing exactly the same terms. 
For some, separating boys and girls in education might be seen as conducive to the 
orderly reproduction of society through time. It might be viewed as helping children to 
develop mature relationships at the proper time. For others, orderly reproduction might 
mean a school in which the genders mix freely. This might be viewed as avoiding 
unhealthy sexual repression and heteronormativity—that is to say, the inculcation of 
social norms that presume heterosexuality. The political value is just the same, but the 
interpretations are quite different. So if one wants to see how these conclusions are 
reached one needs to look deeper: the first conception of orderly reproduction seems 
to fit with a philosophy of life that locates the good in long-term adult relationships and 
restraining adolescent whims and desires. The second fits much better with, say, a 
philosophy that emphasises the significance of being liberated from social constraints 
and listening only to one’s “voice within.” 
 
It is relatively easily to illustrate how these different positions might emanate from 
detailed philosophical conceptions. Traditionally in Islam, for example, the self is 
divided into components, the lubb and the nafs. The lubb is like a core or “seed” that 
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inclines toward what is ultimately meaningful in life, particularly the “signs of God” that 
point to the divine unity (tawhid) behind the manifoldness of phenomena. (The word 
ayatollah actually means “sign of God.”) The nafs, by contrast, is impulsive and follows 
its hawa, all those trivial desires that cannot be sated. The nafs inclines aimlessly to all 
amounts of money, food, sex, and power even though it is not really possible to have 
and to enjoy all these things. As a result, being directed by the nafs ultimately leads, it is 
said, to a deep sense of dissatisfaction.128 In general, therefore, the Islamic tradition has 
tended to support a degree of restraint, which has been interpreted as involving the 
management of libidinal desire, especially in public life. This includes, in the view of 
some Muslims, single-sex education. Not all Muslims see it this way, of course, but it is 
certainly true that there have been concerted campaigns by Muslims in Britain over the 
last three decades on this matter.129 Rawls’s argument appears to imply that these efforts 
should be regarded as “unreasonable.”  
 
Contrast that with what Robert Bellah et al. call “expressive individualism.”130 This 
worldview holds that every person has a unique core of feeling and intuition that should 
unfold or be expressed if individuality is to be realised. This core, although unique, is 
not necessarily alien to other persons or to nature. Under certain conditions the 
expressive individualist may find it possible to “merge” with other persons, with nature, 
or with the cosmos as a whole. The philosophy has its roots in Romanticism, and has 
been traced back to Rousseau.131 Today it is sometimes linked with the culture of 
psychotherapy, and more generally with an emphasis on revealing oneself through 
truthful expression. In some variations—such as in the poetry of Walt Whitman, for 
example—it has involved the celebration of bodily life, including celebration of human 
sexuality.132 For that reason the tradition has tended to be wary of techniques for the 
disciplining of sexual feeling. It celebrates—even sacralises—the self where the Islamic 
tradition stresses overcoming of the self. Sociological studies have demonstrated the 
tradition’s continued influence, both within the US133 and UK,134 rising in the twentieth 
century at the same time as sexual permissiveness has grown. This has coincided also 
with a slow decline in emphasis on single sex education. Clearly, it would be wrong to 
say these are the only two moral traditions that are “in the mix” when it comes to 
debating education in the UK; after all, gender-segregated education existed in the UK a 
long time before mass migration by Muslims (see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, one can see 
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how these different worldviews relate to this debate, and how it is surely difficult to just 
de-link them from public deliberations. 
 
Needless to say, these underpinnings seem to indicate that Rawls’s “completeness 
requirement” has significant problems. Indeed, they reveal a difficulty in his conception 
of public reason, which hinges on the ability of people to debate just using independent 
political values. Most importantly of all, this unavoidable reliance upon philosophical 
conceptions seems to hint at a general tension in his political liberalism as a whole. On 
the one hand, Rawls says today an overlapping consensus is needed, and to find that we 
need to ensure that many moral conceptions can support the state on their own terms. 
Yet on the other, Rawls constantly strives to disconnect these conceptions from 
debates about public matters by encouraging citizens to debate only in political values 
that, he insists, have to be self-sufficient.135 “What we cannot do in public reason,” 
Rawls says, “is to proceed directly from our comprehensive doctrine, or a part thereof, 
to one or several political principles and values....”136 Charles Taylor has noted the basic 
problem with this argument. Taylor is speaking in this passage of the book A Theory of 
Justice, but the point fits Political Liberalism too: 
 
[Rawls agrees] we recognise ... acceptable principles of justice because they fit 
with our intuitions. If we were to articulate what underlies these intuitions we 
would start spelling out a very “thick” theory of the good. To say we don’t 
“need” this to develop our theory of justice turns out to be highly 
misleading.... [W]e have to draw on the sense of the good that we have here in 
order to decide what are adequate principles of justice. The theory of justice 
which starts from a thin theory of the good turns out to be a theory which 
keeps its most basic insights inarticulate.137 
 
By saying all this I do not mean to imply that an overlapping consensus is not possible. 
It is perfectly possible for incompatible philosophical traditions to find agreement on 
the way that certain things ought to be done. Sometimes people portray the West just as 
individualistic and Islam as narrowly focused self-restraint, but even in the Islamic and 
expressive individualist traditions there are points of overlap. Rousseau’s philosophy 
supported the underclass, for example, as expressed in his famous claim that “Man was 
born free, yet he is everywhere in chains.” The Islamic tradition, too, emphasises the 
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need to support the oppressed (the mustad’afin). Perhaps in the above-mentioned debate 
about the welfare state those thinking in terms of these two traditions will overlap? The 
main point, though, is that if they do, they will still be reliant on an underlying 
philosophical conception.138 For as Taylor observes: “Ontological accounts have the 
status of articulations of our moral instincts.”139 
 
 
2.9.  The cultural specificity of public reason 
 
So Rawls seems to be quite wrong about the question asked at the start of the last 
section, and in his view that political values are not “puppets manipulated from behind 
the scenes.” The only thing one might say is that in many debates the puppet strings 
may remain invisible. The question that obviously follows from this is: If he is wrong 
on this point, what are the implications for the introduction of comprehensive 
doctrines into public debates? Does public reason have to be jettisoned, or should some 
elements of it be retained? These are questions I want to consider later on in the 
chapter. However, before doing this it is helpful to consider political values in a bit 
more detail. By looking at where Rawls, in my view at least, goes wrong, one can get a 
better understanding of how to proceed. 
 
I said above that political values can be interpreted differently depending upon one’s 
philosophical stance. One way of understanding a political value, then, is to say it is a 
value lacking in determining content. A political value is in need of something to “fill it up” 
and give it clearer meaning. If I were to claim something is “destructive to the raising 
and educating of children,” for example, I must be assuming certain things about 
“destructiveness” unless I spell these out. The pertinent question to ask, then, is does 
Rawls make specific assumptions? Rawls’s critics argue, correctly in my view, that he 
makes two in particular: first, he assumes a certain cultural context, particularly the 
American political culture; second, he relies upon a Kantian conception of the subject, 
yet is reticent about these philosophical roots.140 
 
In relation to the first of these, it is worth pointing out that political values can have a 
much clearer meaning in certain contexts. Imagine, for example, that an MP in the 
House of Commons makes the case that “The Serious Fraud Office’s suspension of its 
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investigation into alleged Saudi bribes to British Aerospace was wrong because it 
breached the principle of the rule of law, and the British government must abide by that 
principle.”141 In this case it is highly unlikely that this would be followed by any further 
justification or explanation because all MPs in the House of Commons operate within 
the context of a particular political tradition that is familiar to everyone and that has 
accepted normative authority. There is no ambiguity because all MPs know what it is 
that the “rule of law” enjoins. Similarly, when Henry and Madison debated the Anglican 
Church’s role in Virginia, I think it is fair to presume that both had an idea of what 
“good conduct” referred to in that tradition. 
 
There are points in Political Liberalism where Rawls’s arguments clearly rest upon an 
assumed political context. At one point, for example, he argues that a feature of 
political values is “they can be worked out from fundamental ideas seen as implicit in 
the public political culture of a constitutional regime.”142 That is to say, political values 
are to be supplied by the political culture as it currently exists. Now, imagine Rawls was 
making this point not in the United States but instead the Aztec culture described by 
Georges Battaille in The Accursed Share.143 There was in that context not a principle of 
equal citizenship but of hierarchical division, with slaves having their still-beating hearts 
torn out in elaborate human sacrifices. I think it is probably right to say Rawls would 
not support drawing from that political culture, only, as he says, political cultures in 
which every citizen treated as free and equal. This, though, leaves a problem, which 
William Connolly has spelled out in detail: 
 
Reasonableness finds its grounds in itself if and when it is already widely 
shared in a cultural tradition. But what does a Rawlsian moralist appeal to 
when such a tradition is deeply conflictual, or weak, or active in some domains 
and absent in others? What do Rawlsians appeal to, that is, when the appeal is 
most needed? Rawls has nothing compelling to say in such cases. This is 
because, in a way reminiscent of John Caputo, Richard Rorty and Jürgen 
Habermas, he rules “comprehensive doctrines” out of public discourse in 
order to protect the impartiality of justice.144 
 
Connolly perhaps overstates slightly the cultural embeddedness of Rawls’s position in 
this passage, particularly as he focuses upon Rawls’s notion of the “reasonable,” which 
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is carefully specified in Rawls’s work. (I give more details about this anon.) Even so, he 
touches on an important point. The main point of Rawls’s shift between A Theory of 
Justice and Political Liberalism was to correct his stance in response to increasing levels of 
moral and cultural pluralism, and to make his liberalism fit with different traditions. Yet 
this apparent reliance upon a pre-existing political context, and his insistence that 
citizens should not relate the traditions in terms of which they understand the good to 
that context, works to undermine his efforts. Imagine, for example, that a new moral 
tradition emerges in a political society (as Islam has in the UK in recent decades, as it 
happens). Rawls implies that people who follow this new moral tradition should just 
leave it to one side, instead working out the values in terms of which they are going to 
debate political issues from their host political culture. This seems a very odd demand, 
akin even to a form of assimilationism: a Muslim who has migrated to the UK should 
leave his or her beliefs to one side and instead work out independent political values 
from the ideas implicit in British political culture. There is no space for translation, or 
for dissent on the basis of one’s beliefs, or any dialogue. This seems to me like a recipe 
for serious fractures within a political community.  
 
 
2.10. Moral standoffs 
 
Then there is the second assumption, what Bhikhu Parekh describes as the “rationalist 
bias” in Rawls’s work.145 One of the clearest explanations of this can be found in the 
work of Chantal Mouffe, who raises criticisms I have touched on, but who gets to the 
heart of the philosophical tension in Rawls’s work: 
 
One of the central claims of the “political liberalism” advocated by Rawls is 
that it is ... political not metaphysical and ... is independent of comprehensive 
views. A clear-cut separation is established between the realm of the private 
where a plurality of different and irreconcilable comprehensive views coexists, 
and the realm of the public where an overlapping consensus can be established 
over a shared conception of justice.... [However] Rawls cannot succeed in his 
strategy of avoiding philosophically disputed issues, because it is impossible to 
develop his theory in the free-standing way that he announces. Indeed, his 
notion of the “reasonable” as well as his conception of the “person” 
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necessarily involve him with questions concerning concepts of rationality and 
truth that he pretends to bypass. 146 
 
To avoid the accusation of moral or cultural relativism, Rawls needs to find a way of 
securing his political liberalism. He needs to exclude some comprehensive doctrines, as 
he does not want to offer his support to an overlapping consensus of conspiracy 
theorists or white supremacists. He does this by insisting that individuals accept that 
everyone should be treated by the state as a free and equal citizen; any person that does 
not accept this can be considered “unreasonable.” This, though, implies the need for 
some kind of philosophical basis, which Rawls finds by drawing on Kant and arguing 
that everyone possesses two moral powers, namely, a sense of justice and the capacity 
to form, revise and pursue a conception of the good.147 At this point, of course, his 
liberalism ceases to be “free-standing.” As Parekh has noted, irrespective of whether or 
not one finds his Kantian philosophy compelling, “Rawls implicitly concedes that 
democratic political culture is not self-validating.”148 Rawls tries to develop a liberalism 
that remains philosophically neutral, but in the end he bases it on philosophical 
foundations that remain to an extent hidden. 
 
It is not possible here to go into a lengthy discussion of the merits of Rawls’s Kantian 
philosophy. However, one thing that can be said about his reticence is that it leads him 
to make some rather unconvincing arguments about some very significant political 
debates, in particular over racism and abortion. At one point in Political Liberalism Rawls 
discusses the abolition movement in the antebellum South, where the abolitionists had 
overcome the argument that black people should not be considered fully human as they 
do not possess full rational autonomy. They did this by invoking the law of God, but 
Rawls regards this as not a problem because, he says, they “could have seen their 
actions as the best way to bring about a well-ordered and just society in which the ideal 
of public reason could be honoured.”149 By contrast, when he speaks about the legality 
of abortion, where the debate turns on the ethical status of the unborn foetus, he says 
“any comprehensive doctrine that leads to a balance of political values excluding [the] 
duly qualified right in the first trimester is to that extent unreasonable.”150 What Rawls 
does in the first case is use the existing political culture in the US, which fits his Kantian 
ethics, as an arbiter, retroactively pardoning breaches of public reason that occurred 
around 1700. This raises the question: Could not anti-abortionists see themselves and 
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their actions today as working toward a “well-ordered and just society” in which 
equality is extended also to unborn persons? 
 
To be fair, Rawls is unfailingly cautious on these difficult points. On abortion, he is 
careful to stress the really important thing is acceptance of the law as legitimate.151 The 
second quote is also taken from a specific context, where Rawls is trying to make a 
technical point. Public reason, Rawls contends, is a method of argument based on a 
balance of political values rather than a contest of comprehensive doctrines. He then 
illustrates this point by saying that in the case of abortion there are three political values 
to factor in: respect for human life; ordered reproduction of society, including the 
family in some form; and respect for women as equal citizens. The remark then follows 
as an aside in the footnotes.152 Yet even given this there is a problem because Rawls 
does not explain why, after balancing the three political values, the woman’s right to an 
abortion prevails. One suspects that it is because he follows Kant in stressing the 
normative force of autonomy and choice. None of this can be made explicit, though, 
because his philosophy remains masked. As a result of this confusion, it is hard not to 
have at least an element of sympathy for Chaplin when he says the following about the 
approach of Rawls and other liberals: 
 
We might ask ... why liberal secularists uniformly affirm Desmond Tutu as a 
hero of liberal democracy (and they do) but uniformly denounce Catholic 
Cardinals who appeal to the very same biblical doctrine in opposing what they 
see as another form of legalised violence: abortion.... As far as I can see, liberal 
secularists do not have any remotely convincing answer to that question—
other than that they happen to support racial equality but oppose restrictions 
on a “woman’s right to choose.”153 
 
I should perhaps acknowledge here that ultimately I hold the same views as Rawls on 
the question of abortion. What worries me, though, is public reason closes down rich 
discussion of the philosophies underlying different positions on abortion, which seems 
relevant particularly in this case. Rawls argues that arguments both for and against 
abortion can be put forward using only political values. He concedes that this might 
lead to a standoff (which I suspect it would) but then suggests that if this happens the 
matter should just be put to the vote. This is certainly one way of resolving a dispute. 
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Yet for someone who is a champion of deliberation as a means of enacting political 
participation and solving problems, it is a rather pessimistic view to take. Rawls claims, 
in relation to debates in the US over abortion, that citizens “learn and profit from 
debate and argument, and when they follow public reason they instruct society’s 
political culture and deepen their understanding of one another even when agreement 
cannot be reached.”154 Chaplin’s frustration, mirrored by many less philosophically 
literate critics, seems to cast doubt on this. Chaplin’s issue seems to be that liberalism 
appears to know all the answers in advance, its rules being unfair. It calls to mind the 
late football manager Brian Clough’s famous comment about the appropriate way to 
manage players: “If I had an argument with a player we would sit down for twenty 
minutes, talk about it, and then decide I was right.” 
 
This raises the question: Can arguing using the full range of comprehensive views ever 
improve debates? It would certainly be foolhardy to claim that religious discourse never 
inhibits productive conversation. At the same time, though, some religious arguments 
are more sophisticated than others, and some, in my view, contain important insights. 
For example, Nicholas Wolterstorff recently published an intriguing critique of rights 
grounded in capacities such as the Rawlsian capacity “to form, revise and pursue a 
conception of the good.”155 The problem, he points out, is that some humans inevitably 
lack whatever capacity one chooses. Although Wolterstorff does not discuss the 
example of abortion, it can be used to illustrate his point. A capacities-based rights 
theorist might take the view that foetuses do not possess full human rights because they 
do not possess the capacity to reflect on the good. This, though, does not work because 
neither do babies or the severely mentally impaired, and to argue that such persons do 
not have the right to life would be abhorrent. Even grounding rights (for any of these 
three persons) in the capacity for suffering has limitations. Animals suffer, and so that 
presents serious problems to any non-vegetarian. The only way to secure rights for 
infants or the handicapped is to find a way of developing a conception of the human 
that is imbued with powerful normative force. Wolterstorff argues that if God loves 
each and every human being equally and permanently then rights are grounded in that 
love, and so concludes that grounding is available to Christians (such as him) and other 
theists. Obviously, this is not available to non-believers. Even so, the challenge still 
remains. Wolterstorff’s argument implies that it may be far harder than conventionally 
thought to articulate the source of the ethical demand, and that words such as “spirit” 
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and even “soul” might not be entirely irrelevant to the modern moral vocabulary. I shall 
make no further comment on what this means for laws relating to abortion, but I do 
not mind admitting that, though I do agree with Rawls, Wolterstorff’s argument is one 
of the main reasons why I believe that it is unfair to describe opponents to abortion as 
simply unreasonable and not worth debating with. I have personally learnt a great deal 
from his—and not just his—religious convictions. The question this raises is what this 
might mean for public, political deliberations. 
 
 
2.11. Re-casting public reason  
 
What needs to be jettisoned from Rawls’s model of political deliberation is the idea that 
it is desirable, or even possible, to have a realm of “political values” that are 
independent of any philosophical grounding. The notion that political reasons are in 
some way “free-standing” or independent of philosophical conceptions turns out not 
just to be incoherent, but also to risk isolation and possible division between different 
philosophical traditions. On account of this, Rawlsian political liberalism seems to be 
placed in serious jeopardy. Yet before simply rejecting it, it is worth recalling that Rawls 
is dealing with some complex problems. The idea of a free-standing polity may not be, 
as Mouffe maintains, entirely coherent, but even Chaplin recognises that states ought to 
refrain from presenting comprehensive doctrines as grounds for the decisions they take.  
One might be a little sceptical about public reason on account of these problems, but it 
is still the case that philosophical differences can be divisive, and that there would be 
something seriously wrong with a president or prime minister publicly saying that Islam, 
Christianity or atheism are irrational. Moral decisions may always need some kind of 
basis, but in a plural polity there may be a variety of overlapping justifications that all 
shape a particular choice by legislators. So the question one needs to deal with is: If 
public reasoning, as Rawls conceives of it, does not work, are there nevertheless some 
conventions for debate that should be retained? 
 
There is, I believe, a way of interpreting Rawlsian public reason that, although it cuts 
against some elements of Rawls’s argument, is more defensible. This comes close to 
Appiah’s interpretation of the norm of public reason, which he regards basically as 
“debating tips: as rhetorical advice about how best, within a plural polity, to win 
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adherents and influence policies.”156 Such an interpretation could hardly be objected to 
by religionists (save a few eccentric sects). To get an idea of what this interpretation 
might mean, it helps to offer a few more examples of “conversation stopping” claims, 
some of which I repeat from Rorty’s quote: 
 
1. It is God’s will that women should wear a veil in public 
2. I would never have an abortion 
3. Reading pornography is about the only pleasure I get out of life these days 
4. Abortion destroys a human soul, and is hence the taking of a life 
5. There should not be any welfare state because humans are essentially animals, 
and nature is red in tooth and claw 
 
Rorty’s response to these statements, that they are just matters of “personal concern,” 
seems to me to be wrong. Even the statement about reading pornography, which would 
in all probability cause most interlocutors to swiftly end the conversation, still relates to 
some moral, social and political questions. For example, is a life in which reading 
pornography is one’s only pleasure really a fulfilling life? What kind of society is it that 
leads to that being the only pleasure one gets in life? Should explicit pornography be 
accessible, and if so how easily? Like Rawls, Rorty seems in this case to assume a neat 
split between private views and public arguments. 
 
Rorty’s objection, then, is misdirected. The problem does not seem to be that these 
quotes are not relevant, but that they are poorly expressed. Specifically, they are expressed in 
such as way that they do not appear to have any connection to matters of public 
concern, or at least not any immediate connection. Nor is the problem that the quotes 
offer religious arguments, but simply abrupt arguments; they do not offer any background 
detail, and do not reach out to any other individuals. What they lack is any kind of 
additional contextualisation or reasoning. Recall the proviso157 mentioned earlier that 
Rawls and Audi both support: they argue religious justifications can be offered if they 
are accompanied by public or secular reasons. Now, if “public reasons” are conceived 
of as comprehensive doctrines of a non-religious character then this makes little sense: 
the religious person will state his or her beliefs then, it seems, quickly have to offer the 
same argument justified by, say, a reading of Rousseau, even if he or she considers 
Rousseau to be very wrong. It does not make much more sense if one regards, as Rawls 
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seems to do, public reasons as independent of comprehensive doctrines: the religious 
reason is then little more than additional detail. However, one could think of Rawls’s 
proviso as a tool that helps develop private concerns into matters of public interest, or 
that makes a philosophical position intelligible to people who have no knowledge of it. 
Public reason should, then, imply translation. 
 
To illustrate the point, it might help to re-state the first of the claims above in a more 
“public” and more accessible way:  
 
1. In order for there to be respect for persons there have to be some spaces 
in society in which sexual inclinations should not be acted upon, where, 
to borrow Freud’s terms, the “reality principle” takes precedence over the 
“pleasure principle.” If public spaces are sexualised there is a very real risk 
that people, women particularly, will find themselves in a situation where 
their success and their worth as human beings will be determined by their 
physical appearance and the extent to which they follow the whims of 
fashion. For Muslims, a certain standard of modest dress is prescribed, 
both for men and women, to avoid these problems and also because it is 
recognised that the most meaningful experiences in life are found within 
intimate relationships and by saving oneself for a person with whom one 
is in a long-term intimate relationship. Of course, this usually includes a 
veil of some form for women. In Islam, since meaning and fulfilment are 
all gifts of God’s mercy (rahma), to respect and foster those forms of 
meaning is to respect and follow God’s will.158 
 
Of course, there are objections that might be raised against this argument. For example, 
it might be objected that, while there may have to be public spaces in which sexual 
desires should not be acted upon, it should not be necessary to prescribe modest dress 
for this to happen; it should just be a matter of people not acting on their impulses 
(although it may be worth mentioning also that this kind of argument has a place in the 
Islamic tradition, and indeed the Qur’an).159 It might also be objected that this argument 
is silent about traditional gender roles. Or there might be a deeper suspicion of the idea 
that the suppression of sexual impulses is for the good. Still, it is hard to suggest that 
the argument is illegitimate or has no value in a debate. Indeed, it might be used 
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constructively to argue against the prohibition of veils in public places such as schools, 
which has been a major issue in France.160 
 
Such an interpretation of public reason leads to a more helpful way of looking at the 
connection that Rawls makes between the notion of the “public” and specific political 
and cultural traditions too. As we have seen, Rawls associates political values with 
already existing political cultures, and at times implies that political values are 
justifications whose meanings are found within such cultures. This, for reasons already 
explored, leads to confusion if one views political values as complete or independent. 
However, if one does not then one is invited to think about the ideal of public reason 
as a way of attempting to translate the moral tradition that one is drawing from into the 
terms of the political culture in which one lives. In the Islamic context, one sees this 
effort clearly in the work of Tariq Ramadan, with his attempts to understand Islamic 
principles within a broad framework of citizenship.161 One can find clearer examples in 
the essays of Abdal-Hakim Murad, a British convert to Islam whose work will appear in 
some of the later chapters of this thesis:  
 
God’s law, for the mainstream fuqaha’, is an ideal for whose realisation we 
cherish a firm and ultimate hope. But it also includes the duty to act, out of 
maslaha, within the framework of laws drafted by majoritarian non-Muslim 
legislatures.... The fundamental objects, maqasid, of the Shari‘a are the right to 
life, mind, religion, lineage, and honour; and these are respected in the legal 
codes of the contemporary West.162  
 
Another reason why it is helpful to think of public reasoning as similar to translating 
into a language that is used as standard in a given political context is it helps to clear 
some of the confusion about the rather unclear line between religious and secular 
reasons. The English language is, after all, replete with terms that have religious 
undertones but that are in everyday usage: one could cite “soul,” “spirit,” “holy,” 
“sacred,” “sanctity” and even the word “secular” itself. One can’t help but notice that 
the term “comprehensive doctrine” has Christian links. Many common aphorisms and 
moral teachings come from the Bible, such as “Love thy neighbour” or “Let him who 
has no sin cast the first stone.” To cut out these terms would be to cut out a significant 
portion of moral discourse—a portion that is employed by non-religious people as 
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much as by Christians. This is part of the reason why separating “public” from 
“secular” terms is, as Rawls rightly says, necessary. 
 
 
2.12. Reasonableness reconsidered 
 
One of the potential problems with being more open about the connections between 
political values and comprehensive doctrines is that it seems to open a door to attacks 
upon non-religious and religious philosophies. As Rawls says in defence of his model, 
“without citizens’ allegiance to public reason and their honouring the duty of civility 
divisions and hostilities between doctrines are bound in time to assert themselves, 
should they not already exist.”163 In the same way that the non-establishment clause 
limits religions in order to maintain individual religious liberty, so too does the norm of 
public reason restrict religious talk so religions are not subject to hostile attacks upon 
their internal coherence and truthfulness. 
 
It is tempting to respond to this by saying that, if this is what public reason is supposed 
to do, it doesn’t seem to be doing a very good job right now, at least not out in the 
“background culture” where over the last five years The God Delusion has managed to 
sell a couple of million copies by arguing that any belief in God is comparable to a 
mental illness.164 Not only is it common currently to encounter the claim that bringing 
children up in a religious tradition is tantamount to child abuse, one also often hears it 
said that, in the words of polemicist Sam Harris, religious belief “allows otherwise 
normal human beings to reap the fruits of madness and consider them holy.”165 There 
may be something to be said in this about the ability of liberalism to respond to the 
rough-and-tumble of everyday debate. Still, I shall leave that to one side, and consider a 
different approach. One way of responding to Rawls’s concern here is by reconsidering 
the way he separates “reasonable” (or politically legitimate) from “unreasonable” (or 
illegitimate) comprehensive doctrines. 
 
It is very rare to encounter favourable references to reason in current scholarship in the 
humanities and social sciences. This is not, as some books have argued, simply because 
of a decline in standards.166 Rather, recent scholarship has tended to concentrate upon 
how certain conceptions of “reason” served as justifications for colonialism and slavery. 
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Some authors have also examined how rationalists, Rawls included, have neglected the 
significance of emotional life.167 Nevertheless, there are some explicit criticisms of 
Rawls’s understanding of the “reasonable” that have been unfair. Paul F. Campos, for 
example, has said this of Rawls’s position:  
 
Rawls’s analysis of political issues amounts to little more than the shamanistic 
incantation of the word “reasonable.”... Rawls simply declares that some 
position is “reasonable” and then condemns the opposing view for being not 
merely wrong, but contrary to the dictates of reason. The term “reasonable” 
thus serves the same performative function in Rawls’s theory as that served by 
the term “God” in dogmatic religious argument. 
 
Hence, for Campos, Rawls is a “secular fundamentalist.”168 This criticism does have a 
basis of sorts. There are certainly some moments in Political Liberalism where the word 
“reasonable” is used to curtly delegitimise an argument about a complex issue, such as 
abortion (which Campos focuses upon). Yet it is worth paying attention to what Rawls 
means exactly by “reasonable.” As Stephen de Wijze has observed, for Rawls, 
“reasonableness” and “rationality” are different: 
 
Rational conduct has two important aspects to it: the issue of choosing certain 
ends given certain preferences and the question of how such ends are to be 
achieved. The focus here is on the link between preferences and choices and 
then how to connect those choices to the appropriate action. In a political 
context, rational persons have a conception of the good and a plan on how to 
achieve it. What “the rational” lacks, however, is [in Rawls’s words] a 
“particular form of moral sensibility that underlies the desire to engage in fair 
cooperation as such, and to do so on terms that others as equals might 
reasonably be expected to endorse.”169  
 
There are many aspects of “reasonableness” that Rawls specifies, not all of which can 
be detailed here. It includes the Kantian conception of the subject with two “moral 
powers,” so Mouffe’s criticisms earlier about Rawls not being able to avoid basic 
philosophical issues are still very relevant. Yet its most significant aspects refer not to 
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knowing, but to accepting one lacks knowledge. One can distil Rawls’s conception of 
the reasonable into three key points: 
 
1. Reasonableness involves willingness to come to considered conclusions 
on the basis of reasons and evidence. 
2. Reasonableness involves a degree of reciprocity, recognising that others 
come from different perspectives. Specifically, it involves awareness of 
the fact that others may reach different conclusions because: evidence is 
not complete and complex; concepts are vague and subject to hard cases; 
the way a particular person assesses evidence is influenced by the entirely 
of his or her personal experience.  
3. Reasonableness requires that we enter the world of others as political 
equals and be prepared to propose and accept fair terms of cooperation 
with them provided they reciprocate in kind.170 
 
Rawls refers to the second of these under the heading the “burdens of judgement.”171 
One is “reasonable” if one recognises that others might come to different conclusions 
based upon their experience of life, and one can call someone “unreasonable” if they do 
not respond in kind. In this way these “burdens” encourage the view that others are 
equals in a public debate. Whereas “reason” is often linked with rightness, the idea of 
the reasonable is based on the possibility that one might be wrong. There are significant 
implications in this for Rawls’s advocacy of public reason. Rawls wants to protect 
people’s beliefs from fundamental attacks. However, if one accepts this aspect of his 
conception of the reasonable as a moral imperative—in the same way that Rawls says 
using public reasons in civil society should be a moral imperative—then one already has 
a bulwark against such attacks. If one dispenses with Rawls’s approach to public reason 
one might open up space for at least some criticism of religious faith. If, though, one 
accepts this aspect of the “reasonableness requirement”—and in my view it is the most 
sensible aspect—then these criticisms cannot go too far. For example, it may now be 
acceptable to point to the difficulty some people may have fully accepting a particular 
religious tradition given that its core claims seem to cut against the everyday experience 
of life (which contains few miracles). What would not be correct, though, is contending 
that anyone who believes in God is deluded—just as it would not be right to suggest 
that unbelief is a serious moral failing. There appears, then, to be a way of debating 
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publicly that allows for the careful introduction of comprehensive doctrines but that 
also retains a way of discouraging hostile attacks. This leaves just one more objection to 
religious reasoning that needs to be addressed. 
 
 
2.13. Religious reasons and religious communities 
 
A significant portion of the debate about religion’s place in society relates to an issue 
that so far I have not paid much attention to. Anxiety about religious belief is often not 
concerned so much with arguments and justifications, but rather with forms of 
organisation. The focus falls not just on political parties—such as the Christian People’s 
Alliance—that have some sort of confessional allegiance and that therefore appear to 
pose a threat to the neutrality of the state; it also falls on organisations that function in 
the “background culture” as deliverers of the sort of services that are, or ought to be, 
publicly provided. Gila Stopler has objected to the provision of health services in the 
US by the Catholic Church, for example, because they have been known to refuse 
emergency contraception and limit access to abortion.172 Similarly, in the UK there have 
been tense conflicts over whether Catholic adoption agencies should be permitted to 
discriminate against same-sex couples. Another—particularly pertinent—example is the 
emergence in the UK of a number of unofficial legal councils offering to resolve marital 
disputes via Muslim personal law.173 The issue in these cases is different: it is not 
whether or not traditional Catholic views regarding the ensoulment of the foetus or 
certain Islamic views concerning marriage should be allowed to participate in debates 
about what ought to be illegal; the problem is religious organisations operating “by their 
own rules,” potentially undermining the state. This is part of the reason why the efforts 
of religious organisation to do “good things” such as ameliorate poor social conditions 
through the establishment of clinics or schools in underserviced areas (what Asad 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter) can cause disquiet: because faith groups can 
impose their moral stances at the same time. 
 
This is, of course, a complicated subject, and one that it is not possible to cover all 
aspects of in a thesis, let alone a chapter.174 All I want to consider in this section is how 
these concerns regarding autonomous (or semi-autonomous) religious groups relate to 
the question I have been focusing upon here of whether it is sensible to support open 
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articulation of religious belief in public forums. Specifically, it is necessary to consider 
the suggestion that restrictions to religious discourse can be justified on the grounds 
that religions, unlike secular philosophies, are communal forms. In 2009, for example, 
Habermas and Taylor took part in a public conversation in New York about the role of 
religion in public life. For a number of years now Taylor has advocated a more open 
model of secularism, and part of the burden of his argument during this discussion was 
that religion should not be considered a “special case,” either with regard to political 
discourse or with regard to reason and argumentation in general. Instead, he suggested, 
religions should be regarded simply as examples of the more general contemporary 
challenge of diversity, including diversity in comprehensive conceptions of the good. By 
contrast, Habermas, although he concurred that religious arguments should not simply 
be deemed “less rational” than secular arguments, suggested that the majority of secular 
traditions can be “very clearly distinguished from any kind of religious tradition by the 
fact that [they do not] require membership.” 175 The basic gist of Habermas’s argument, 
to use the terms preferred by Chaplin, was that whereas secular orientations are “open” 
religious orientations are almost always “tribal.”176 
 
This is undoubtedly a challenging criticism because, obviously, religious life does usually 
have a communal dimension, and community is often emphasised in the theological 
discourses of religious traditions. (Think, for instance, of the idea of the Umma.) Indeed, 
one can argue with some justification that religions are becoming increasingly tribal in 
the modern world. It is not always taken on board by polemicists writing about the 
subject of faith, who tend to depict religions as homogenous and unchanging, but the 
major religious traditions do not have the same character as they did in the medieval 
period. A vast sociological literature has been published demonstrating this point,177 and 
it has been summed up well by Parekh: 
 
The traditionalist’s fear or the rationalist’s hope that modernity will see off 
religion as a legitimate form of thought has paradoxically both come true and 
been proved false. It has come true because religion is no longer what it was in 
pre-modern times. It is self-conscious, argumentative, seeks rational 
justification, and is not a matter of basic ontological trust, an unargued faith, 
or a taken-for-granted fact of life. The hope or fear has been proved false 
because religion matters a great deal to large numbers of people, in some 
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respects even more than it did in pre-modern times, and continues to survive 
as a culture or a civilisation shaping the thoughts of even those claiming to be 
free of it.178 
 
Peter Berger, one of the most philosophically sophisticated sociologists of religion, has 
persuasively argued that this shift can be deeply unsettling. Where once people lived 
snugly under a “sacred canopy” where the ultimate purpose of life was well-established 
and woven into cultural structures, now people are constantly faced with alternatives, 
with literally hundreds of different beliefs. As a consequence, once-stable belief systems 
appear increasingly precarious. For some religious traditions, the immediate response is 
to go on the defensive, with religious believers trying to “entrench themselves behind 
whatever socio-religious structures they can maintain or construct.” The religious group 
retreats into a “sub-world,” a closed space in which the members of the community can 
huddle together like penguins in a blizzard.179 Berger’s main focus is on Christianity, but 
the same trend has been observed by a number of scholars. Olivier Roy, a sociologist of 
Islam, refers to it as the process of “communitarisation.”180 The American legal theorist 
Ayelet Shachar, who focuses mainly on Judaism, has described a similar tendency using 
the phrase “reactive culturalism.” Shachar is very careful to point out that within such 
inward-looking religious organisations fundamental rights are not always fully respected; 
restrictive impositions, particularly upon women, can be seen as a necessary price for 
the survival of some kind of meaningful social system.181 As we shall see in Chapter 6, 
this has a lot of relevance for Islam in the UK. 
 
Rawls does not directly engage with this literature in any of his main texts as far as I am 
aware. Yet Political Liberalism can perhaps be regarded as a response to the challenges it 
highlights. Rawls’s basic question is: How can different religious and non-religious 
perspectives coexist within the same society, each one giving their support to the same 
political system and institutional structure?  What kind of conception of justice will help 
foster a genuine overlapping consensus, preventing both intractable conflicts between 
philosophical traditions and disconnectedness and mutual isolation existing between 
religious and secular groups? To put this another way: What political norms might help 
countervail this move toward tribalism? Now, what Rawls appears to believe, and what 
Habermas says more explicitly above, is that open articulation of religious conceptions 
encourages conflict, inwardness and tribalism; public reason, by contrast, encourages 
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the coming-together of different individuals. Already though (see section 2.9), we have 
seen that this suggestion is flawed: public reason advises religious and secular people 
against relating their core beliefs to their political context, insisting instead upon the use 
of independent, “purely political” values. Religious believers are not encouraged to step 
out into the wider world but rather retreat into an enclosed, private sphere—a gesture 
which seems to imply more insularity and tribalism among religious groups rather than 
less. Might not, then, a more open model of public deliberation offer a better approach? 
Could an open model that is accepting of both religious and secular justifications (but 
in which people are encouraged to articulate them cautiously) actually work against the 
tendency toward insularity and tribalism? Put otherwise, does Habermas above identify 
a valid problem, but the incorrect solution? 
 
Habermas certainly does make an inaccurate remark in the above quote. The distinction 
between religious and non-religious traditions is not a clear as he makes out, for a whole 
number of reasons. Firstly, there are obviously secular organisations such as the British 
Humanist Association and the National Secular Society that also have members and 
loose affiliates. It is also worth mentioning, secondly, that while some religious groups 
see their members as elect and outsiders as damned, it is unfair to use this to restrict all 
religious traditions, most of which do not. (Roman Catholicism no longer does, which 
is partly why Rawls considers it to be “reasonable.”)182 Thirdly, the idea of “belonging 
to” or being a “member of” a religion is highly complex. Many people in the UK and 
elsewhere in Europe remain loosely attached to the churches—and to Christianity more 
broadly—despite not having faith in traditional doctrines like the existence of a soul, an 
afterlife, and even God.183 Even the most aggressive secularists in Britain still admit to 
having been shaped culturally by the Christian tradition,184 which is perhaps a reflection 
of the fact that Christian conceptions have influenced the philosophies that today tend 
to be regarded as the “successors” to Christianity.185 Fourthly and finally, the humanist 
and anti-humanist philosophical traditions that have flourished in the West over the last 
five-hundred or so years are also, precisely, traditions: Rawls draws from the Kantian 
tradition, others from expressive individualism. Secular people too can therefore be 
seen as members of communities of sorts. Secular justifications are not just “open” in 
contradistinction to religious justifications that are “closed” because, as Chaplin has put 
it, they are based on “secular confessions.” 186 
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To say this is not to claim that there is not a tension between religions as communal 
forms and religious arguments made by individual people, or that collectively operating 
religious groups never pose serious problems. But it is misleading to suggest an absolute 
distinction between religious justifications that are related to membership and secular 
justifications that are not. Religious traditions are caricatured if one portrays them as 
restricted to specific churches and organisations, particularly non-Christian traditions, 
many of which do not have the same structures of authority or “churches” per se (see 
Chapter 5). It is unfair, too, to characterise religious traditions as things into which the 
young are socialised and secular traditions as emerging autochthonously from a natural 
state or some kind of original position. In trying to articulate what is meaningful, good 
or just both religious and secular people inevitably employ terms and concepts that they 
did not invent, and thereby become members of linguistic and moral communities of 
some form or another.187 If we take both these two points at the same time then one is 
forced to at least modify Habermas’s argument. No longer is it possible to argue that 
leaving people’s “final vocabularies” to one side will result in a level playing field or 
politically neutral space in which to resolve differences. Rather, the aim must be to try 
and get all kinds of religious and secular traditions to speak to and engage with the same 
political and social system on their own terms, and use this as a way of working against 
the worrying tendency toward mutual isolation.  
 
There are of course some people—though not Habermas, Rawls or Rorty—who take a 
harder line, believing that religious belief is not fully rational, and that as a consequence 
it should be viewed as a threat and kept to the margins of society. As I hope is obvious 
by now, this is not an argument I sympathise with. Religious belief can be irrational, but 
to say all theists are irrational is frankly an insult to those who are not, like An-Na’im, 
Taylor, Wolterstorff, Berger (as well as non-religious people who draw from religious 
traditions, as Erich Fromm and Simone Weil did). The suggestion that it is possible to 
discriminate qualitatively between religious beliefs, or separate Young Earth creationists 
and apocalyptic Protestants from others, does, though, suggest there is a question to be 
answered about what institutional conditions might help facilitate wise forms of faith 
and undermine insular conspiratorial forms of faith—perhaps better education, or more 
lucid conversations about the subject? I touch back on this subject in Chapter 7, but it 
will suffice for now to flag this up as the next significant question for scholars engaged 
in debates about public reason to address. 
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2.14. Conclusion: moderately agonistic pluralism 
 
Whatever the flaws with Rawls’s conception of political liberalism, there can be little 
doubt that it touches on some fundamental challenges. In states marked by increasing 
levels of moral and religious diversity getting a wide constituency to accept the same 
political system as legitimate is hard, especially if one wants that acceptance to be based, 
as Rawls does,188 not merely on the assumption that it is not advantageous for anyone 
to upset the applecart, but upon a moral consensus. To do this one has to work out a 
system that is acceptable according to people’s beliefs, despite the fact that these beliefs 
are all shaped by conflicting conceptions of the good. This raises the difficult prospect 
of trying to talk across those conceptions, both to find points of agreement and flatten 
out, through debate, points of disagreement. 
 
Mouffe argues, I believe correctly, that Rawls’s problems all stem from his attempts to 
simplify these challenges by “circumscribing a domain that would not be subject to the 
pluralism of values and where a consensus without exclusion could be established.”189 
His effort to locate independent political values that everyone can accept and in terms 
of which everyone can debate is perhaps the best illustration of this. She also argues, 
with Bader, that when one dispenses with this idealised approach to democratic debate 
one is left with an “agonistic pluralism.” By this, she means a more adversarial form of 
politics in which tensions between conceptions of the good are not bypassed and in 
which fellow citizens are people “whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend 
those ideas we do not put into question.”190 There is no longer any uncontested 
principle, such as citizen equality, that can be used as a standard by which all moral 
conceptions are judged. This means that those who support equality—or to be more 
specific, a particular interpretation of equality—will have to constantly argue or even 
fight for it, winning round converts to their cause.  
 
Even Mouffe, though, accepts the need to ensure that the severity of these struggles is 
kept to a minimum and that a certain amount of consensus needs to be found for a 
liberal democracy to flourish and cohere. The question that she and the other theorists 
in this field are left with, then, is: What can be done to develop this consensus and, to 
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use Mouffe’s terms, prevent an agonistic conflicts between adversaries from descending 
into an antagonistic conflict between enemies? For Bader, the answer is to no longer try 
to establish fixed principles and rules but instead work toward the inculcation of virtues 
and good practices. In this chapter I have suggested two such practices myself, namely, 
encouraging a form a public discourse that places emphasis on the need to translating 
one’s conception of the good into the idiom that predominates in the political culture in 
which one lives, and acceptance that others may have reasons for coming to different 
conclusions about life. Yet of course, as Bader fully acknowledges, the inculcation of 
such virtues requires time, alterations to institutional arrangements and probably (for 
that reason) money too. For now, the key question to flag up is whether such a 
consensus will be easiest to build by following Rawls and remaining silent about moral 
disputes and fundamental convictions, or whether open articulation of one’s core 
convictions might actually help build consensus. I shall argue throughout this thesis that 
more open moral debates can actually help avoid serious conflicts, for reasons Connolly 
has touched on. I shall end with his words: 
 
People say that Communism kept virulent nationalisms alive in Eastern 
Europe by suppressing public engagement with them. Maybe secularism in 
democratic capitalist states has muffled the public ventilation of diverse 
religious and irreligious perspectives needed to adjust public life to the 
multidimensional pluralism of today?191 
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3. Researching and representing religious ideas 
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3.1.   Theology and society 
 
Writing in 1977, the sociologist and theologian Robin Gill observed that “giving a 
sociological account of theology represents an obvious academic risk. Even though a 
number of scholars have hinted that such an account is both possible and potentially 
important, few have attempted it in any thoroughgoing manner. As yet there are no 
established guide-lines, mile-stones or border posts.”192 A little less than thirty-five years 
on there are still relatively few guides to which one can turn when thinking about how 
to determine the social role of religious ideas; Gill’s work remains one of only a few 
systematic discussions of the subject. This may be because theology and the social 
sciences come from quite different starting points. Indeed, some sociological traditions 
have been in direct tension with theology, and have sought to show how theology 
“supports the dominant class” or exclude theology from the study of knowledge on the 
basis that it is knowledge “off its proper course.”193 It may be partly because 
sociologists do not see it as useful. Yet it is hard not to suspect that one of the main 
reasons is that studying religious ideas is not at all easy. Even at a historical distance, 
theology’s role in society can be very difficult to determine. Max Weber’s The Protestant 
Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism became a classic precisely because its thesis is very hard 
to demonstrate, which is why it caused controversy.194 Today, when religious discourse 
is increasingly scattered all over the Internet and where dominant theological ideas are 
increasingly hard to identify, the task is harder still. The social role of religious ideas 
cannot easily be weighed, measured or quantified, and nor can it easily be worked out 
just by examining individuals’ life narratives.   
 
Nevertheless, one of the main points of this chapter will be that theological ideas are 
worth researching, even despite all the difficulties. Part of the reason for this relates to 
the discussion in the previous chapter. If, as I argued there, religious discussions are of 
potential importance to public life, it is worth knowing what kind of discussions are 
going on in the society one is focusing upon. Public debates are not (as liberal theorists 
at times seem to imply) just abstract things. Another, more important, reason is that 
recently public discussions of Islam have done a very bad job of representing the role 
of Islamic theology in contemporary society. The tendency has been to refer simply to 
“Islam” as the single explanation for all kinds of phenomena, from the smallest (such as 
rioting amongst disaffected youth) to the largest (such as economic stagnation in the 
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Middle East and, of course, September 11th). Olivier Roy has shown beyond doubt that 
the influence Islam has upon present-day societies has been overemphasised.195 Often, 
he notes, a verse of the Qur’an is cited as the sole motivation for Muslims’ actions. (I 
give a couple of examples in Chapter 5.) This usually functions not just to render 
differences of opinion in Islam invisible, but to turn attention away from other factors, 
ultimately creating unfounded suspicion of Islam. 
 
To illustrate the risk, consider the following example. Data on educational attainment in 
Britain consistently show that Muslims do much less well in school than other groups, 
with fewer getting the top grades in school and fewer going into higher education. 
Strikingly, there are significant differences even between Muslims and other South 
Asian religious minorities. According to the last census, the number of Muslims leaving 
school with no qualifications in 2001 was a little under the thirty percent mark, far 
higher than the figure for both Sikhs (11 percent) and Hindus (6 percent).196 The data 
are similar for percentages of people unemployed, where one finds particularly striking 
statistics for Muslim women. Some 70 percent of Muslim women aged twenty-five and 
over were economically inactive in 2001. This compares with 30 percent for Christian 
women and 35 percent for Hindu and Sikh women.197 This has been the case now for 
decades, the statistics being similar in the 1970s.198 
 
On the face of it, it seems like Islam is the obvious root cause of these disparities. After 
all, it appears to be the single relevant variable. Yet to do this in this case would be, if 
not entirely wrong, misleadingly simplistic. Examine the data in a little more depth and 
the picture alters. First of all, it is only Muslims whose ancestors are from Bangladesh 
or Pakistan who tend to suffer; Indian Muslims, although not as successful as their 
Hindu co-ethnics, tend to do much better, with only 15 percent leaving school without 
qualifications. The Egyptian Muslim community based in London is completely 
different; it includes some fourteen-hundred doctors as well as an élite of several 
thousand bankers, academics and financiers.199 The determinant seems not to be 
“Islam,” then, but rather being from a particular religio-cultural context, specifically a 
rural and relatively poor context. The data concerning the percentages of women in 
employment are also highly complex. The temptation here is to view the underlying 
cause as the patriarchal cultures found in contexts where Islam is influential. Certainly, 
gender norms cannot be disregarded as a salient factor in this case. Philip Lewis cites 
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the norm of purda, or the seclusion of women, as the most significant determinant of 
these statistics. Yet Humayun Ansari has argued that that norm may not be quite as 
influential as appears to be the case at first glance. Firstly, the statistics neglect the many 
Muslim women who do paid work in the informal sector. In addition, taking paid work 
is not always an appealing option for poorer first generation migrants: the domestic 
burden tends to be higher as they cannot afford labour saving appliances. There is a 
lack of decent employment opportunities too, not to mention the fact that Muslim 
women can suffer from discrimination.200 
 
The Islamic tradition then, mediated through a particular cultural context, does have a 
social role. Certainly, the forms of Islam that predominate in Bangladesh and Pakistan 
have influenced the lives of second- and third-generation migrants in the UK, as we will 
see in Chapter 4. But it is complex; it needs to be contextualised, and if one fails to do 
this it proves hard to avoid the trap of generating hostility toward Islam by picturing it 
as the problem. Indeed, failing to situate Islam can turn attention away from other social 
issues (poverty, say) that ought to be addressed.  
 
The main aim of this chapter is to give an account of the research process that formed 
the basis of this thesis. In it I explain what I wanted to explore in the thesis, why I 
wanted to explore it, and how I did so. I begin with an account of why I made the 
choice to examine theology and differences in religious interpretation, using some 
examples of survey research to illustrate. This is followed by a description of how I 
went about the research and why I made the choices I did. In particular, I focus in this 
section on the way in which I represent the research in the four chapters that follow. I 
also consider some of the significant methodological dilemmas, such as those relating to 
ethics and possible bias in the research. Underlying the entire discussion, though, will 
be more general questions about how one thinks about theology’s role in society: how 
theology relates to ethnicity and culture, and how one can avoid overstating or 
understating the significance of religious ideas. 
 
 
3.2.  Reasons for examining religious ideas 
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In the Preface and in Chapter 1 I explained a number of the motivations behind this 
study. Yet it is worth mentioning one more, closely connected motivation that was of 
particular significance in the choice of methods. As I said, I was frustrated by the way 
Islam has been discussed in the UK recently, but there was another frustration at the 
problems with some recent research into Muslims. In recent years a raft of surveys and 
polls have been published asking Muslims what they feel about the issues of the day, 
their responses frequently being contrasted with Britain’s other residents. The methods 
employed are usually quantitative, sometimes qualitative, and the authors range from 
academics to policy think-tanks and polling agencies. But the primary goal—the Holy 
Grail, as it were—has just been to find out Muslims’ views on things like nationhood, 
Islamic law, politics, the legitimacy of militant violence and homosexual unions.201 
There are good reasons for this being a point of focus, of course. It is common right 
now, even in academic publications, to come across individuals making unsupported 
assertions about Muslims such as the following, from Ihsan Yilmaz: “Muslims do not 
only wish to be regulated by the principles of Islamic law when they are living in a non-
Muslim state; they also seek to formalise such an arrangement within the state’s own 
legal system.”202 The obvious rejoinder that this kind of blunt statement invites is: “Do 
they? How exactly do you know?” It turns out there are actually varied views on this 
issue, some of which I will explore in Chapter 6.203 
 
But even this rejoinder has serious limitations. For what does one mean by “Islamic 
law”? Imagine for a moment that one actually went out and asked five-hundred or so 
Muslims if they wanted to be regulated by the principles of Islamic law, using that 
precise phrasing. Would they all have the same legal system in mind when they were 
offering their responses? Would all of them have a clear idea of what “Islamic law” 
involves? I think one can be fairly sure that they would not. After all, there are a huge 
number of countries whose legal systems incorporate Islamic law in some way or other, 
some claiming that it forms the basis of the state and others including certain family 
regulations in otherwise secular legal systems.204 There are also substantial differences 
between the four canonical legal schools (madhhabs) in Sunni Islam, and these are drawn 
on in very different ways by the different traditions found in present-day Islam. The 
word can refer to very different realities. 
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The question, “Do you wish to be regulated by Islamic law?” assumes that every 
respondent is “on the same page,” then, and making this assumption can have various 
negative consequences, some serious. In February 2007, for example, the think-tank 
Policy Exchange published a report whose findings were based upon a collection of 
interviews and a survey conducted by the organisation Populus. On the morning that 
followed its publication the study’s results were reported on the front pages of most of 
the UK’s newspapers, primarily because of two findings: that 37 percent of Muslims 
aged between 16 and 24 said that they would “rather live under Shari‘a law than British 
law” (this compared to 17 percent of over 55s); and that 36 percent of 16-24 year olds 
agreed that “Muslim conversion is forbidden and punishable by death.”205 Now, these 
are, without doubt, findings that should prompt concern, but one should not jump to 
any hasty conclusions on account of them. It is important to bear in mind that 84 
percent of the respondents to the same survey thought that they had been treated fairly 
by British society, a finding that has been backed up by numerous similar surveys.206 
The interviews in the report—ignored by the press—revealed a more complex picture 
too.  Most importantly, one also needs to be aware of how ambiguous these questions 
are, and the varying ways they can be read. This is partly because of the differences 
mentioned above, and for other reasons too.  
 
One of the problems is the use of the term “Shari‘a” in the survey. Traditionally, this 
word has not described a set of rules, or even a “law.” The term literally refers to a 
“path” or “track,” or more accurately a “path to the watering hole.” Historically, it has 
generally been used to describe the best course of action for humans—the “divine 
path”—as it is known to God. As the American Muslim scholar Khaled Abou El Fadl 
describes it, the word “Shari’a” is, for Muslims, a symbol of society’s collective efforts 
to work out what God wants from people.207 It has therefore historically functioned as a 
symbol of justice, authenticity and legitimacy. Where the Shari‘a has been spelled out as 
a collection of norms and moral principles it has always been through a process of 
formal juristic reasoning (fiqh). A faqih’s goal is to discern the Shari‘a in almost the same 
way that an aesthetic philosopher’s goal is to work out the nature of beauty. Thus Fred 
Halliday has rightly remarked that even 
 
to pose the question as being in favour of or opposed to something called 
“Islamic law” is to start from the wrong place. The assumption of both sides 
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of the argument is that Shari‘a—for it or against it—is a given text, a code 
available in set form to which jurists and believers may or may not relate.... In 
fact, Shari‘a is no more specific than the terms “British way of life” or “the 
Italian way” or “American values.”208 
 
Clearly, this is not to say that there are not unpleasant laws that have been justified by 
making a claim upon the Shari‘a; obviously that is the case. It is just to say that very few 
Muslims, even those uneasy with what “Islamic law” has come to stand for in some 
jurisdictions, will repudiate the Shari‘a entirely, and that may well have influenced 
respondents. It is also to emphasise the point that the tradition is more complex than 
appears to be the case from the media. The matter of the laws relating to apostasy 
(ridda) offers an excellent example. The four canonical Sunni schools of Islamic law 
recommended the death penalty for apostasy early on in Islam’s history, citing certain 
hadiths where this harsh measure appears to be advocated. Since that time both the 
Ottoman Caliphate and more recently al-Azhar University in Cairo, the foremost centre 
of learning in the Arab world, have rejected the ruling, citing changed circumstances 
and ambiguities in the source texts as reasons.209 It is well worth noting, too, that Islam 
is by no means alone in having this history: William Tyndale was burnt at the stake in 
1536 for the “crime” of translating the Bible into English. Today the consequences for 
Muslims who, say, convert to Christianity can still be very serious, particularly in areas 
such as Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan where more puritanical varieties of Islam hold 
sway.210 But one shouldn’t just assume that “Islamic law” mandates the death penalty 
for anyone who loses their faith in Islam. 
 
Once one has taken all this on board the limitations of some surveys of young Muslims 
become fairly clear, at least when it comes to the more complex aspects of the 
interaction between Islam and the UK. I am not, of course, saying this research is never 
worth undertaking: the Policy Exchange’s report did bring to light a concerning 
tendency among some young Muslims in the UK to take on a more literalistic stance 
than their parents, and in particular to conceive of an “Islamic state” as a utopia of 
sorts. (I outline the context for this in Chapter 4.) Nevertheless, it fails to do justice to 
the intricate subject matter. As Lewis has shrewdly pointed out, if the survey had then 
gone on to inquire, “What do you know about the Shari‘a and what parts of it do you 
especially value?” who knows what kinds of answers, if any, would have been 
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forthcoming.211 Similarly, if the respondents had been asked what, precisely, constitutes 
“apostasy,” or whose views on the Shari‘a should be considered binding, or what the 
process of selection for Islamic scholars in an “Islamic state” ought to be, the answers 
might well have been just a little confused. 
 
Even if there is value in finding out about people’s immediate responses, then, there is a 
level of nuance that is needed but is rarely present when complex questions arise about 
Islam’s relationship with Britain. To a large extent social research—both in and outside 
the academy—lacks the will and the vocabulary to engage with the more complex 
deliberations among Muslims. Given this it is worth considering, to illustrate further, 
the following statement on the same subject from a Muslim theologian speaking at an 
event in July 2008 in London. I make no claims at all here about its representativeness, 
but refer to it only to give a tiny hint of some of the complexities. How, one might ask, 
would this argument fit into the above survey? 
 
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya212 says, “When the signs of justice appear and its face 
is radiant, by whatever means it may be, there you find the Shari‘a of God and 
his religion....” So when you have—for example, in this country—people 
saying, “Oh, Muslims want to implement the Shari‘a as part of English law,” a 
good answer could be: “Yes, but when there is justice in English law there is 
already the Shari‘a.”213 
 
 
3.3.  Considering the research focus 
 
This is one of the main reasons why I chose to study Islamic theological debates rather 
than just Muslims’ opinions. Islam is too complex and multi-layered a subject to study 
only by canvassing people’s opinions about it, and social researchers ought to aspire to 
research that does justice to this complexity, looking into the different ways that 
particular concepts and ideas from the Islamic tradition can be interpreted, or mapped 
on to a specific social or political context. (This, of course, dovetails with my interest, 
outlined in the previous chapter, in how different moral traditions relate to a political 
culture and develop an “overlapping consensus.”) If one is going to ask about Islamic 
law, and whether someone is for or against it, one ought at least to try to develop an 
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understanding of what each person means by the term. Better still, it helps to have an 
understanding of the Islamic traditions different people may have been, knowingly and 
indeed unknowingly, influenced by. This can be, however, a very difficult thing to do, 
for a whole host of different reasons. 
 
The biggest difficulty is, of course, deciding what to focus on, because inevitably one 
cannot cover every area. If one is going to dig a little deeper to try and discover and 
articulate people’s different interpretations of Islam it makes it far more difficult to 
cover as much ground. In his book The Fall of Public Man Richard Sennett describes his 
method as “postholing”—that is to say, he sinks a few “shafts” into the terrain he 
wants to cover, not retrieving information from every place but going into detail about 
certain areas.214 Sennett acknowledges that if one tries to cover a wide area—and his 
book covers three centuries—it is very hard to be representative and to avoid leaving 
oneself open to accusations of bias. Islamic Britain is an enormous and extraordinarily 
complex terrain. As Ziauddin Sardar has observed, “the sheer diversity of [the] British 
Muslim community [can be] quite baffling”: 
 
To begin with, there is an extensive range of countries of origin—Pakistan, 
India, and Bangladesh, Egypt, Yemen and Iraq, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, 
Malaysia, Somalia and Turkey, to mention the most obvious. Each nationality 
also hides a wide range of ethnic backgrounds. So a British Pakistani Muslim 
may be a Panjabi or Sindhi, a Pathan or a Kashmiri, may speak any one of the 
scores of languages and dialects of the Subcontinent, and be quite distinct in 
his or her cultural practices from all other Pakistanis. And, of course, there are 
a host of religious denominations to which any particular individual may 
belong. One could be Sunni or Shia, a practising Sufi mystic, a follower of one 
of the (mostly legalistic) Six Schools of Thought, of a traditional movement 
such as the Barelwis, of a modernist revivalist movement such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood, or a totally apolitical group like Tablighi Jamaat. On top of all 
this, there is the entire spectrum of political persuasions, from the 
revolutionary left to lunatic right.215 
 
Furthermore, this complexity is exacerbated by the fact that many of these Islamic 
“denominations” have altered greatly as they have settled down in the UK over many 
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decades. Research by Jonathan Birt has shown how some of the ‘ulama based in the UK 
that follow the South Asian Deobandi tradition preach a slightly different Islam to their 
coreligionists in India.216 To add to all of that, one has then to reckon with the fact that 
a Muslim’s sectarian affiliations are not always obvious. It is a fairly common (but still 
correct) observation that Islam differs from Christianity by having less formal structures 
of authority and less hierarchical forms of internal organisation (see Chapter 5). 
Denominational boundaries are much less clear-cut, particularly in the UK where the 
tradition is still not very well-established. This means that it can seem that the further 
one looks into Islam in the UK the more one becomes aware of how little one really 
knows about it and how hard it is to describe. 
 
The problem then—and it is one of the major issues this study has had to deal with—is 
that by examining an inevitably limited number of theological positions in a little more 
depth than usual one risks misleadingly presenting certain Islamic traditions as 
representative of Islam in the UK as a whole. In fact, given all this, one could argue 
fairly persuasively that categories such as “Islam in the UK” and “British Muslims” are 
actually misleading and ought not to be used. Certainly, they can be employed in a 
misleading way, and often are. One can perhaps question the validity of surveys that 
claim to offer “the British Muslim view.” I do not, however, believe that inquiring into 
the relationship between Islam in Britain and British social and political life is 
necessarily misguided. To indicate briefly why, it is worth remembering one can take 
this point too far as well, as some analysts occasionally do by saying that there is no one 
“Islam” but rather many different “Islams.”217 Leaving aside the possibility that this may 
frustrate Muslims who find value in the fundamental unity of the Umma,218 this 
approach has major drawbacks. To illustrate, contrast the idea of Islam with the idea of 
the nation. There are many nations (plural!) in the world, and nationhood does have 
some normative aspects. People argue over “British character” and what it should 
mean. In these disputes, the British may contrast themselves with, say, the French 
(usually in a xenophobic way): “British character” may be viewed as better than “French 
character.” Frenchness, though, is never seen as a violation of Britishness. In this, 
Islamic traditions are different. It is not just the case that one tradition or sect might 
consider itself better than another tradition or sect; one tradition might be considered 
to violate standards in terms of which both traditions should be judged. That is why 
debates over what Islam prescribes can and (as we shall see) do cut across different 
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ethnicities, movements and political persuasions. A sociologist who stresses just the 
diversity in British Islam risks missing this.  
 
 
3.4.  Details of the research focus 
 
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, this study draws from speeches and opinions of, and 
debates between, Muslim clerics, scholars and activists operating in a wide variety of 
organisations in the UK, but concentrates upon and draws the majority of its primary 
material from three initiatives in particular. There were a number of reasons why they 
were chosen, but two are particularly significant. Firstly, they are interestingly placed in 
a broad narrative about Islam in the UK. They all emerged against a background of 
internal change in Islam and two were formed in response to an increasing interest in 
the faith after the events of September 11th 2001. I give details about this narrative in 
the following chapter, firstly to situate the initiatives, and secondly because without at 
least some knowledge of it discussing Islamic theology within the British context is 
made almost impossible. Secondly, they have some commonalities. Although they do it 
in slightly different ways, all three of these organisations have the aim of exposing 
different Islamic perspectives to a broad audience. This means the three organisations 
provide a window into broader debates in the UK. Each of them provides a platform 
for Islamic scholars, clerics and activists, many of whom have affiliations with other 
organisations within the UK. By listening in to their events one can gain an insight into 
the perspectives of people from major Islamic legal councils in the UK, representative 
organisations like the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), Muslim theologians from UK 
universities and representatives from Muslim women’s groups. I did from time to time 
use these organisations as a way of discovering clerics and activists, many of whose 
interpretations I have looked into further (see below). This means it has been possible 
to offer an account of debates that, at least to a limited extent, cut across the various 
“denominations” that Sardar outlines above. 
 
My encounter with the first of these three organisations was different to the two others, 
it being earlier, longer and closer. I worked with this organisation, known as Maslaha 
(after the Islamic legal term for the “public good”) initially for three months, three days 
out of each week. After that, I came into contact at regular intervals either to interview 
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the organisation’s managers, to assist with their work and to attend particular events 
that they held. The organisation is used at various points to illustrate the arguments 
made in the following chapters, yet it is worth mentioning that one of the main reasons 
I got involved with it is to help familiarise myself with and orient myself within the 
Islamic tradition, both in general and in the UK specifically. The vast majority of the 
individuals to whom I refer over the following chapters I became aware of first while I 
was working with that organisation. Working for that organisation also facilitated access 
to some other clerical figures who might otherwise have been rather reluctant to talk to 
an unfamiliar individual. Access has been a persistent problem in researching Muslim 
groups, with many mosques and other religious institutions being wary of having their 
activities recorded and published. Samia Bano observes in her study of Islamic legal 
councils that access “proved difficult, lengthy and problematic,” as does Sophie Gilliat-
Ray in her study of dar al-ulums.219 I have encountered similar reluctance in an unrelated 
project that involved interviews with university Islamic societies.220 Within these 
contexts—Shari‘a councils, dar al-ulums and Islamic societies, all of which are often seen 
as “hotbeds of radicalism”—there can be a degree of unease, seemingly based upon 
concerns about how the research may be used.221 To anyone who has read the 
sensationalist and frequently unethical research published on these institutions, this 
wariness is entirely understandable. All too often recent research has simply noted any 
illiberal utterances in publications and websites and then presented them, without any 
context and without paying much attention to contrasting perspectives, as the norm 
within Islam in Britain.222 In doing so, such research depicts organisations, even Islam 
in Britain as a whole, as a subversive presence. Understandable as this reluctance to let 
researchers have access may be, however, it still does not make it any easier to draw up 
a reliable portrait of Islam in Britain. 
 
The issue of access did, in fact, play a minor part in the choice of organisations. My 
work with Maslaha came about due to a connection with its parent organisation, and 
this, in turn, led me toward related individuals, although not directly to the other main 
points of focus. The other two initiatives I draw from are better known. The second, 
the Radical Middle Way, grew out of Q-News, a Muslim magazine which was established 
in 1992. Over the course of 2008 and into 2009 and 2010 I attended as many of the 
organisation’s meetings as I could, in addition to interviewing some of the people 
behind it. These meeting are held sporadically, and normally take the form either of 
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discussions with prominent Islamic scholars based in the UK and abroad or debates 
among the Muslim public on matters such as the role of women in Islam in Britain or 
the effect of the Internet upon the Umma. These are normally broadcast on the 
Internet, meaning that I have also drawn from a number of talks that took place before 
the period mentioned above. The same can be said, roughly, for the third organisation I 
concentrated upon, an Islamic circle called City Circle which meets most Friday 
evenings throughout the year. That organisation was set up in 1999 by a small group of 
Muslim professionals, but over the years has grown in stature and has hosted a number 
of prominent clerics, scholars and MPs. Again, during the period of research I attended 
as many of the organisation’s weekly meetings as possible, in addition to interviewing 
the organisation’s former Chair. Of course, all this information was easily accessible 
because it was gathered at public discussions at which people of any belief (and none) 
were welcome. This does, however, raise questions about possible bias: those 
institutions that are wary of social researchers tend to be more conservative. (That is 
certainly what is indicated from Bano’s and Gilliat Ray’s projects.) I discuss this 
potential limitation in more detail below. 
 
Together the information gleaned from these organisations, combined with visits to 
other organisations like the Islamic Foundation and the Muslim College, provides a 
wealth of material on a large number of individuals. I then added to this through the 
gathering together of books, published articles, essays, sermons and talks on various 
subjects and a total of thirteen interviews. Quantifying all this material is not a simple 
task, particularly because the amount of information I have obtained from different 
figures has varied considerably. In the case of the individual I have the most material 
on, it amounts to one interview, ten lectures of varying lengths, numerous magazine 
articles and fifteen long essays. In the case of those I have gathered relatively little on, it 
may be one or two speeches at events in London. The amount of material collected was 
usually somewhere between the two. The number of individuals I have gathered some 
kind of information on runs to approximately eighty; obtaining the exact figure is 
extremely difficult when one starts to factor in individuals on whom I gathered very 
little information, such as a short talk. But the number of individuals I have compiled a 
dedicated file on comes to forty seven. One thing I should stress about the research is 
that I have only rarely made efforts to anonymise individuals. The main reason for this 
is many of the people to whom I refer are public figures and many have some kind of 
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religious or academic authority. This means that what a person says often has to be 
understood in light of their role—not to mention the fact that the thesis brings together 
many different sources, so at times the text moves rapidly from the sermons of an 
individual I studied to essays they have written and interviews with them. (I specify all 
these sources in the endnotes.) This occasionally led to minor dilemmas. I have had to 
use my discretion from time to time (for example, when interviewees made ad hominem 
comments about other Islamic scholars), and there were some personal details I chose 
to leave out which, if it had been possible to anonymise the individuals in the study, I 
would almost certainly have included. 
 
 
3.5.  Locating “floating discourses” 
 
The quantity of information I draw on is, though, less significant than the far more 
complex issue of how it is situated. This is an issue that Roy engages with in depth in his 
groundbreaking book Globalised Islam. Roy recognises that today it is necessary to try 
and find new ways of examining Islam that look at theological discourses simply 
because there is, as he says himself, a “growing discrepancy between the forms taken by 
Islam in the West, and in the cultures of origin.”223 But he also highlights a major 
methodological problem researchers face: 
 
Yes we have data: books, articles, sermons, interviews and the vast amount of 
material to be found on the Internet, including private sites, chat rooms, and 
random postings. But it is difficult to ascribe to those who generate such 
material specific social categories ... and to fathom the impact they have on 
their fellow Muslims. To what extent do these floating discourses give way to 
social and political movements or even shape the behaviour and thinking of a 
significant number of believers?224  
 
Roy touches upon a whole host of difficulties in this passage. One of the issues that he 
is interested in is the impact upon the Islamic tradition of recent migrations, global 
communication flows (including the Internet) and current political conflicts. But this is 
an inherently difficult thing to do. Sociologists of religion such as José Casanova have 
managed to assess the effects of the new religious positions taken up by the Roman 
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Catholic Church after Vatican II within a multitude of different national contexts. This 
was possible only because of the formal structures of authority in Catholicism. The 
social researcher is able to look at the theological discussions from the Second Vatican 
Council and trace their direct influence in contexts such as the US, Brazil and Poland.225 
One of the problems sociologists have when they are looking at Islam is not only is the 
tradition less centralised, but in recent decades traditional structures of authority have 
been severely weakened, in part due to the emergence of new technologies such as mass 
education, print and the Internet.226 I examine the different effects of these 
developments in Chapter 5, but for now it is sufficient to merely highlight the huge 
difficulties they present for those wishing to research and represent Islam: they have 
made determining the social significance of Islamic theologies incredibly difficult, as 
increasing numbers claim to speak for Islam. 
 
One of the other difficulties—a closely related problem—is that one needs to be very 
aware of the way that specific social contexts shape particular utterances, an issue that 
Gill focuses on. To illustrate, consider one of his examples from a very different period. 
Christian theology, Gill observes, changed dramatically after the accession of 
Constantine in 312. In particular, before Constantine almost no theologian approved of 
Christian participation in battle. After Christianity came to power, however, this 
changed: very gradually Christian theologians began to justify taking part in wars, 
eventually developing just war theory.227 The social context, it seems, had the effect of 
determining the theological positions. In much the same way, it is necessary to consider 
how Islamic positions are shaped by context, in this case by things such as the Iraq war, 
the poor economic position of many Muslims, the evident unease found in the UK and 
Europe toward Islam, and so on. It is amazing how frequently this issue is completely 
ignored, giving the impression that a particular expression of a religious idea is shaped 
by nothing more than the texts. Even John Rawls suffers from this kind of problem. In 
Political Liberalism he simply assumes that “most intractable struggles ... are ... for 
religion, for philosophical views of the world, for different moral conceptions of the 
good.”228 For Rawls, the philosophy of life comes first then conflict ensues because of 
philosophical differences. This does not, however, always seem to be the case, going by 
historical examples. It was the economic crisis in Weimar Germany that allowed 
Nazism to flourish. Similarly, the rise of modern militant Islam cannot be understood 
without looking into the history of colonialism.229 Material conditions sometimes seem 
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to be prior to theological justifications. Indeed, as Alain Badiou has said of the “war on 
terror,” sometimes it seems that “Good, Evil and God [simply] serve as rhetorical 
ornaments to jousts of financial ferocity.”230 
 
The third issue, which Roy’s passage does not mention explicitly but which he is very 
much aware of, is how one locates particular theological accounts within specific 
traditions. In the UK certain theological traditions have become significant on account 
of many different factors, but particularly due to the history of migration from former 
British colonies.  When one encounters the sermons or speeches of a particular scholar 
one will usually not be able to represent him or her accurately if one is not aware of the 
theological traditions within which he or she works. One could say that when one 
encounters a particular religious scholar (who I’ll call Scholar X) one needs to give 
consideration to the following questions in order to successfully locate him or her 
within the British Islamic landscape:  
 
1. What kind of school of Islamic thought does Scholar X adhere to, or 
what organisation(s) does he or she belong to? 
2. How influential is that tradition or organisation and why? What set of 
circumstances—social, political, economic—led to it coming into 
existence and flourishing over a period of time? 
3. Is what Scholar X says representative of that school or organisation, or is 
his or her position stand out within it? 
4. What is Scholar X’s standing within that school or organisation? Does he 
or she have some kind of authority? 
 
 
3.6.  Situating the study 
 
These considerations have all had major implications for this study. Of course, it has 
been necessary to try and determine how much of an impact upon Islam in Britain the 
three initiatives I focus upon have, and how broad or narrow their constituencies are. 
This is not easy to do, but they do play a significant role in my view. I shall explain my 
full reasoning for this in later chapters rather than here, however, as it requires a 
significant amount of background detail. The more significant implication, which it is 
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worth giving details of here, relates to the way the research has been interpreted and 
presented in the chapters that follow. I mentioned earlier that the majority of research 
into Muslims and Islam conducted lately, certainly if one includes research conducted 
by think-tanks and polling agencies, has been survey based. One of the other common 
approaches, favoured particularly by academics (particularly in anthropology), has been 
to employ ethnographic methods.231 Unlike the surveys discussed earlier, I have nothing 
negative to say about this form of research. Indeed, this thesis would not work were it 
not for a number of available ethnographic studies. However, despite the fact that most 
of the research for this thesis has been at three “sites,” it would be highly misleading to 
describe it in these terms, particularly given the way I have needed to present the 
research over the following four chapters.  
 
One of the challenges for contemporary ethnography is to retain the distinctive aspect 
of the method, which is based on “immersion” in a particular context, with the 
increasing interconnectedness of the modern world. Etymologically, the term hints at 
the “writing” (graphikos) of a “unit of people” (ethnos); half a century ago it signified the 
classification of types, even “races,” of people. Yet today, of course, people are not 
generally found in coherent “units.” In the case of this particular study, even if I had 
wanted to present an ethnographic account, the sheer diversity of the individuals the 
research sites present the observer with would have made it almost impossible. During 
their events it is entirely common to be presented with Islamic scholars from California, 
Yemen and Egypt, and they address audiences in many different cities. Situating the 
material requires a huge amount of background detail. Moreover, theological stances 
often cannot be understood in isolation. 
 
To illustrate the point, consider the issue I discuss in Chapter 5: authority. It is next to 
impossible to discuss Islam meaningfully without touching upon issues of authority. 
After all, it is central to defining what Islam is: when people say Muslims don’t drink, or 
eat pork, or that they have to pray five times a day they implicitly rely upon a particular 
construction of authority in Islam. In this section of the thesis I attempt to consider 
approaches national loyalty and belonging, but inevitably a scholar’s argument on that 
topic involves a claim upon Islamic authority; the two issues are intimately linked. If a 
cleric says that Islam supplies arguments for national loyalty, it inevitably conflicts with 
other religious figures who claim that it does not. The majority of individuals working 
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in the organisations I concentrate upon do, indeed, make arguments on those lines, but 
one needs to know also who they argue against, whose authority they dispute. The topic 
thus requires a certain amount of contextualisation.  
 
The same can be said for all of the following four chapters. Chapter 6 for instance, 
which looks at the debates in these initiatives over the issue of recognising Islamic law 
in Britain, requires background detail about the different legal tribunals in the UK (or 
specifically, London) and how they were founded. Only then can one make sense of a 
debate between the individuals who work in them. The same can be said for Chapter 7, 
looking at attitudes to public funding. The chapters, therefore, each make efforts to 
contextualise the subject under discussion by outlining a broad picture, and do so by 
drawing extensively on secondary sources. Each one of them begins by setting the topic 
in some kind of context, and from there I go on to explore the debates and, in some 
cases, tease out significant political questions. 
 
 
3.7.  Weaknesses and limitations of the method 
 
It is important, of course, to bear in mind some of the limitations of this study, the 
majority of which are related to one thing. The main empirical focus of this thesis is the 
speeches and opinions of what Max Weber called the “religious virtuosi,”232 which 
makes it unusual, but also comes with the risk of neglecting what “lay” Muslims think. 
This issue is particularly vexing for a study informed by the liberal tradition, which has 
tended to emphasise the equality of all persons to the detriment of religious authority. 
To an extent, this can be avoided by making use of other research, which is abundant, 
but there are still some possible problems. 
 
 
3.7.1. Access and bias: “open” and “closed” worlds 
 
I mentioned earlier in this chapter that gaining access to the research sites was not a 
significant problem, and that this has not been the case in all research looking at Islamic 
institutions and Muslim groups. This presents a possible pitfall, namely, that the 
account I offer will be partial, and therefore misleading, on account of its being based 
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upon organisations that are open and welcoming and not those that are more wary of 
and reluctant to talk to outsiders—which seem, on available evidence, to be the 
organisations less open to social engagement. This problem can be overstated, as I have 
been able to relate the sites I concentrate upon to research conducted on other groups 
and Islamic traditions based in Britain. I should also point out that, while the three main 
organisations are managed by more liberal individuals, they still offer a platform to a 
wide variety of people—not all of whom share their open-ended attitudes to society. 
Nevertheless, I do acknowledge an imbalance. I do not examine in great detail youthful 
forms of Islamic radicalism and the utopian ideas that they tend to draw upon. Nor do 
I go into much detail about organisation such as Jamaat-i-Islami, which have had a 
significant impact on British Muslim politics.233 The only defence I have against this is 
that, even if there is an imbalance, one cannot object to it too strenuously given the 
biases of the media. As Charles Taylor has said:  
 
How many times does the European critic meet this kind of response: “But 
where are the Muslims who are criticising extremist Islam?” Of course, you 
patiently explain that you are not likely to find them in the drawing rooms of 
Paris journalists or the French political class....  Contributions ... are urgently 
needed to impart further depth and realism to the often frighteningly one-
dimensional western debate on Islam.234 
 
 
3.7.2. Religious authorities, reliability and representation 
 
Another difficulty is that paying an unusually high level of attention to clerics and 
religious scholars involves having to assess the reliability of specific claims they make 
about organisations or Muslims in the UK as a whole. Sometimes claims made by the 
leaders of Muslim organisations are clearly dubious. For example, the founding 
manifesto of the Muslim Institute, an organisation that was launched following the 
Rushdie affair and that was driven by a separatist agenda, makes the odd claim that 
there are no divisions or generational tensions in British Islam.235 This claim is, as we 
shall see, quite clearly false. More seriously, some of the clerical figures I spoke and 
listened to claimed the Islamic legal tribunals in Britain do not disadvantage women in 
any way, which conflicts with reliable research on the subject. This may be linked to 
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what could be a tendency to try to present one’s organisation, tradition or even Islam as 
a whole in a positive light. The most vivid illustration of this I encountered was during 
a discussion of women in Islam in Britain, where the daughter of one of the members 
of a large Islamic legal tribunal admitted: 
 
It is hard because the men are pleased that I’m there but rather embarrassed, 
and try to hide me when they can, maybe just bringing me to the front when 
there’s a camera team there because it looks good. 
 
This is where in-depth ethnographic research has a definite advantage over the type of 
research offered here, as it is better placed to bring hidden aspects and power dynamics 
to the fore. As outlined above, I do draw upon this kind of research where possible (see 
Chapter 6 for more detail on this specific issue). In addition, most of the claims I 
encountered were, I discovered upon checking, well informed. Sometimes also religious 
scholars are able to relate their own experiences to good effect. Even so, this is a 
potential weakness and worth bearing it in mind. 
 
 
3.7.3. Religious authorities and gender 
 
Concentrating on individuals who are regarded as religious authorities also raises a 
number of significant questions about how this thesis deals with the vexed issue of 
gender, and gender power within the Islamic tradition. Islam is often characterised, not 
entirely without reason, as being a male-dominated, structured in such a way that 
women find themselves marginalised and unable to contribute to debates about how 
the tradition should be interpreted. The quotation above about where women are 
placed in the UK’s Islamic legal tribunals hints at this problem. The real risk for a study 
such as this is that by focusing on those who are considered to have some kind of 
religious authority I contribute to marginalisation of women by allowing the latter to be 
represented by people who exclude them. 
 
This is obviously a criticism that is not easy to brush aside, but, again, one has to be 
aware that it is possible to exaggerate the extent to which Muslim women find 
themselves marginalised in intra-Muslim debates. It is important to stress that while 
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people who lead prayers (imams) are almost always236 men there is no barrier in theory, 
according to many traditions in Islam, to women becoming religious scholars. In the 
West there are a number of female scholars, such as the German-born convert to Islam 
Sheikha Halima Krausen and Ingrid Mattson, the current President of the Islamic 
Society of North America, who visited the UK on a number of occasions between 2007 
and 2010. It is worth bearing in mind, too, that not all participants in debates about 
Islam are religious authorities in the traditional sense. Indeed, Islamic scholars have 
begun to lose their monopoly on religious interpretation (see Chpater 5).237 Many of the 
people contributing to the emergent Islamic public sphere are activists of many kinds, a 
number of whom work within Muslim women’s groups. The chapters that follow 
include the insights of women activists who are frequently strongly critical of the 
existing religious authorities. All three of the organisations that I draw from, also, have 
been at some point managed by women. 
 
It remains the case, though, that the majority of people in the UK who get to speak for 
and define the Islamic tradition are men. To the best of my knowledge, there are no 
women in any kind of positions of influence in the Islamic legal tribunals, for example, 
save in a fairly marginal “advisory” capacity. To try to give an account of a discussion of 
the different interpretations of Islam one finds in Britain is, to some extent, to describe 
a conversation that is mostly between men, and from which women can be excluded. It 
does not necessarily follow, of course, that this study is not worthwhile: the House of 
Commons is dominated by men too, and no-one would argue that that arena is not 
worthy of sociological study. Even so, striking a balance between accurately depicting 
and unwittingly colluding in power relations is a fine one. I have tried to avoid the 
latter, but some may consider unsuccessfully. 
 
 
3.8.  Conclusion: relating theory to reality 
 
“Political philosophy,” Michael Sandel once observed, “seems often to reside at a 
distance from the world.”238 It can appear that when liberal theorists write about public, 
political debates often they have in mind, as Bruno Latour has caustically remarked, 
conversations held only between “men of good will [who assemble] with their cigars in 
the Habermas Club.”239 In reality, of course, public debates are situated and therefore 
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messy and frequently antagonistic affairs. Public debates between Muslims in the UK 
are no exception to this general rule. One of the major problems in British public life at 
the moment, though, is that debates about Islam have not always fully appreciated this 
fairly obvious fact. Often, in truth, debates about Islam seem to work from a version of 
the tradition that existed five-hundred or so years ago rather than the tradition as it 
exists today. (For a good example of this, see Chapter 6.) There is therefore a need to 
try and connect the more abstract discussions that one finds in political theory with the 
actual debates, so to speak, “on the ground.” 
 
Doing this, though, presents many significant practical challenges. Power differences of 
all kinds suddenly emerge. One has to start considering whether those who publicly 
articulate what Rawls might call an “unreasonable” position have been influenced by an 
unfortunate set of social conditions. Most significantly of all, one has to contend with 
the sheer diversity of perspectives on any given issue. The four chapters that follow, of 
course, do not get anywhere near to a full account these perspectives. All that they aim 
to do is facilitate a constructive conversation. For this conversation to be broadened 
and turned in a positive direction it will take much more sustained reflection on how to 
best research, represent and engage with religious ideas. One can only hope that such a 
process of reflection will emerge in the future.  
101 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Intergenerational transitions and emerging 
Islamic theologies 
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4.1.   Islam as a permanent feature 
 
Scholars are often keen to point out that Islam is not, contrary to popular perception, a 
new feature in Britain. This was observed recently by Abdullah Saeed, for example, who 
has observed that rather than it being “a recent phenomenon mostly of the twentieth 
century, Islam, from its inception in the seventh century CE, has been part of the 
Christian West and the western psyche.”240 On a level, this is entirely true. As far back 
as 1641 documents refer to sects existing in London “with a certaine foolish beliefe of 
Mahomet.”241 Further back still, in 1541, Elizabeth I formed an alliance with the rulers 
of the Ottoman Empire ostensibly on the grounds that Islam and Protestantism are 
similar faiths, both rejecting the “idolatry” of the Roman Church (although one does 
suspect that this early exercise in inter-faith engagement was motivated more by mutual 
political opposition to the King of Spain than it was by principled scriptural 
reasoning).242 There are even records of the powerful Anglo-Saxon king Offa of Mercia, 
who died in 796, having coins minted that had the shahada inscribed in Arabic on one 
side.243 This argument is well-intentioned too, trying as it does to undercut anti-Muslim, 
anti-immigration rhetoric, which regularly speaks of a recent “invasion.” The point 
being made is that Islam should not be regarded as a foreign presence in Britain 
because, as the historian Richard Bulliet has contended, the historical development of 
Christianity and Islam are so closely intertwined that they are best understood as two 
strands of a “common socio-religious system.”244 
 
Even so, such arguments cannot hide the fact that the twentieth century, and the last 
fifty or so years in particular, has seen something quite novel. One can see this just 
from taking a glance at recent statistics. In 1951 there were 21,000 Muslims in Britain, 
which at the time accounted for around 0.05 percent of the country’s population.245 In 
2001 there were 1.6 million, 2.7 percent of the total, with the figure increasing to 8.5 
percent in the nation’s capital and even higher in other cities.246 This trend looks set to 
continue, for the foreseeable future at least. Britain’s Muslim population is young, the 
youngest of any religious group in the UK. The Bangladeshi and Pakistani households 
into which the vast majority of the country’s Muslims are born are on average almost 
twice the size of those of the white majority. One in three Muslims in Britain is below 
sixteen, compared to one in five of the population as a whole.247 It is therefore sensible 
to expect that, regardless of whether or not UK immigration policy continues to 
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become more and more restrictive, there will be about three million British Muslims by 
2021, about 4.4 percent of the total population.248  
 
What has happened for the first time during the last century is that a significant 
minority of Muslims has settled in Britain—and a number of other European states—
permanently. The main driver of this has been economic need, both the needs of the 
incoming migrants and the need in the UK for greater labour power in the periods 
before and during the two world wars. The first mass migration to the UK by Muslims 
occurred around the time of the First World War after the fighting on the Continent 
resulted in huge demand for men to replace those abroad. Muslim seamen from the 
colonies were attracted to port towns in the UK such as Cardiff, Newport and South 
Shields. This first wave of Muslim migrants was, to put it bluntly, treated appallingly 
after the war ended. The return of the demobilised soldiers and the drastic economic 
downturn led to increasing hostility toward “coloured” workers, and the passing of the 
Alien Restriction (Amendment) Bill in 1919 and the Aliens Order in 1920 severely 
restricted the ability of non-white British residents to get paid work. Many Muslim 
seamen were driven into desperate poverty and squalor, which the white majority 
responded to by suggesting they just lacked proper “Christian” morals and standards of 
propriety. This poor treatment understandably dissuaded more Muslims from the 
colonies from making the significant journey across to the British Isles, and as a result 
this migration remained relatively small in numbers—even though these first settlers 
did beat a path others would later follow.249  
 
As the statistics above indicate, only during the 1960s did migration of Muslim workers 
from the now former colonies become significant. During the 1950s and ’60s large 
numbers of Muslims came to the UK, drawn primarily by the possibility of work that 
paid more than, say, the £30 per year that was standard in 1960s Pakistan.250 This 
migration tended to take the form of a “chain,” with initial “pioneer” migrants from 
South Asia being later joined first by their immediate family, and then in many cases by 
members of extended kinship networks (biradaris). In addition to this, migrants from a 
large number of different locations were pushed toward the UK by events such as the 
partitioning of India and later Cyprus, or various forms of political upheaval taking 
place in areas such as Somalia. This led, as we saw in the previous chapter, to high 
levels of ethnic diversity among Britain’s Muslim population. The majority of British 
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Muslims today—a little over two thirds—are of South Asian origin, with a little under 
half coming from areas in Pakistan. The remaining third come from a whole host of 
different national and linguistic contexts: 60,000 from Eastern Europe; 40,000 from 
Somalia or other central- and east-African countries; 7000 from Nigeria; smaller 
numbers from Turkey and north-Africa; and then, of course, a fairly small collection of 
converts whose ancestry is in the UK.251 
 
The initial motor for this wave of migration may have been primarily economic, but 
slowly a more interesting—and it is tempting to suggest meaningful—relationship has 
developed. The majority of the migrants that made the journey to the UK did not 
believe that it would become their permanent place of residence, or that they would 
become “settlers” rather than just “sojourners.” Nevertheless, that is what happened, 
with the dream of return gradually diminishing. Muslims have in significant numbers set 
roots down in the UK. This resulted in changes in the composition of the Muslim 
communities in Britain, changes that will be my primary focus in this chapter. My aim 
in what follows is to give a brief description of the religious traditions that settled in the 
UK as a result of these migrations, and then to examine some of the shifts that these 
traditions have undergone over time, which will involve a detailed account of the 
organisations that this thesis focuses upon, as well as a broader discussion of some 
emerging forms of Islamic theology. I begin with a short description of the process of 
community formation during the 1960s. Then I outline some of the traditions that have 
been imported into Britain from South Asia before going on to look at some tensions 
and differences that have emerged across generations. This provides the backdrop to 
the following discussion of newer theologies. Finally in this chapter I consider briefly 
the possible emergence of a distinctive British Islam. 
 
 
4.2.  The settling of Islam in Britain 
 
According to Humayun Ansari, prior to the 1950s modernist forms of Islam were in 
the ascendant in the UK. The Muslim port communities in Cardiff and South Shields 
were fairly small and slow to establish religious institutions. The main Islamic centres 
were places such as Liverpool, where for a while there was a Muslim collective active in 
the public domain led by the prominent convert William Abdullah Quilliam, and 
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Woking, where members of the pan-Islamic movement (not to be confused with what 
today is sometimes referred to as “pan-Islamism”) ran a successful mission from the 
small but impressive-looking Shah Jahan Mosque. Recognising that to make Islam 
appealing to a British audience it would need to be presented to them in a form they 
would recognise, these groups wrote in English, drew parallels with Christianity and 
challenged the traditional position regarding the seclusion of women (purda) and 
punishments for “apostates” in Islam.252 Members of the Pan-Islamic Society in 
London also distilled the hadith collections into short books with the main aim of 
correcting misconceptions about the Islamic faith.253 
 
The migrants that journeyed to the UK from South Asia, by contrast, tended to 
subscribe to a more modest form of Islam, even perhaps a simpler form. As Philip 
Lewis has observed, most Muslims living in Britain can trace their ancestry to “rural 
contexts where Islam was part of the rhythm of life, its prayer times and local festivals 
devoted to ‘the friends of God’—dynasties of holy men accessible through shrines 
dotting the countryside—enriching its religious calendar.”254 In these contexts, Islam is 
a largely unself-conscious part of a shared oral tradition. Ansari and Lewis concur that 
as the first generation of Muslim migrants’ dreams of one day returning to their native 
country began to fade they started to construct institutions and communities that would 
enable them to practice their faith as best they could and help them preserve their 
traditions for future generations. They made efforts to import their particular 
understanding of Islam into the UK—sometimes literally, with imams being brought to 
the UK from overseas—and slowly from the 1960s through into the 1970s and ’80s 
these forms of Islam became dominant. Mosques and madrasas were set up which 
inevitably reflected the particular linguistic and doctrinal character of their founders.255 
Indeed, the creation of these institutions following migration led to Muslim migrants 
separating into groups, as Ansari explains: 
 
Segregation [between Muslims followed chain migration], and previously 
ethnically mixed Muslim communities increasingly fragmented according to 
village-kinship, tribal, ethnic and sectarian affiliation. Indians, Yemenis and 
Turkish Cypriots who had lived together in boarding houses during and after 
the Second World War, sharing more or less the same religious facilities, 
gradually separated to form ethnic settlements that then established their own 
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distinct institutions. Mosques and religious schools also reflected this process 
of segmentation, and imported religious functionaries reminded Muslims of 
their traditional values and reinforced conformity to embedded practices. 
These Muslim communities, close-knit and relatively self-contained though 
often internally divided, became, as Fred Halliday has put it, “urban villages” 
interacting with the broader society surrounding them in a selective fashion.256 
They were able to generate and sustain institutional infrastructures that 
embodied and perpetuated specific religious and cultural norms. What 
emerged at the end of the 1970s was a patchwork of communities, each 
impressing its particular national, ethnic, linguistic and doctrinal character on 
the organisations it had created.257 
 
These new communities in which religious, ethnic and cultural identification were all 
tied into one another were semi-autonomous, often providing support networks for 
their members. They remained aloof from British society to an extent,258 making few 
demands and entering into political debates rarely. When Muslims did enter into 
political debates it was generally to secure accommodations from government, most 
successfully in education. During the 1970s numerous efforts were made to change 
education policy, for a variety of reasons—in response to classroom racism, or as part 
of an effort to purge the curriculum of Orientalist references to the “fanaticism of the 
infidel”—but primarily to secure the continuation of these ethno-religious groups. For 
some, this meant protecting younger Muslims from “undesirable” influences in British 
society, with requests being made for the expansion of same-sex schools, or schools 
with a specific confessional ethos.259 Such efforts to keep communities together also 
affected marriage patterns profoundly, the selection of a marriage partner often being 
partly determined by ethno-religious loyalties. Arranged marriage partners were often 
chosen from within a specific community or extended kinship network, particularly by 
South Asian families with strong rural ties.260  
 
 
4.3.  Sectarian affiliations 
 
Because the Muslim population in Britain is so diverse in terms of its ancestry it is 
impossibly difficult to describe all the different varieties of Islam that emerged in the 
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UK following the post-World War II period of migration. There are, however, two 
strands of the Islamic tradition that have been particularly influential due to the fact 
that they predominate in the South Asian context. The first mosques established in 
Britain had no obvious affiliations with any particular school of thought or sectarian 
tradition as most arose out of local initiatives.261 Yet as the different ethno-religious 
communities became more established sectarian affiliations became more pronounced, 
with the majority of mosques in the UK eventually becoming to some degree linked to 
the Barelwi or the Deobandi traditions.  
 
Both the Barelwi and Deobandi movements emerged in the 1850s during the period of 
British colonial rule in India. The former is the largest in Britain, followed by the latter. 
Barelwis follow a form of essentially Sufi-inspired devotional Islam which was 
consolidated in Bareilly in northern India, after which the tradition is named. In the 
Barelwi tradition devotional love of Muhammad is emphasised strongly, to the extent 
that the Prophet is imbued with almost divine status. In Britain, the Barelwi groups 
follow primarily the Chisti, Naqshabandi and Qadiri Sufi orders. Mystical experience 
and intercession between layman and God by minor saints and charismatic spiritual 
teachers (pirs) are both seen as acceptable, a tendency that goes firmly against Deobandi 
orthodoxy, as well as Saudi Wahhabism. Cities such as Bradford have large Barelwi 
communities, with fifteen of the thirty-four mosques that were based there during the 
late 1980s being linked to the tradition.262 
 
The Deobandi movement is historically based on the teachings of the Dar al-Ulum 
Deoband in India, which was founded in the 1860s by a group of ‘ulama who were 
committed to preserving Islamic scholarship and learning at a time when the influence 
of the British and Christian elite was steadily growing, and who sought to create centres 
for the study of Islam that would be independent both of British and older aristocratic 
sources of patronage.263 The movement is “reformist” in the sense that it has tended to 
subvert classical scholarship by insisting that Islamic norms must be linked to scriptural 
proofs found in the Qur’an and collections of hadith.264 Its focus on scripture and the 
concomitant disregarding of philosophy, logic and Persian language and literature has 
given the movement a reputation for being literalistic and puritanical. This reputation is 
not altogether undeserved, yet in contrast to politicised Islamic movements such as 
Jamaat-i-Islami the Deobandi movement has tended to emphasise the importance of 
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reforming the individual morally rather than concentrating on society or the state. 
Although it has had political influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan (where it has shaped 
the thinking of the Taliban), it has generally been apolitical or even anti-political.265 In 
the UK this anti-political trend has become predominant, partly due to the outreach 
movement Tablighi Jama‘at, which has its European headquarters in Dewsbury. The 
Deobandi movement is particularly strong in Leicester and Birmingham, and has been 
successful in establishing a sizeable network of dar al-ulums in locations across the UK, 
with a main centre of learning based in Bury.266 
 
It is an interesting question to ask, and a difficult one to answer, quite how self-
consciously Muslims in the UK see themselves as part of these movements, and the 
extent to which they shape Islam within the UK. Many mosques and institutions such 
as legal tribunals do not acknowledge any kind of affiliation, but are still influenced by 
and appeal to a particular tradition’s scholarship. Jessica Jacobson recalls that in her 
interviews with young Pakistanis self-identification with these traditions was very rare, 
and only occasionally did I come across references to them in my own research.267 For 
younger Muslims particularly, these denominational affiliations appear to be far less 
relevant, even an unnecessary inconvenience. There is evidence indicating that these 
affiliations have been a significant source of conflict between South Asian Muslims in 
the UK, particularly in relation to control of mosques, reflecting parallel conflicts that 
have occurred in India and Pakistan.268 They also appear to have influenced the 
bewilderingly complex web of Muslim representative bodies and organisations aimed at 
bringing all Britain’s mosques under a single umbrella. The Muslim Council of Britain 
(MCB)—the largest Muslim representative organisation in the UK—only contains on 
its central committee two Barelwi scholars.269 By contrast, The British Muslim Forum is 
closely linked to the Barelwi tradition. In the 1980s the two organisations set up to link 
together different mosques, the Council of Imams and Mosques (COIM) and the 
Council of Mosques (COM), were split along these lines, the former becoming a pole of 
attraction for Barelwi organisations.270 The latest organisation to be set up with a similar 
aim, the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB), has also been 
accused of excluding Deobandis from its Board.271 Finally, it is certainly the case that 
these traditions have had a significant impact on Islamic education, particularly the 
Deobandi movement, as noted above. 
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4.4.  Transmitting traditions 
 
There have been vigorous debates, particularly since the terrorist attacks of 2005, over 
whether it is a good thing to have different ethno-religious minorities living in Britain in 
semi-autonomous units, each with their own support networks. Some have been deeply 
unsettled by their emergence. Chetan Bhatt and others have maintained that these 
“autarchic” (Bhatt’s term) ethno-religious communities all too often, as part of an effort 
to survive in a confusing and often hostile environment, resort to tactics of disciplining 
their wayward members, particularly women who have “transgressed.” Self-appointed 
leaders or elders too often seek, he maintains, to speak for the younger generation, 
causing profound frustration.272 Other critics, usually on the political Right but 
increasingly also on the centre-Left, have suggested that these communities have 
seriously damaged national togetherness.273 This is, of course, an important debate, but 
it has not always taken into account intergenerational changes, internal differences, and 
the profound difficulties that the ethno-religious groups that emerged in the UK in the 
’70s have actually had maintaining themselves and their interpretations of Islam in a 
stable state over time. Lewis is very clear about this, arguing that “many parents and 
religious leaders, imported into Britain’s mosques from the [South Asian] religio-
cultural world, are often at a loss to help their children answer questions about Islam 
posed by school friends, teachers or youth workers.” They are, he suggests, unable to 
provide Islamic teachings that “can connect with [the] lived experience [of] British 
Muslims whose first language is English.”274 
 
An insight into some of these problems can be gained by looking at the content of the 
curriculum taught in some of the Deobandi dar al-ulums in Britain. Research into these 
institutions has indicated that, at least until relatively recently, they worked from an 
attenuated version of the religious education syllabus developed in Lucknow known as 
dars-i-nizami, which was itself inherited from eighteenth-century Farangi Mahall scholars. 
The education syllabus developed by these earlier scholars was rich, covering elements 
of Persian literature, logic and mathematics. For reasons outlined earlier, these elements 
were marginalised by the Deobandis in favour of renewed emphasis on the Qur’an and 
hadith and the preservation of the core “Islamic sciences” (that is to say, techniques for 
exegesis and the formulation of legal opinions).275 This is reflected in the British 
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institutions too, where the curriculum has focused on the writing and studying of 
textual commentaries, usually on matters of law and hadith. Students are required to 
translate the Qur’an and the “Sound Six” hadith collections from Arabic into Urdu, and 
are asked to show an awareness of key texts and commentaries. They may be 
encouraged to ask questions of clarification, but not substance. Teaching itself has 
often been in the medium of Urdu, with a minimal English curriculum taught in the 
afternoon to conform to English law.276 
 
The problem with this that a number of academics—and indeed some Muslim religious 
leaders277—have identified is that it lacks much by way of a relationship to the particular 
history and character of the UK. The centres produce new religious leaders yet, as 
Sophie Gilliat-Ray has observed, “what is striking is the absence of subjects that might 
help graduates engage with British Muslim youth, and the society in which they are 
based.”278 Interestingly, some of the younger Deobandi ‘ulama began to react to some of 
these difficulties during the 1990s, and these changes have continued up to the present. 
Jonathan Birt has studied a prominent Birmingham-based ‘alim trained in the UK and 
the Al-Azhar in Egypt named Riyadhul Haq, and highlighted how he has become a 
“self-conscious pioneer, struggling to bring the reform message to an often sceptical, 
even cynical Muslim constituency.” In Haq’s (usually admonitory) preaching South 
Asian cultural and religious references are downplayed and very few explicit mentions 
are made of the virtues of the Deobandi elders, which is standard in many of the 
seminaries within the UK.279 Haq’s sermons are often scornful of the West, and 
contemptuous of the “war on terror”; he is by no means an open-ended liberal. Yet his 
preaching has subtly modified the Deobandi tradition in order to appeal to young 
Muslims for whom South Asia is less relevant. 
 
Yet despite these internal changes most of the institutions of religious learning remain 
disconnected from the society in which they are placed, and have little appeal for many 
young Muslims. The situation in mosques seems to be very similar. A recent study of 
the mosques in the UK, which surveyed five-hundred of the country’s fifteen-hundred 
or so masjids, indicated that 44 percent of mosques do not include English in any part of 
their Friday sermons, preferring instead Punjabi, Bengali or Guajarati.280 Figures from 
the Foreign Office also indicate that large numbers of imams are still coming to the UK 
to serve in places of worship,281 meaning that perhaps 90 percent receive their initial 
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religious formation abroad.282 Women appear also to be for the most part excluded 
from these places of worship: only 46 percent have prayer facilities for women, and 
only rarely can women speak with an imam.283 
 
 
4.5.  Broken chains of transmission? 
 
According to many commentators and social scientists, this has resulted in separation 
between young, English-speaking Muslim men and women who hold their faith to be 
of fundamental importance and the older, often foreign-born individuals who retain 
control over the majority of mosques. It has also caused young Muslims to turn to 
other outlets for their religious guidance. Whatever impact the mosques and dar al-ulums 
have had in the UK, they have not prevented slow sociological changes occurring in 
Muslim families across generations. In Britain the geographical isolation of South Asian 
ethno-religious groups has diminished in recent decades.284 Although Muslim families 
are still usually larger than the average, British-born Muslims tend to have slightly 
smaller families than those born abroad.285 Nor has it prevented questions being asked 
about the varieties of Islam passed down by parents. One good example concerns the 
finding of a marriage partner. Younger Bangladeshis and Pakistanis are far more likely 
than their parents to consider marriage partners from outside their families’ kinship 
groups or countries of origin, and some are willing to consider partners who are white 
provided that they are Muslim.286 Pakistani women with high qualifications and who are 
in skilled employment are particularly likely to be vocal in asserting their choice of a 
spouse.287 This has, as we shall see in Chapter 6, led to tensions in some cases, the 
reasons for which Olivier Roy has noted: 
 
The media have tended to focus on the plight of girls caught between two 
cultures. But if these cases seem to be increasing (forced marriages, the hijab, 
honour crimes, rape), it is because Muslim girls are increasingly escaping from 
their traditional position. The disruption of traditional family patters is 
particularly obvious in Western Europe in neighbourhoods that are often 
supposed to be experiencing re-Islamisation.288  
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It is tempting when considering these cases of women “torn between two cultures” to 
see the differences in terms of a simple binary division: the young women are more 
Western, more modern and less religious, and their older relatives are more Islamic and 
more traditional. But the reality is much more complex than that. Firstly, in some cases 
it appears these conflicts arise because arranged endogamous marriages are being used 
as a way of bringing friends and distant relatives to the West, so neither “culture” nor 
“religion” is really relevant.289 It is also worth emphasising that Muslim women in the 
UK still generally agree that parents should have some say in the choice of the marriage 
partner for their offspring.290 The real reason this analysis fails, though, is that religion, 
culture and tradition rarely link up in the way that this binary categorisation implies that 
they will. Certainly, secular and transgressive aesthetic traditions have been drawn upon 
by younger South Asians in opposition to the perceived puritanism of the “community 
elders.”291 Yet what is striking about the ethnographic literature on Muslims is how 
often one comes across younger Muslims making criticisms, not of Islam as such, but 
rather of parents getting “religion and culture mixed up”292 or confusing “the traditions 
of their little village with [Islam].”293 Islamic ideas are drawn upon to contest the form 
of Islam inherited via a cultural tradition and to challenge the position of women in the 
ancestral contexts of the first generation. (Both of these two quotes are from Muslims 
objecting to imposed endogamous marriages.)294 
 
This represents just one way, out of many, in which Islam has been employed in new 
ways by young Muslims in response to being brought up in a drastically different 
context to their parents. Of course the cases that tend to attract the most attention, 
both among academics and the media, are those young Muslims whose frustration with 
their parents’ faith leads them to adopt a literalistic and intolerant form of Islam. Many 
analysts of religious literalism in the UK view the growth of young Muslim radicalism as 
at least partly the consequence of mainstream Sunni Islamic traditions in Britain being 
unable to connect with Muslims who have been educated—sometimes to a higher level 
than their parents—in this country. Radical parties can sometimes, in the opinion of 
one former member of the radical revivalist party Hizb ut-Tahrir, “fill a void for the 
young intellectually frustrated youth who had been told that Islam is the truth and they 
must pray and fast by people who couldn’t explain why.”295 The comments of Hassan 
Saleemi, another ex-Hizb ut-Tahrir member and now one half of the Islam Channel’s 
Hassan and Habibah Show, support this: 
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By the age of eighteen—with the unearthing of Public Enemy, who were 
talking about “fight the power,” imperialism and slavery—I was unhappy with 
Pakistani Asian culture, I was unhappy with British culture and I was not 
happy with the sectarianism in my local mosque. I felt alienated from Muslims 
and I had some grounding in colonialism. I had a history GCSE and was doing 
a history A-level as well, so I knew a bit about colonialism ... and ... Bosnia.... 
And [then] there was a tall white guy outside my mosque talking about Bosnia 
and Kashmir, and giving out leaflets, and the fact that he was white struck me. 
I attended the talk, and you could say the rest is history. [Hizb] were non-
sectarian, they were internationalist.296 
 
As Saleemi notes in this passage, groups such as Hizb are “internationalist” in that they 
aim to traverse all ethnic, national and linguistic differences to bring all Muslims under 
the banner of Islam through, they claim, the re-establishment of the Caliphate. They 
thus have, as Roy, Lewis and Bhatt have noted, appeal for Muslims who are seeking to 
cast off cultural inheritances that do not appeal to them.297 This form of Islam has been 
described well by Bhikhu Parekh: 
 
Many of them read Arabic, have direct access to the text, and interpret it 
themselves or rely on others like them. Islam is “purged” of local culture and 
is textual in its orientation. It is not woven into a taken-for-granted aspect of 
their lives as it is for their parents, but a self-consciously adopted badge of 
identity needing constantly to be asserted, an ideology providing them with a 
clear programme of action. Since it is a matter of conscious commitment, it is 
shadowed by a deep fear that the commitment might weaken or become 
diluted. They therefore become rigid and uncompromising in their religiosity, 
both to guard themselves against the fear that they might slacken, and to ask 
others to pull them up if they should do so.298 
 
There are reasons to proceed carefully here. To point out that these forms of Islam 
have been purged of their parents’ cultural influences is not to say that they represent a 
“pure form” of Islam necessarily—even if that is what the people who affirm this often 
rigid creed sometimes explicitly state. It would be very wrong to regard these rigid 
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forms of Islam as the only forms willing to base themselves upon the inner “essence” 
or “core” of the Islamic tradition. Of course, it is difficult to say whether someone’s 
interpretation of the Islamic tradition does or does not reflect its “inner core” without 
offering some kind of theological polemic, which I do not wish to get into now, even 
despite my undoubted interest in Islamic theology. Even so, there are some points one 
can make. What is striking about some forms of Islamic revivalism is the way they have 
drawn upon classical Islamic scholarship, but in novel ways. For example, some forms 
of religious extremism have argued that military jihad is not a matter for political 
institutions with some form of jurisdiction, but ought to be considered a personal 
obligation (fard ‘ayn) incumbent on every Muslim.299 Extreme interpretations have also 
been known to employ revolutionary rhetoric, even despite the fact that medieval fiqh, 
particularly in the Sunni tradition, tended to forbid the overthrow of one’s rulers even if 
they were unjust, as that was regarded as preferable to strife and the dissolution of 
society (fitna).300 Many of these forms of Islam have been, in the view of John Gray and 
others, shaped as much by the ideologies of the revolutionary Left as they have by the 
mainstream Islamic legal tradition.301  
 
More significantly for this discussion, there are good reasons for thinking these 
abrasive, uncompromising forms of Islam have been influenced by the very Western 
societies that movements such as Hizb so vehemently reject. This relationship is 
certainly multifaceted, taking in aspects of Leftist utopianism (the stress placed upon 
the future Caliphate’s establishment), youth culture (the mobilisation of a “protest 
identity” and the use of forums on websites such as “Traditional Islamism,” “Islamic 
Awakening” and “Salafi Manhaj”)302 and even materialism (the defining of the self 
through the ostentatious wearing of clothing).303 Nevertheless, it is hard to deny: one 
can see from the excerpt above that Saleemi was influenced by Public Enemy. This 
relationship has not gone unnoticed by some contemporary Muslim theologians too. 
Suhaib Webb, a charismatic American preacher, has said the following on the issue. If 
one can overlook the fairly explicit theological polemic, it can work as a fairly accurate 
précis of what has been argued by Roy and others: 
 
[We need to understand], in the spirit of Ibn Khaldun,304 the sociological 
reality of the Western Muslim. We come from the DMX madhhab.305 We come 
from Star Wars. We come from professional wrestling. We come from Bruce 
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Lee. We come from a misogynistic reality that dominates women, in hip hop 
music.... And you give this religion to someone who comes from that 
background and what type of mentality is he going to have to his fellow 
brothers and sisters? He is Luke and Obi-Wan vs. Darth Vader.... [T]he social 
constructs that we live [with] in the West are those of domination. We seek to 
dominate others—and then we’re given a group mentality that transforms 
itself into attacking fellow Muslims.... [S]o Hulk Hogan and Andre the Giant 
now know about Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Arabi,306 and they’re going to take it to 
the masjid and battle each other! Go on-line and look at our forums about how 
we talk about scholars and individuals, how we talk about each other—the 
hatred, the spite. Why? DMX mentality.307 
 
 
4.6.  New platforms for Islamic knowledge 
 
As I noted earlier, much has been written about these radical, youthful forms of Islam. 
So much has been written, in fact, that there is there is a real risk that even academics 
whose main aim is simply to clear up misunderstandings of the nature of “Islamism” 
can end up giving the impression that these forms are more pervasive and influential 
than they actually are. It is worth pointing out that, despite the impression the media 
may give, this kind of radical response to frustration with one’s parents’ religion is not 
inevitable, or even very common.308 It is thus worth examining some of the other ways 
in which these differences have come to the surface through different articulations of 
Islamic ideas and principles. Against this backdrop, it becomes much easier to see why, 
as I observed in Chapter 1, a wide variety of other novel initiatives, theologians and 
activists have come to the surface, many which have attempted to circumvent older 
institutions and producers of Islamic knowledge, offering information that is not easily 
accessible via the more established routes such as mosques. These are what I propose 
to examine in the rest of this chapter. 
 
There have been, unsurprisingly, some moves in formal educational institutions to 
respond directly to changed cultural circumstances. The clearest example of this is the 
Muslim College, which is located in Ealing in the suburbs of West London. The Muslim 
College was established by Zaki Badawi, who up until his death in 2006 was arguably 
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the person who had done most to establish Islamic institutions in Britain and set out 
arguments in their favour. The institution was established as a response to the perceived 
need, as one of its current senior figures, Maulana Shahid Raza, has said, to “train our 
young people here, not only geographically, but also ideologically and emotionally in 
this country.” Raza shares Gilliat-Ray’s concern that many educational centres do not 
relate well to the UK, as he observes: 
 
[T]here are many institutions—in the Midlands, in the North—and when you 
go there you see that some of the British-born children are being educated 
over there.... [In some of] these institutions, geographically they are here but 
ideologically they are somewhere else—they are in Saudi Arabia, or in 
Pakistan, or somewhere else.... [T]hey will be influenced by institutions created 
maybe one-hundred years ago in the Subcontinent or in the Middle East [that] 
have been imported, without any amendment, to our children. They get 
knowledge, but that does not make these young Muslims suitably qualified to 
lead the community in this country.309 
 
More recently, in 2009, the Cambridge Muslim College has been established to train 
religious leaders with the ultimate aim of developing, in the words of its website, “new 
ways to express the faith and knowledge of Muslims in a manner [that is] both 
meaningful and constructive for the community itself, and comprehensible to its friends 
and neighbours in Britain.”310 Both of these colleges have links with UK universities 
and invite rabbis and Christian clergy to talk to students about their different religious 
beliefs. Very recently tentative steps have even been made in this direction in some of 
the Deobandi centres of religious learning.311 
 
Yet these colleges, despite their founders’ ambitions for them to act as centres of 
religious formation,312 remain fairly small. Other initiatives, which perhaps reach a wider 
audience, are not based in educational centres or places of worship but instead use a 
wide variety of new media to connect with younger Muslims. A good example of an 
initiative of this kind is Maslaha, an organisation with its base in Tower Hamlets in East 
London. Maslaha, whose name is taken from the technical Islamic legal term for the 
“public good,” came into being largely due to the work of Rushanara Ali, who went on 
in May 2010 to be elected as Member of Parliament for Bethnal Green and Bow. It was 
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established as a response to what Ali and the current manager of the organisation, 
Raheel Mohammed, felt to be, in the words of the former, the “lack of available 
intellectually grounded knowledge of Islam” in the UK.313 The aim of the organisation 
is thus to disseminate knowledge about Islamic history and tradition and information 
about the principles of Islam. To achieve those ends it works with both university 
academics and Islamic scholars, whose opinions it makes available on a wide range of 
issues, from the permissibility of getting a mortgage to whether a Muslim woman can 
refuse a proposal of marriage against the wishes of her parents.314 For Mohammed, the 
hope is that by transmitting this knowledge to those who may know little of it from 
their upbringing or from the national curriculum, Maslaha might be able to encourage a 
different perspective and different ways of thinking. As he has put it himself, “If I can 
get just one young person to come away from it thinking a little differently, with a little 
less frustration, then I’ll be happy.”315  
 
Another similar, although slightly older, organisation is the Radical Middle Way (RMW). 
RMW is an offshoot of Q-News, a Muslim magazine that has been running since the 
early 1990s, and sees itself as, in a sense, a “middle of the road” organisation: its name 
is a passing reference to the second Sura of the Qur’an in which Muslims are described 
as a “community of the middle way” (umma wasat).316 Its main aim is to give a platform 
to ‘ulama—some from the UK, some from abroad—whose writings would not 
otherwise find their way into the hands of young Muslims living in Britain. It has given 
a platform to Islamic scholars from Yemen, Germany, America and Egypt, and when it 
does so it generally attracts sizeable audiences, upwards of a thousand to events in 
Bradford, Birmingham and London. 
 
It is hard to make sense of either of these two organisations without taking into account 
the generational shifts ongoing within Islam in the UK. The fact that they are not based 
in religious institutions—even if they do, of course, sometimes make use of them—is 
of particular significance. Their events frequently include overt complaints about the 
way that things are done in the mosques in Britain. Consider the following advert for a 
RMW event in 2010, for example: 
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There are, though, some other reasons one ought to cite for the emergence of these 
initiatives. Firstly, the events of September 11th have created huge levels of interest in 
Islam and Muslims, to the extent that it has become normal to perceive the world 
through the prism of religious identification. Where once young Muslims whose parents 
came from Pakistan would have been regarded as “Asians” now they are seen as 
“Muslims.” (The boxer Amir Khan has been described as a “Muslim boxing hero,” 
something that never happened to Naseem Hamed, the British-Yemeni boxer who 
retired in 2002.)317 It was once the case that one could argue convincingly that religious 
identities had been generally neglected by sociologists and political commentators.318 It 
is worth remembering that while racial discrimination has been outlawed since the 
1970s, religious discrimination was not completely outlawed in employment until 2003, 
and in the provision of goods and services until 2006. Yet if this swing toward 
perceiving events through the prism of religion has fixed that problem, it has arguably 
gone too far the other way. Now there is a seriously confused dialogue in the public 
sphere about religion’s influence. Rushanara thus cites as her second main motivation 
for founding Maslaha the desire to “change the vocabulary around Islam” so Muslims 
are not “viewed through the lens of terrorism.”319 
 
The other thing that has happened since 2001 is the state has taken an interest in Islam 
in the UK. After 9/11 the Labour government made a number of attempts to affect the 
production of Islamic knowledge in Britain. These efforts were redoubled in the wake 
of the London bombings of July 2005, an event which prompted ministers such as 
Ruth Kelly, the former Secretary for Communities and Local Government, to say that it 
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was “time for a British version of Islam.”320 Accordingly Labour prioritised Islamic 
studies in British universities and commissioned reports on the role of the dar al-ulums 
in Britain.321 It also, more controversially, began taking a role in the training of foreign-
born imams and, in Kelly’s words again, “inducing a step-change in the role of madrasas 
in teaching about citizenship.”322 Neither RMW or Maslaha can be entirely separated 
from this drive; both have received public funding of some form. (I look into this issue 
in much greater depth in Chapter 7.) 
 
These new platforms of the production and dissemination of Islamic knowledge are, 
then, responding to rapid and disorienting political changes, but at the same time 
cannot be detached from slower social shifts. It would be wrong to regard these new 
platforms just as the product of post-9/11 confusion, or worse, government agencies 
manipulating things from behind the scenes. It is worth bearing in mind that many of 
these initiatives predate the new millennium, and thus government interest in the 
production of Islamic knowledge. This can be said of Q-News, and there are some 
organisations one can name too. For example, in 1999 City Circle was founded by a 
group of Muslim professionals. Like many Islamic circles, it meets weekly on a Friday, 
but sees itself as a space for public debate. Its main purpose not, like RMW and 
Maslaha, the dissemination of Islamic knowledge. Rather, it aims to bring different 
religious and secular perspectives into conversation with one another over matters that 
have been exercising Britain’s Muslims. Topics for discussion range from matters of 
theological principle, to complex questions about the relationship of civil to religious 
law, to environmental activism. Crucially, a diverse constituency takes part, both 
women and men and, indeed, Muslim and non-Muslim. It was in fact founded partly to 
allow younger Muslims to contribute more.  
 
 
4.7.  New theological voices 
 
What is striking about these more recently developed organisations is the fact that they 
are generally located outside formal Muslim institutions means that, not only do they 
tend to bypass sectarian affiliations, but they can include a number of different 
theological and interpretive traditions. For example, Maslaha, in the section of its 
website that offers religious advice to Muslims, brings together the perspectives of four 
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scholars, three of whom have been born and educated in Britain, but who have 
nevertheless different sectarian backgrounds. RMW, similarly, draws from a number of 
streams of thought. The Islamic scholars whose work it promotes do have things in 
common: they tend to support principled democratic engagement and argue against 
those aspects of Islamic law that cut most sharply against liberal democratic norms, 
such as the medieval penalty from apostasy. RMW tends to disregard the puritanical 
voices located in Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, its speakers do not by any means come 
from one area or school of thought. Since its launch in 2005 it has included at its events 
scholarly authorities from institutions of higher learning in the Muslim world, such as 
Ali Gomaa, the Grand Mufti of Egypt and one of the most senior scholars in the Al-
Azhar, the ancient and revered centre of Sunni Islamic learning in Cairo. It has hosted 
Tariq Ramadan too, the noted scholar of Islam who, despite residing outside of the 
traditional juristic bounds of Islamic authority, has proved capable of inspiring and 
leading Muslims in many national contexts. 
 
Particularly striking is the prominence of a number of converts to Islam in some of 
these initiatives who have become Islamic scholars. In her study of Muslim converts in 
Britain, Kate Zebiri suggests converts tend to play a “disproportionately large role in 
Islamic institutions and activities.”323 For example, Sarah Joseph, the founder and 
current editor of Emel, a Muslim lifestyle magazine that was launched in 2003, is a 
British convert. RMW has given a regular platform to Ingrid Mattson, a Canadian 
Muslim who is currently the President of the Islamic Society of North America, and 
Halima Krausen, a convert to Islam currently based at the Department of Theology at 
Hamburg University. Zebiri also argues there is evidence that “converts are making a 
disproportionate contribution to the indigenisation of Islamic practice, thought and 
discourse in the West.”324 One British Muslim who reflects this particularly is an imam 
and lecturer at Cambridge University, Abdal-Hakim Murad (a.k.a. Tim Winter), who is 
one of the most regular speakers at RMW events and the person on whose original 
vision the Cambridge Muslim College is based. Murad is an unusual individual, one of 
the few people in Britain likely to refer in the same sermon to the work of ancient 
Muslim jurists such as Mohammad al-Ghazali (1058-1111), Christian mystical tracts 
such as The Cloud of Unknowing, intricate Anglican doctrines like the Trinity, and British 
intellectuals like Thomas Carlyle.325 He is self-consciously traditionalistic in outlook, 
making regular references to the “brilliant mediocrity” of the modern age, to the 
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“aimlessness of the West’s hi-tech pleasuredrome,” or to “England’s desertion of its 
own identity.” Yet he fits relatively unproblematically into these new settings, speaking 
to large audiences at RMW events. One of the main aims of his sermons and writings is 
to “graft the Muslim religion onto the tree of [Britain’s] religious and cultural life,”326 
and to give Muslims “a sense of how they can authentically belong, geographically, to 
things that are sacred and profound.”327 Accordingly, he maintains that “an English 
move to Islam” would not represent “a farewell to [the country’s] heritage [but could 
instead mean] its unlooked-for revival”328: 
 
[T]he British Isles have for several hundred years been the home of individuals 
whose religious and moral temper is very close to that of Islam. To move from 
Christianity to Islam is hence ... not the giant leap that outsiders might 
assume.... Islam, once we have become familiar with it, and settled into it 
comfortably, is the most suitable faith for the British. Its values are our values. 
Its moderate, undemonstrative style of piety, still waters running deep; its 
insistence on modesty and a certain reserve, and its insistence on common 
sense and on pragmatism, combine to furnish the most natural and easy 
religious option for our people.329 
 
(This is, of course, relates to the far more significant issue of national identity, which I 
explore in greater depth in Chapter 5.) 
 
Yet while converts are overrepresented in these initiatives, it still remains the case that 
most of these new theological voices belong to second generation British-educated 
‘ulama who have made efforts to step outside of the “subculture” of seminary and 
mosque. Musharraf Hussain, one of the Islamic scholars whose advice Maslaha 
disseminates, is a good example. Hussain is of Pakistani ancestry, currently in his early 
forties, and based in Nottingham. He has a PhD in medical biochemistry and studied 
Islam in Pakistan and the Azhar. In Nottingham he has founded the Karimia Institute, 
a centre comprising a mosque, sports centre, nursery and private primary school, and 
the charity Muslim Hands, a relief agency operating out of modest offices in inner city 
Nottingham that employs sixteen workers.330 
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A useful illustration of the ways Muslim identity and religious interpretation can shift 
between generations is offered by the one imam who has worked in all three of the 
organisations that are mentioned above. Usama Hasan is a London-based second 
generation migrant from a family of Islamic scholars who now works as a lecturer, part-
time imam and one of Maslaha’s advisors. He has spoken at RMW events and between 
2007 and 2009 worked as Chair of City Circle. Hasan’s grandfather, Abdal Ghaffar 
Hasan, was involved with the radical Pakistani revivalist movement Jamaat-i-Islami, 
acting as a senior advisor to Abul A’ala Mawdudi, its founder, before rejecting the 
organisation and advising his children to do likewise. His father, Suhaib Hasan, is also 
an Islamic scholar, and was one of the founders of the Islamic Shariah Council, an 
institution which was set up in the 1980s and which adjudicates on some civil matters. 
(I look at the ISC in Chapter 6.) Usama’s religious formation has come mainly from his 
family, his grandfather and father each having given him ijaza, the authorisation to 
transmit a certain form of Islamic knowledge. Yet his relationship with his religious 
heritage is complex. As a young man Hasan, going against his grandfather’s advice, was 
attracted to radical revivalism, and travelled to Afghanistan to train with the mujahedin 
shortly after the Soviets had been ejected from the country (and while they still had the 
support of the US military). He eventually, like his grandfather, became frustrated with 
the internecine conflict that broke out among the Afghans, at which point he returned 
to England to complete his degree and doctoral studies. During this time his religious 
stance began to alter, away from a Manichaean worldview. Gradually he became, he 
confesses, “fed up of being a hypocrite”: 
 
I felt, when I used to rant against this, that and the other—against the West 
for example, or ranting at secularism—that religion is supposed to be a state 
of honesty and sincerity within yourself, a balance between inner and outer, 
between thought and practice, words and practice, preaching and practice. 
And I realised: I’m Western; I was brought up in the West. I’m very Western 
in all my habits, and I saw that in Pakistan when I lived there for a while; I 
realised how British I was.... I just had to be honest and say, “We agree with 
[secular laws], as Muslims.” There’s nothing in the Qur’an against that. The 
Qur’an promotes that kind of justice. So I felt I just had to reconcile, with all 
the talk in the Qur’an of unity, the unity of knowledge, the unity of God, but 
also the unity that comes with sincerity, if you like.331 
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The religious interpretations that have emerged out of this change are by no means 
radically new, but they are interesting. Hasan’s father, who is senior imam at the same 
mosque as his son, takes a fairly conservative stance on matters of law and hadith, as is 
fitting for a figure on the Islamic Sharia Council, which is a conservative institution. He 
has been portrayed in the UK media, most strikingly on the Channel 4 programme 
Dispatches in an episode entitled “Undercover mosque” (broadcast on the 15th January 
2007), as a dangerous radical, ultimately intent on gaining political control in the UK. 
This depiction is misleading, but it is true that he is firmly opposed to women imams, 
supports traditional hadd punishments as a deterrent to crime, and would support the 
introduction of Muslim personal law within Britain. Usama Hasan, by contrast, takes a 
more integrationist view, believing—as we shall explore in depth in Chapter 6—that 
separate jurisdictions are not necessary. Interestingly, his background in the sciences has 
led him to also, along rather different lines, publish articles calling on Muslims to stop 
rejecting theories of natural selection.332 
 
 
4.8.  The demand for Islamic knowledge 
 
The obvious question that presents itself at this point concerns how significant these 
new platforms for the dissemination of religious knowledge really are in terms of the 
impact they have upon Islam in the UK. Addressing this question is incredibly difficult, 
as these are modern organisations, and their main media are the Internet and events 
which do not require any lasting commitment from audiences. In that sense, they are 
representative of the new forms of Islam one finds in the global age, where “floating 
discourses” can be taken up and acted upon as the individual wishes, without any 
particular social pressure being applied. I mentioned earlier that these organisations 
have a greater reach than formal educational institutions and mosques, but they also 
make more fleeting contact with people. 
 
Nevertheless, the popularity of some of these new religious voices is arresting. I have 
mentioned the large audiences that they can draw; on one particular occasion that Lewis 
mentions in Bradford in February 2003 the American ‘alim Hamza Yusuf, founder of 
the Zaytuna Institute in California, drew an audience of between four- and five-
124 
 
thousand when he arrived in England to speak at a mosque in Bradford—a huge 
audience given that the talk took place in a city of around 300,000 people, of whom 
only 16.1 percent are Muslim.333 Such numbers might be explained in part by the wish 
to get close to a “religious celebrity,” the desire being to get an instant encounter, a little 
like a nominal Catholic who goes to see the Pope but does not attend mass. Even so, it 
would be excessive to simply use this as a reason to push the significance of such 
interest to one side; this kind of curiosity does appear to stem partly from a genuine 
desire to encounter new Islamic perspectives. 
 
It is also worth bearing in mind that there is a large body of data that indicates the 
increasing willingness of younger Muslims to make use of religious knowledge when 
negotiating with their peers and elders. Jacobson, in her study of young Pakistanis in the 
1990s, draws together a significant body of literature which gives examples of Muslims 
make use of different forms of religious knowledge in discussions and disputes with 
parents and relatives.334 Similar examples can be found within the discussions taking 
place inside the organisations and initiatives I have been focusing on in this chapter. 
The following statement, from a public discussion of women in Islam hosted by RMW 
in London in April 2008, is fairly typical:  
 
We have to claim back our scholarship. We have to reclaim our Islamic 
heritage in terms of knowledge. Because if you look at the books—especially 
the English books—that are out there, the books that are coming from a 
particular source; it is very narrow in its thinking.335 
 
Ultimately, I am reluctant to make any firm conclusions on this matter, simply because 
it is, as I observed in Chapter 3, almost impossible for anyone to tell exactly how 
influential particular religious ideas are. Many anecdotal examples can be drawn upon, 
but nothing clear can be inferred. There do appear to be hints of the desire for 
knowledge of Islam, however, and there are also a number of plausible sociological 
reasons for why such desire should be there. 
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4.9. Finding a place in public space 
 
Yet it is important to note also that these pioneering religious figures do not just play in 
influencing Muslims’ religious formation. They also have a noticeable role in the public 
sphere—or better, spheres. One of the things that magazines such as Emel and Q-News 
and spaces for debate such as City Circle enable is a number of different sects and 
organisations to come into close contact with one another, and with non-Muslim 
intellectuals and institutions as well. Between 2007 and 2010 City Circle brought into 
contact representatives from the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, Women Living Under 
Muslim Laws, Lincoln’s Inn and Queen Mary, University of London, to talk about the 
relationship between Islam and civil law. It also brought together senior figures from 
diverse organisations such as EcoMuslim, the MCB, the Institute of Race Relations and 
the Islam Channel to discuss the benefits, drawbacks and dangers of accepting UK 
government funding of Islamic organisations. In a sense, then, these organisations act 
as useful spaces for intra-Muslim debate. 
 
In addition to this, many of the pioneering religious figures are prominent in the 
debates going on in the mainstream media about social, moral and political questions. 
Murad, for example, contributes regularly to the BBC Radio 4 programme Thought for the 
Day and has appeared on the flagship BBC2 news programme Newsnight speaking about 
polygynous marriages in the UK and the recognition given to them. Similarly, Hasan 
has appeared on talk shows to discuss Islam and his own past. (Indeed, on one day I 
was due to meet him for an interview we had to quickly reschedule after he was called 
to go on national news, on two different channels, to offer comment upon the initial 
convictions of Ibrahim Savant, Arafat Waheed Khan and Waheed Zaman for plotting 
to detonate bombs on a flight to the United States.) For the most part, they appear in 
the news media discussing “Muslim issues” such as the state of the UK’s mosques or, 
as in the case above, Islamic militancy in the UK, and when they do so they usually 
appear alongside new Islamic actors who have no institutional clerical position. 
Occasionally, however, they are called on to communicate Islamic traditions to a wider 
audience. Both of these two individuals were, for example, asked to contribute to a 
Washington Post series clarifying Islamic doctrine on such things as the law relating to 
conversion and the purpose and nature of jihad. 
 
126 
 
Such forays into the public sphere are not without risks and pitfalls. Murad, for 
example, appeared on “Undercover mosque,” speaking negatively about the influence 
that Saudi-funded theology is having upon the UK’s mosques. His comments were 
reasonable, yet the documentary itself tended to exaggerate the influence of the radical 
influences in Britain and has consequently come to be viewed as a set-up by a number 
of Muslims in the UK. Hasan, similarly, has become used to taking strong criticism for 
his viewpoints, particularly when he presents views that cut against the majority 
opinion. “As usual,” he said before his comments on evolution were published, “I’m 
going to get hammered from all sides.”336 Yet such engagement is ultimately viewed as a 
positive thing by both these individuals, a constructive contribution to the emergence 
of the new “Euro-Islamic public sphere.” 
 
 
4.10. Conclusion: e pluribus unum? 
 
I have been speaking in this chapter about the fact that Muslims have over the last few 
decades become a significant permanent—and growing—minority in the UK, and how 
the tradition is altering. What I have only briefly mentioned, however, is that this 
development has generated widespread consternation, some of which borders on panic. 
Historians such as Michael Burleigh and Niall Ferguson, novelists such as Martin Amis 
and political commentators such as Christopher Caldwell and Mark Steyn have all 
portrayed this demographic growth in Muslims as an indication of the withering, and 
maybe even the ultimate demise, of Western civilisation.337 “One implication of current 
demographics,” the prominent philosopher A. C. Grayling has suggested, “is that in so 
many generations’ time, Europe will have a majority population descended from today’s 
Muslim immigrants. People in 200 years’ time are going to be saying how odd it was 
that women were allowed in our time to have an education and wear bikinis.”338 In 
some of these accounts, usually those published in the US, Europe is depicted as having 
already “fallen” to Islam, with America next to go. The continent is full, maintains the 
Right-wing journalist Bruce Bawer, of “embryonic colonies” that look like they are 
going to take it “beyond the point of no return.”339 
 
The dismay that the new presence of Muslims in the UK and other European nations 
has caused has prompted some to respond by drawing a parallel between the current 
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situation and the experiences of Catholics in America between the eighteenth and the 
twentieth centuries.340 There are certainly similarities between these two cases. In 1789 
Catholics made up just 0.9 percent of the US, but by 1850 it was the largest Christian 
denomination and by 1910 17 percent of Americans were Catholic, prompting serious 
concern amongst the Protestant majority.341 Mutual suspicion was the norm between 
the two denominations342 and conflict was common, one of the worst examples being 
the Protestant-Catholic riots in 1844 which left over a dozen people dead and Catholic 
churches razed to the ground.343 Right up until the election of John Kennedy in 1961 
Catholics were suspected of undermining the country’s democracy through their failure 
to fully commit to the American nation. Gladly, this slowly subsided, and by 1980 
Catholicism had transformed into a significant public presence. With around a quarter 
of Americans currently now nominally Catholic, the Church has launched official 
campaigns against everything from the Vietnam War to nuclear armament, health cuts 
and the relaxation of family planning laws. 
 
One of the reasons this parallel is useful to draw is simply because it puts things in 
perspective, and reminds all concerned not only that inter-religious antagonisms are not 
new, but also that they can be overcome. Yet it is also worth referring to because 
Catholicism then, much like Islam now, was forced to overcome ethnic differences as 
an older generation gave way to a new one. In 1916 America’s Catholics were organised 
into Irish, Polish, Italian, Mexican, German and other ethnic parishes that together 
spoke a total of twenty-eight different languages.344 After immigration restrictions came 
into force in the 1920s, however, these distinctions began to collapse, meaning that by 
the 1960s there was left just one American Catholicism contemplating how to manage 
the relationship between nation and religion in the wake of Vatican II. In this chapter I 
have tried to outline some of the similar transitions that are going on within Islam in 
the UK. Ansari, in his history of Islam in Britain that I quoted at length earlier in this 
chapter, acknowledges a similar change: 
 
As the influence of the societies and cultures from which they originated on 
attitudes and behaviour has faded with the emergence of British-born and       
-educated Muslims (around 70 percent of British Muslims are under 25) they 
have come increasingly to identify common features, as reflected in greater 
solidarity across ethnic and regional differences.... Muslims are much more 
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exercised today than earlier by their experience of British society and how they 
can respond to issues of greatest concern to them.345 
 
Does this mean, then, that there is now one British Islam contemplating how to work 
out the relationship between nation and religion in the wake of events such as the 
Rushdie affair, September 11th and the London bombings? It is clearly far too early to 
say that. Indeed, even if all ethnic ties were to wither away completely—which is 
extremely unlikely—it is improbable that Islam in Britain would end up looking 
homogenous. But then, Catholicism in America is not uniform; that doesn’t mean that 
one cannot talk about a distinctive American Catholicism. In the same way, there may 
emerge a distinctively British form of Islam. Whether—or in what way—that happens 
depends on how the tradition is negotiated. 
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5. Emerging theologies, contested authorities 
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5.1.   Religious authority and religious prejudices 
 
The relationship between religious authority and the willingness or ability of religious 
people to be part of, participate in or remain loyal to a political community is highly 
complex and often obscured by layers of confusion, if not straightforward prejudice. A 
huge portion of the writing on the subject over the decades has been influenced in one 
way or another by some form of chauvinism. Yet it is undoubtedly the case that 
religious authority has at many different times and in many different places influenced 
the ways that believers belong. The history of Roman Catholicism offers a number of 
helpful illustrations, both of intolerance rooted in a distorted view of the influence of 
religious authority, and of authority having a real impact on believers’ commitments. 
We saw at the end of the last chapter how it was quite common in nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century America for Protestants to be suspicious of Catholic Americans, 
much of which was, as Stephen Macedo has said, motivated simply by “xenophobia, 
prejudice, and sheer racism.”346 Religious authority was often at the heart of this. There 
is an illuminating televised interview with Reinhold Niebuhr from 1958 in which the 
interviewer, Mike Wallace, asks the renowned theologian if he would ever vote for a 
Catholic politician. When Niebuhr responds by saying that not only would he, he has 
done so on many occasions, his interlocutor goes on to inquire why he does not think 
that there is a risk of Catholic politicians being influenced, potentially against the 
interests of America, by a “foreign sovereign.”347  
 
Yet while there may be examples of Catholic authority being exaggerated for the wrong 
reasons, there are also obvious instances of Catholic authorities discouraging and 
obstructing civic participation. For example, in the UK in 1871 when religious tests 
were abolished at Oxford and Cambridge, allowing for the first time Nonconformists, 
Jews and Catholics to attend, the response among the Catholic hierarchy was mixed. 
Only in 1895 did Pope Leo XIII permit Catholic students to attend Oxbridge, and only 
then if there was a Catholic chaplain who could offer teaching in the philosophy and 
history of Catholicism.348 Macedo maintains that in the American case, too, religious 
authority has limited Catholics’ participation in the country’s legal system and in civic 
life more generally. There have been cases in which Catholic clergy advised reconciled 
divorcees against registering re-marriages with the civil authorities.349 The hierarchy also 
encouraged American Catholics to reject public schooling, which they then did “in 
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impressive numbers.”350 For Macedo, therefore, before 1965 Catholic authority actually 
obstructed American democratic politics: 
 
Prejudice against Catholics should be distinguished from not unreasonable 
fears that those educated in relatively authoritarian religious doctrines may be 
more prone than others to reject liberal democratic political norms and 
institutions.... Recent research supports the notion that institutionalised 
Catholicism in its traditional form, with its “vertical” patterns of authority, 
discourages the formation of an associative civic culture supportive of liberal 
democracy. Only where the Catholic Church itself [undergoes a] levelling of 
authority patterns ... does it appear to promote a social order supportive of 
active citizenship and healthy liberal democracy.351 
 
Such a levelling is of course, as Macedo then goes on to say, just what occurred in the 
1960s when the Catholic Church radically altered following Vatican II. The Church, as 
José Casanova has put it, changed gradually from an “oligarchic” institution into a 
“people’s church,” its leaders adopting the language of human rights and supporting 
participation in civil society rather than encouraging social isolation or attempts to 
undermine secular states.352 The influence of Catholic authority altered. Macedo and 
Casanova argue—persuasively, even if they both occasionally take a rather uncritical 
view of the Church’s activities after 1965353—that the institution became “a positive and 
in many instances decisive force for liberalisation around the world”354 on account of 
the new theologies adopted by its episcopate. 
 
 
5.2.  Authority and belonging in Islam 
 
In the UK, other parts of Europe and the US dubious rumours are, of course, common 
regarding Islam as well. In the summer of 2010 a plan to construct a Muslim cultural 
centre in lower Manhattan (the so-called “Ground Zero Mosque”) caused widespread 
rumours about disloyal Muslims trying to topple America from within. (As I write, this 
issue is yet to be resolved.) Political violence, even dissent by Muslims, is frequently 
attributed to the fact that Islam’s adherents feel an overriding sense of commitment to 
the Umma, as Anthony McRoy has claimed: 
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How do we explain the presence of British Muslims fighting alongside al-
Qaeda and the Taliban ... [or] the British Muslim bombers who caused such 
carnage in London on 7 July 2005? The answer is the concept of the Umma.... 
This Umma is the primary community to which Muslims in Britain belong, and 
it can be seen from this that the strongest communal links for any Muslim—
according to Islam—will be those with the Umma rather than with fellows of 
his race, ethnicity or nationality.... [T]he tendency for second- and third-
generation Muslims to ... identify their distinction from the rest of the British 
population as being essentially the membership of the Umma, is not only 
natural but actually “scriptural.”355 
 
Along very similar lines, it is sometimes argued that Muslims are committed only to 
their religious law, a commitment that renders any professions of loyalty to a secular 
state dubious, as Roger Scruton has said: 
 
It is not possible for a Muslim to believe that the conception of the good that 
is so clearly specified in all the intricate laws and Maxims of the Qur’an is to be 
excluded from the social contract. On the contrary, in Muslim eyes this 
conception, and this alone, gives legitimacy to the political order: a thought 
which has the most disturbing corollary that the political order is almost 
everywhere illegitimate, and nowhere more so than states where Islam is the 
official faith.... The opportunity never arises, for the student of the Qur’an, to 
distinguish those matters which are open to political negotiation from those 
which are absolute duties to God. In effect, everything is owed to God, with 
the consequence that nothing is owed to Caesar.356 
 
Neither of these arguments is particularly convincing. While what McRoy says is partly 
true, his argument is nevertheless incredibly simplistic, for reasons that this chapter will 
go some way toward explaining. Scruton’s account is even more misguided. Leaving 
aside the fact that what he says is just a little reminiscent of old anti-Semitic tropes, his 
explanation bypasses those elements of Islamic jurisprudence that deal with political 
loyalty and public duties.357 His suggestion that anyone who is dedicated to the Islamic 
faith will never accept an established political order implies that an enduring Muslim-
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majority political community is impossible, leaving one to wonder how the Ottoman 
and ‘Abbasid empires managed not just to cohere but, particularly in the latter’s case, 
generate great centres of scientific inquiry.358 
 
Is it possible, though, to follow Macedo and cut through this confusion to talk 
accurately about the effects of Islamic authority on social and political life? It is 
certainly the case that some organisations, like Hizb ut-Tahrir, refuse to take part in 
elections, regarding them as illegitimate.359 It is also the case, as we shall see in the next 
chapter, that some Islamic institutions have (knowingly or unknowingly) encouraged 
Muslims to bypass the civil legal system. However, it is hard to analyse this issue in a 
systematic way because, as I noted briefly in Chapter 3, authority in Islam cannot be 
directly linked to a Vatican-like body. What, or who, should be taken as authoritative in 
Islam is complicated and deeply contested. Although Scruton and McRoy misread the 
character of Islam quite drastically, the fact that they locate authority not in a “foreign 
sovereign” or church-like institution but in concepts and norms does hint at a truth: 
that authority in the tradition is decentralised. 
 
In the previous chapter I began to outline a number of initiatives and theological voices 
that have recently emerged on the public scene in the UK, many of which, cutting 
against the analysis offered above somewhat, advocate of a form of Islam that is 
supportive of Muslims’ efforts to be part of, participate in and even remain loyal to the 
country in which they reside. My main concern in this chapter is in trying to offer an 
overview of where these efforts sit in relation to the issue of authority. What I intend to 
examine here is how that attempt to promote such an understanding of Islam 
challenges some forms of authority, draws on others, and even in some cases involves 
considering the creation of new forms. This is quite a demanding task, requiring rather 
a lot of background detail about the tradition. The chapter therefore begins with a short 
explanation of authority in medieval Islam, before going on to explain how traditional 
forms of authority have been put under stress. It locates some UK-based initiatives 
within these sociological processes, and then goes on to offer an outline of some of the 
recent directions of Islamic reform movements. To talk about “reform” in Islam is in 
itself rather challenging as the categories of “reformist,” “traditional,” “liberal” and so 
on do not map neatly onto the Islamic landscape. As a result much of the discussion in 
this chapter is given over to efforts that are being made by some Islamic scholars in 
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Britain to “reclaim” the tradition from new political movements that are considered to 
offer an unduly narrow, literalistic interpretation. Finally, the chapter reflects on what 
the eventual results of these contests may be. 
 
 
5.3.  Traditional structures of authority in Islam 
 
The contrast in the nature of authority in Islam and Christianity can be traced back to 
the medieval era. As Peter Berger has said, the medieval Latin Church represented “a 
very unusual case of the institutional specialisation of religion.”360 The reason for this is 
it divided sharply between sacred and profane realms, the Church being seen as—and 
seeing itself as—the exclusive locus of the sacred, the sole mediator between humans 
and God. On the one side was the institution of the Church, on the other the fallen 
world. To remain in God’s favour one had to remain in communion with the Church 
and regularly receive the sacraments, the instruments of salvation without which a 
person would be unable to enter heaven. In the Islamic tradition there has never been 
this kind of institutional specialisation. Intercession between God and humans by saints 
or clerical figures is less common (although it does happen in Sufi-influenced traditions 
like the Barelwi movement).361 The medieval ‘ulama did not see themselves as mediators 
but rather teachers of sacred knowledge. (The Arabic word ‘ulama literally means “those 
with knowledge.”) There was certainly widespread concern about blasphemy, and the 
punishments for those who were deemed to have left Islam were harsh, but no single 
institution determined what “Islam” was. The major legal schools managed to coexist 
while formally conflicting with one another. Indeed, there has never existed in Islam a 
“church” per se, meaning that, as Khaled Abou El Fadl has pointed out, the issue of 
separating church and state differs slightly. The origins of European democratic theory 
were based on efforts to prevent Christian churches from monopolising the public 
sphere and to keep religion in its place. “Islam,” as Abou El Fadl observes, “has had a 
very different experience with religion”: 
 
In Islamic history, the absence of an institutional church ensured that religion 
could not monopolise or control the public sphere. Rather, religion or the 
representatives of Shari‘a law were always forced to compete to influence the 
public sphere in a variety of ways. Importantly, throughout Islamic history 
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there has never been a single voice that represents Shari‘a law or the canons of 
religion. The Islamic faith and Shari‘a law have been represented by several 
schools of theological and jurisprudential thought, the most powerful and 
notable of these organised into privately run professional guilds. Although the 
state often claimed to rule in God’s name, the legitimacy of these claims were 
challenged by these professional guilds.362 
 
This, even today, is part of the reason why it is much harder to find a representative to 
speak for Islam, whereas the spokesperson for Roman Catholicism is obviously the 
Pope (although there are clearly Catholics who get frustrated with the decisions of the 
Church and who feel the Pope does not speak for them). Traditionally in Islam legal 
norms have not been established by one person or institution, but rather through 
consensus among the scholars, or ijma, which has generally been considered one of the 
“roots” (usul) of Islamic law rather than one of the “branches” (furu)—that is, a part of 
the foundations rather than the main edifice.363 So just as Henry Kissenger could never 
work out who to call when he wanted to “speak to Europe,” there has not been since 
its earliest years one definitive voice in Islam. 
 
 
5.4.  The effect of modern social processes 
 
Of course, there are huge differences between Islam in the medieval period and Islam 
today. If anything, it has become even harder to say who speaks for Islam. Significant 
social and political transformations have profoundly affected the tradition. Numerous 
studies have identified the following hugely significant developments taking place in 
Muslim contexts (I quote Casanova’s list): 
 
• the intrusive penetration and colonization of the traditional life world by 
administrative states and markets, under colonial and postcolonial regimes; 
• the mass migration to urban centres and distant lands, Muslim and non-Muslim; 
• the expansion of mass education promoted by nationalist “developmental” 
regimes; 
• the revolution in mass communications: print, electronic, and high-speed travel; 
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• and the proliferation of global networks building upon already highly developed 
Muslim transnational networks.364 
 
The impact upon Islamic law of the first of these changes—interference by colonial 
powers in Muslim-majority contexts—has been enormous. With the emergence of the 
British and French empires the legal systems of many Muslim-majority nations became 
a mix of traditional Islamic and European common law. The collapse of the Mughal 
Empire in 1858, for example, saw Islamic law reduced to personal regulation, with the 
‘ulama having a say only in such matters as marriage, divorce and inheritance.365 In many 
different contexts the private endowments (waqfs) that allowed the schools of Islamic 
law to flourish were nationalised and became state-owned property. Many legal schools 
were shut down, with some carrying on just as poorly preserved tourist attractions.366 In 
many cases this caused venerable scholarly traditions to be displaced by narrower 
curricula. The rise of the Deobandi movement, with its strict study of scriptural proofs, 
occurred against this backdrop, for instance. The narrow curriculum of the Deobandi 
dar al-ulums found in Britain is partly the result of the ancient centres of learning in 
India being undermined by the colonial authorities. 
 
The sociological changes have been just as far reaching, although their impact is harder 
to sum up. Arguably the most coherent attempt to make sense of them can be found in 
the books of Olivier Roy.367 Roy draws heavily on the work of the sociologist Danièle 
Hervieu-Léger, who conceives of religion as a “chain of collective memory” passed 
from generation to generation. What she argues, drawing on the literature on 
secularisation, is that modern social processes make it harder to transmit memories 
coherently so that the younger generation spontaneously become part of a lineage or 
taken-for-granted tradition.368 Chains of memory break down—or, to mix metaphors, 
once-coherent social fabrics become increasingly frayed, with their threads being tied 
together in ever-more unusual ways. 
 
Something like this, Roy contends, has been happening to the Islamic tradition, 
particularly in the kind of urban, post-migration contexts in which the vast majority of 
Britain’s Muslims live. In the medieval period, he suggests, the Islamic tradition was a 
coherent social fabric, a set of beliefs and values that were embodied in various roles, 
norms and cultural forms. The religious scholars were, in a sense, the guardians of the 
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tradition, the protectors of Islam’s shared memory. The emergence of mass education 
and communication, however, assisted by colonial interference, undermined this. The 
tradition was “disembedded,” its beliefs and principles no longer set into cultural 
foundations. The monopoly that the ‘ulama enjoyed over the production of religious 
knowledge, and by extension their control over Islam itself, was lost. Muslims have 
increasingly interpreted the central texts for themselves, and inevitably the tradition has 
fragmented as a result. As Roy and others have noted,369 the Islamic tradition has 
suffered a crisis in authority from which it has never really recovered. The creation and 
transmission of Islamic knowledge has been, as Peter Mandaville has suggested, 
“democratised,” resulting in “the intensification of a tendency towards decentralised 
authority that has always been present in Islam.”370 
 
 
5.5.  New Islamic actors 
 
Because of these changes it has become harder to assess the importance of honorific 
titles such as ‘alim, mujtahid or muhaddith. It has become harder to determine how 
valuable traditional ijazas (certifications) are, and how socially significant a particular 
fatwa is amidst the many that are produced and transmitted to disparate locations via 
satellite television and the Internet. Roy argues that the individualisation of Islam has 
occurred, with Muslims increasingly turning away from formal theology in favour of an 
immediate understanding of truth through individual faith, to the detriment of 
traditional educational and religious institutions. Perhaps most significantly, a number 
of “new Islamic actors” have emerged: religious intellectuals who are frequently self-
taught and who often are engineers or doctors rather than dedicated teachers.371 Such 
figures have managed to displace traditional scholars in the new religious marketplace, 
leading popular movements. Many of the individuals who are called upon to offer the 
“Muslim perspective” in public debates in the UK now, for example, are not Islamic 
scholars. Up until 2006 the most prominent Muslim representative body was the 
Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), an organisation whose spokespersons are, as Tariq 
Modood notes, “more likely to be chartered accountants or solicitors than imams.”372 (I 
say more on this organisation in Chapter 7.) 
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Needless to say, none of the initiatives and organisations that I mentioned in the last 
chapter cut against Roy’s analysis. On the contrary, to a large extent they can be 
regarded as useful illustrations of it. RMW, Maslaha and City Circle are not traditional 
institutions at which students spend years studying the intricacies of fiqh. As I noted in 
the last chapter, they remain aloof from mosques and formal educational institutions, 
instead usually meeting in “secular” spaces. The Internet is their main medium for the 
dissemination of information, and browsers can dip into and out of the different 
sermons and teachings they provide. Maslaha is a particularly striking example. It was 
founded and is run by two individuals who wanted to improve the transmission of 
Islamic knowledge in the UK, yet neither is schooled in Islam in any formal way or 
makes claims about being an Islamic scholar. In these different ways, the initiatives all 
represent a transition in Islam away from the steady transmission of juridical theory as 
developed over thirteen centuries and toward more mobile, more fluid ways of 
communicating Islamic moral conceptions. 
 
That having been said, scholarly authority does play a role in these initiatives, and some 
of those active in UK public life have religious qualifications. Zaki Badawi was unusual 
in that he was seen as a “Muslim representative” but was also a classically trained 
Islamic scholar. Abdal-Hakim Murad, similarly, has studied at institutions such as the 
Al-Azhar in Egypt. In addition, the Radical Middle Way (RMW) is unusual in its 
emphasis on promoting formal Islamic scholarship. While Maslaha’s managers are not 
themselves religious authorities, they make no efforts to interpret the tradition 
themselves. There was an event shortly after the set-up of the initiative when Raheel 
Mohammed, the initiative’s manager, came into conflict with a prospective supporter. 
His comments about the experience are instructive: 
 
I explained the project to him, and he just kept saying: “What right do you 
have?! What authority?” I tried to explain that I was not going to be the person 
giving the advice; the organisation is merely a vehicle. We are using religious 
scholars, you know?373 
 
This is part of the reason why it is a little simplistic to see these organisations simply as 
illustrations of the trend toward individualised forms of Islam, textual immediacy and 
the undermining of traditional scholarship. They have a relationship with the classical 
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period that is worth exploring, particularly because it helps to understand the contests 
for authority in which these organisations have been engaged. To do this, though, it is 
necessary to first give more background detail.  
 
 
5.6.  Directions of Islamic reform 
 
There is a tendency in the West to associate all challenges to religious authority with 
liberalism and tolerance. This is doubtless mainly the product of a popular historical 
narrative that views modern Westerners as having cast off the fetters that had been 
placed upon them by oppressive belief systems. In popular commentary and political 
theory the Christian Reformation is often portrayed as not much more than one 
positive step on the path to greater personal freedom.374 As a result, the tendency in the 
West has also been to view this crisis in Islamic authority as, in Mandaville’s words, “a 
positive and progressive ‘democratization’ of knowledge production and reception in 
Islam, with Muslims increasingly reshaping religion with their own hands (rather than 
relying on ‘crusty’ clerics) and willing to offer these new formulations to critical 
consumers within the market of the public sphere.”375 
 
While the withering of socially sustained authority can certainly allow people to express 
their beliefs in new ways, there are nevertheless reasons to be circumspect about these 
slightly “Whiggish” assumptions. The Reformation, after all, was a reaction to a 
centralised system of religious authority that never existed in medieval Islam, as we saw 
earlier. Indeed, there are a number of problems with simply transposing this rather 
Eurocentric narrative, as Modood has noted: 
 
Westerners repeatedly ask if Islam will ever have its Reformation; the fact is 
that the upheavals and wars that characterised the Reformation are present in 
the Muslim world today—but with one major difference: non-Muslim powers, 
especially the US, are major players. (It is an interesting speculation what 
Muslim Reformation would look like if it took place without imperial 
intervention or what the European Reformation would have looked like if the 
Ottoman Empire had been one of the key players.)376 
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Mandaville has his own problems with this assumption, pointing out that “it should be 
obvious that the mere fact alone of more people being able to serve up a wider range of 
ideas about religion—that is, a widening of the public sphere—does not in itself 
produce more pluralistic (in the sense of being more tolerant or open-ended) 
knowledge.”377 A similar point has been made, more directly, also by Murad (who is, it 
is worth noting, also an academic historian): 
 
Sometimes one hears the claim that Muslims cannot inhabit the West, or—as 
successful participants—the Western-dominated global reality, because Islam 
has not passed through a reformation. This is a tiresome and absent-minded 
claim that I have heard from senior diplomats who simply cannot be troubled 
to read their own history, let alone the history of Islam. A reformation, that is 
to say, a bypass operation which avoids the clogged arteries of medieval 
history and seeks to refresh us with the lifeblood of the scriptures themselves, 
is precisely what is today underway among those movements ... the West finds 
most intimidating. The Islamic world is now in the throes of its own 
reformation, and our Calvins and Cromwells are proving no more tolerant and 
flexible than their European predecessors.378 
 
Murad’s point here, with Mandaville and Modood, is that “reform” in Islam has not 
always gone in a liberalising direction. Indeed, the recent history of Islam has thrown up 
some deeply reactionary reform movements.   
 
 
5.7.  Challenges to the classical tradition 
 
There are two particular Islamic movements that are worth outlining briefly, the first 
being the Salafi movement. The Salafi movement has its origins in Islamic modernist 
thinking, which emerged in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and was based 
primarily379 in Egypt. Islamic modernism came to prominence against a backdrop of 
colonial interference by the West: one of the first modernist thinkers, the Egyptian 
scholar and translator Rafa’a al-Tahtawi (1801-1873), was born in Tahta just a few years 
after Egypt was invaded by Napoleon in 1798.380 The first modernists found much to 
admire in Western philosophy, science and political organisation. Tahtawi, after living in 
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France for some years, even commented on one occasion: “In Paris, I saw Islam but 
there were no Muslims, but in Egypt, I see Muslims but there is no Islam.”381 Later 
modernists such as Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905), who was also Egyptian, and 
Rashid Rida (1865-1935), who lived much of his life in Egypt, also engaged with 
European thinkers in a positive way.382 Rida read Darwin, and attempted to reconcile 
the Qur’an with theories of evolution.383 Yet ‘Abduh and Rida were (understandably) 
ambivalent about Western power. They were impressed by European philosophers and 
were concerned that some Islamic traditions had hindered the development of the 
Islamic world, yet also portrayed the West as a place of widespread hypocrisy and 
profligacy. This ambivalence can be seen in Rida’s apologetic Al Wahy Al Muhamadi, in 
which he quotes ‘Abduh claiming that  
 
the nations of the West will suffer from the troubles of their civilisation and its 
political decadence to such an extent that they will be forced to seek an outlet; 
that outlet will be found only in Islam—the Islam of the Qur’an and the Sunna 
and not that of the theologians and jurists.384 
 
Highly uncertain about the West and thoroughly dissatisfied with a juristic framework 
they considered dilapidated and restrictive, ‘Abduh and Rida supported a thorough 
reformulation of Islamic traditions, which they believed would allow Islam to respond 
to modern social, political and intellectual challenges and strengthen Muslims’ hearts 
worldwide. They suggested bypassing the classical era and returning to the original 
vision espoused by the Prophet and his Companions (Sahaba). ‘Abduh accordingly 
became involved in initiating a reform movement called Salafiyya, the name of which 
referred to the “predecessors” (salaf): the people living at the time of Muhammad and 
the two generations that followed him. This movement opened up the task of 
interpretation to many more people, and these interpretations went down two paths, 
largely reflecting the ambivalence of its founder. The Salafi movement, as it became 
known, appealed to those sympathetic to liberal traditions but also to disenfranchised 
Muslims who wanted to retreat into the past. Although ‘Abduh was a modernist, his 
ideas were extended by some of his followers to emphasise the normative significance 
of the first generations of Muslims at the expense of historical contextualisation and 
changes in practices and belief. Salafism in the end became a revivalist movement that 
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idealised a lost age, reinterpreting it as a time of Islamic perfection and developing it 
into a model for a hoped-for Islamic future.  
 
Salafism has impacted upon a variety of national contexts.385 A significant number of 
the young literalists whose disenfranchisement I discussed in the previous chapter 
describe themselves as Salafis. The movement has played a significant role, alongside 
sociological changes and colonial conflicts, in undermining the juristic traditions of the 
medieval period. Those calling themselves Salafis tend to be scornful of established 
political institutions and traditional ‘ulama. Their opposition to traditional markers of 
Islamic authority and legitimacy is even visible in the most extreme British Muslims, 
who are generally disdainful of classical scholarship, with its cautious approach. Abu 
Hamza al-Masri, the former imam of Finsbury Park Mosque who was extradited to the 
US before being convicted in the UK on terrorism charges, furiously rejected ijaza. 
“The people who have been bestowed ijaza give us nothing but headache,” he once 
opined. “What is the use of all this ‘Islamic’ knowledge if it’s not bringing anything 
positive to the Muslim people and Islam?”386  
 
 
5.8.  The genesis and influence of Wahhabism 
 
Yet Salafism did not go from being a modernising movement to a puritanical creed 
without any outside influence. It was pushed in this direction by a second “reformist” 
movement known as Wahhabism, which is named after its intellectual figurehead 
Muhammad ibn ‘Abd-al-Wahhab (1703–1792). Wahhabism emerged in the eighteenth 
century in Saudi Arabia as a challenger to the theologies of the declining Ottoman 
Empire, its eponym maintaining that Ottoman Islam had become impure and that for 
the tradition to be restored it would have to be purged of the innovations (bid‘a) that 
had crept into the religion, including mysticism, intercession, and Greek rationalism. It 
developed387 into a rigid, anti-intellectual creed, scornful of non-Muslims and, for that 
matter, the majority of Muslims too, many of whom it saw as heretics. Interestingly, it 
might not have made a lasting impact upon the world were it not for the influence of 
two other political forces: first, the Al-Sa’ud family, which wanted to defeat all other 
contenders and rule over Arabia; and second, the British government, which wanted a 
strong power in the peninsula that would serve British interests by granting exclusive 
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oil-mining concessions.388 They helped Wahhabism become the official creed of Saudi 
Arabia, and that remains the situation today. 
 
Today Wahhabism and Salafism have blended together to some extent. Muslims who 
reject classical and liberal Islam usually refer to themselves as Salafis, while their critics 
tend to use the Wahhabi moniker. In its original form Salafism was not entirely hostile 
to classical knowledge or anti-intellectual, but the fact that it opened up interpretation 
to anyone, combined with its claim upon the authenticity of the earliest Muslims, meant 
it was easy to co-opt. When the Al Sa’ud family took power in Saudi Arabia it was 
viewed with suspicion by many Muslim-majority nations; Nasser even attempted to 
overthrow their government.389 In part, this was because Wahhabism was viewed as 
potentially dangerous: its rejection of many forms of Islamic belief caused Muslims to 
worry about it ruling over Mecca and Medina. This meant the tradition needed to 
establish its credentials, which it did by re-branding itself as “Salafi” and by initiating a 
campaign of global proselytisation. Wahhabism, unfortunately, is financially strong due 
to the oil wealth of the Saudi élite, which was, of course, funded largely by the West—
first the British and, more recently, the Americans. It has been estimated that Saudi 
spending on religious causes abroad has been between two- and three-billion dollars a 
year since 1975, spent on fifteen-hundred mosques, two-hundred and ten Islamic 
centres and dozens of schools.390 It is difficult to be precise about the influence of this 
tradition on Britain’s mosques and centres of learning; recent reports have tended to 
exaggerate its influence upon Islam in the UK.391 Yet it seems certain that it has had an 
impact, giving further reason why some Muslims are frustrated with Britain’s centres of 
Islamic learning. Murad has given the following description of the Central London 
Mosque in Regent’s Park, for example: 
 
There has been a recession in the last twenty or twenty-five years since I have 
been visiting that establishment, from a relatively hospitable openness with a 
diversity of views on their bookshelves to an absolute, totalitarian closure of 
the Muslim mind—imposed, we must assume, by the consensus of the Arab 
embassies who control the Central London Mosque.392 
 
This is a particularly difficult issue because, irrespective of who controls it, the Arabian 
Peninsula is where Muhammad lived; observant Muslims turn toward it in prayer five 
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times a day. For that reason it is easy to regard it as the core of Islam, comparable 
perhaps to what Vatican City is for Catholics. The truth is that until very recently the 
region was, although obviously significant for Muslims, on the intellectual margins, not 
comparable to places such as Cairo or Istanbul. This fact is not obvious to most people 
living in the UK, however, so when reports emerge of women being tried for adultery 
after being repeatedly raped or of girls being left to burn to death in fires rather than 
being allowed out in public unveiled—both of which have occurred in Saudi Arabia due 
to the influence of the Wahhabi creed393—the immediate response among many people 
in the UK is to see that as the Islamic norm. 
 
 
5.9.  The struggle to re-cast Islam 
 
For most of the British Muslim activists trying to develop Islamic teachings that allow 
Muslims to authentically be part of the West, and just about all those I refer to here, the 
biggest adversary is this Salafi/Wahhabi tendency. For example, Mustafa Ceric, who is 
the Grand Mufti of Bosnia (Reis-ul-Ulama) but who visits the UK regularly and has 
spoken at the RMW’s events numerous times, depicts Salafis as the “new Kharijites.” 
The Kharijites (meaning “the seceders”) were a group of early Muslims who refused to 
give their allegiance to the successors to Muhammad, and who were at the heart of the 
conflicts (fitna) among the early Umma. For many Muslims, they are synonymous with 
unreasonableness and extremism. Ceric writes that it is “simply too risky for the Muslim 
global community to be left at the mercy of Kharijite political thought, which might 
lead Muslims to undesired isolation.”394 
 
Of course, Muslim religious leaders in the UK can only do so much to address the 
economic deprivation and social isolation that helps to make Salafism popular in 
Britain, and even less to shape the geopolitical conflicts that have led to Wahhabism 
emerging as a theological force. They cannot do much to dislodge the common 
perception that Saudi Arabian Islam is normative either: the kind of assumption that 
Newt Gingrich, the former Speaker of the House of Representatives, made when he 
argued that building of mosques should be banned in lower Manhattan “so long as 
there are no churches or synagogues in Saudi Arabia.”395 However, some efforts have 
been made by Muslim religious authorities to dislodge these perceptions. The most 
145 
 
prominent of these has been the initiative A Common Word,396 an open letter offered to 
Christian leaders in October 2006 calling for convivial relations between the two 
traditions that, as of October 2007, had been signed by 138 Muslim scholars, clerics and 
intellectuals, including many individuals cited in this and the previous chapter: Ingrid 
Mattson, Ali Gomaa, Hamza Yusuf, Ceric, and Murad. What was unusual about this 
initiative is that it attempted to draw a number of different Islamic authorities—the 
most prominent perhaps being Gomaa, a senior figure at the Al-Azhar, arguably the 
most venerated centre of Sunni Islam in the world—to address not only Wahhabi 
interpretations, but also Westerner’s assumptions about Islam. The main goal of the 
initiative was articulated expertly by Mattson, speaking to an audience in Cambridge at a 
RMW event held in October 2008: 
 
I’ve spent many years speaking to people about Islam, and what I’ve noticed is 
that over the past decade responses to what I have to say have changed.... 
What I find is that the audiences I speak to have already established their 
perception of what a Muslim is, what Islam is, and now they’re very sceptical 
of what I have to say. So I’ve had people stand up in the audience, for 
example—imagine this, an ordinary person standing up and saying: “But what 
you don’t understand about Islam is...” So they are claiming knowledge of 
Muslims, a knowledge that trumps my knowledge—someone who is a 
professor, someone who is the leader of a Muslim organisation—and it’s not 
simply an act of arrogance; they really do believe that they have knowledge of 
Muslims and Islam.... [But] the more people who speak about [this initiative], 
you know, using its trademark name.... We should speak about it over and 
over and over. Use A Common Word; talk about A Common Word, because then 
we will have a message that will stick with people and that will help dislodge 
these misconceptions.397 
 
It is perhaps wise not to be too effusive about developments such as this, positive 
though they may be. They are easily missed in a media culture where the worst news 
travels fastest and furthest. A Common Word, although it was widely reported at the time 
of its launch, generated fewer column inches than, say, the arrest and conviction of four 
Muslim men from Walthamstow who planned to detonate “liquid bombs” on a plane 
going across the Atlantic in August 2006. More importantly, politicians in the West 
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such as Hillary Clinton can applaud these efforts, as she did in the 2009 annual 
Freedom of Religion Report, without doing anything to address the political problems 
in Israel, Iraq or Afghanistan that play a significant part in generating resentment and 
encouraging Islamic militancy. The event at which Mattson was speaking in 2008, 
entitled “Do we need A Common Word?” was organised to try and debate some of these 
very good reasons for being sceptical about the initiative, and a number of the people 
present voiced concerns of exactly this kind. 
 
Despite this, the launch of A Common Word was notable, it being one of the first times 
Muslim scholars from a variety of national contexts, both in- and outside of the West, 
managed to enter Western secular public spheres and affect debates about Islam in the 
UK and elsewhere. It brought together different forms of authority from the Middle 
East, North Africa, South Asia, Europe and America, who collectively authored a 
message that managed to influence debates about what Islam stands for. The initiative 
continues to communicate fatwas (religious judgements) formulated in areas of the 
world the Western media pays little attention to such as Egypt, Yemen, Kuwait and 
Turkey, in doing so taking small steps to create new forms of authority in Islam and, it 
is hoped, fill the current vacuum.398 
 
 
5.10. Liberalism, fundamentalism and tradition 
 
What is especially striking about these internal debates within contemporary Islam are 
the different arguments that are used in opposition to the Wahhabi/Salafi tendency. 
These differences are often missed in discussions of Islam in the West, where debates 
are usually framed in terms of “liberal” or “modern” opposition to “fundamentalism.” 
This kind of description is simplistic because, as we have seen, modernist and Salafi 
forms of Islam share historical roots and both have worked to challenge classical 
scholarship.399 At their worst, such descriptions can give the impression that the conflict 
is simply between a traditional, backward-looking interpretation of the texts and a 
progressive, forward-looking interpretation. This makes it appear that Islam simply 
needs to “catch up” with the modern West, and portrays traditionalist and literalist 
forms of Islam as basically the same thing. In truth, there are (at least) three different 
approaches in these disputes over authority. 
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There is, of course, a conflict between modernist and liberal forms of Islam and the 
scriptural literalism embodied in Wahhabism. Within the UK, organisations such as 
British Muslims for Secular Democracy (BMSD) work to oppose radical and intolerant 
forms of Islam and argue for clear separation of church and state without recognition 
of any form of religious law.400 The most prominent European voice arguing against the 
idea that it is impossible to be firmly committed to the tradition and still be a fully 
participating member of a political community is Tariq Ramadan, who, though not an 
advocate of a “liberal Islam” as such,401 has clearly taken on and been influenced by a 
number of the liberal tradition’s themes. Ramadan clashes most clearly with Wahhabi 
thought over civic participation. Where Wahhabism has become influential it has 
undoubtedly acted as a negative force, preventing the kind of civic interaction on which 
a healthy democracy depends. Abd-al-Wahhab affirmed a doctrine, said to be widely 
discussed in Wahhabi circles, known as al-wala wa al-bara (literally, “loyalty and 
disassociation”) that claimed allegiance should be given only to the immediate imam, 
and not to “man-made” authority. Frequently this is taken to mean one should not 
associate with any non-Muslims.402 The contrast between this view and Ramadan’s 
position could not be starker. “The best way to be close to God,” he has said in one 
essay, “is to claim your rights as a citizen.”403 This emphasis on citizenship gives his 
thought an “individualistic” side, similar to the “ethical individualism” affirmed by the 
liberal philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah.404 In his text Western Muslims and the Future 
of Islam Ramadan re-casts the tradition, rejecting the classical categorisations of 
territories such as dar al-Islam (“abode of Islam”), dar al-harb (“abode of war”), dar al-ahd 
and dar al-sulh (“abode of treaty”). Instead he argues that Muslims should base their 
understanding of the modern West upon Mecca before the Hijra, and regard it as dar al-
dawa (“abode of testimony”).405 By doing so, Ramadan casts Islamic ethics less in social 
and cultural terms, and more as a set of personal loyalties, placing emphasis particularly 
on the individual conscience406 and trying to ensure that personal autonomy and privacy 
are both protected. The ethical emphasis he places upon the individual is best illustrated 
using his remarks on homosexuality:  
 
For more than twenty years I have been insisting ... that homosexuality is 
forbidden in Islam, but that we must avoid condemning or rejecting 
individuals. It is quite possible to disagree with a person’s behaviour (public or 
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private), while respecting that person as an individual. This I have continued 
to affirm, and gone further still: a person who pronounces the attestation of 
Islamic faith becomes a Muslim; if that person engages in homosexual 
practices, no one has the right to drive him or her out of Islam. Behaviour 
considered reprehensible under the rules of morality cannot justify 
excommunication. There is no ambiguity, and ample clarity: Muslims have the 
right to express their convictions while at the same time respecting the 
humanity and rights of individuals.407  
 
For many people, of course, the word “liberal” implies acceptance of all sexualities, so 
using this passage to illustrate the influence of the liberal tradition might seem strange. 
What is worth highlighting about the passage above, though, is the way it divides 
between the individual’s choices and behaviour, on the one hand, and the “rules of 
morality,” on the other. Like Mill, Ramadan accepts morality shouldn’t be enforced and, 
like Rawls, he appears to indicate that the individual qua citizen can be fully respected in 
public even if one disagrees with his or her actions. The second part of his argument 
will not convince everyone: some (myself included) would argue full respect includes 
respect for all aspects of a person, sexuality included. It is, though, a position which 
coincides with aspects of liberal political philosophy. 
 
Many of the other new theological voices in Britain are, however, more wary of 
bypassing ancient traditions, choosing instead to draw directly from classical forms of 
Islam that Salafis and Wahhabis repudiate. Ramadan, like the first modernists, is not 
hostile to classical Islam but emphasises the need to “repair” the tradition (islah) by 
returning to the “sound form of origin.”408 For others, the classical period is a more 
direct source of inspiration and guidance. Many of these theologians are not based in 
the UK, but contribute to British debates. Hamza Yusuf is a good example of this. His 
primary intellectual influence is the Mauritanian scholar of Maliki law ‘Abdallah bin 
Bayyah, who has argued during his long career as an ‘alim that classical fiqh required 
conviviality and respect for non-Muslim neighbours, and allowed adaptations of even 
fundamental religious rules, such as prayers, to facilitate the integration of Islam. Both 
bin Bayyah and Ceric depict the West as dar al-sulh, which they (and Yusuf, who is a 
translator of bin Bayyah’s fatwas and speeches) choose to translate either as “abode of 
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treaty” or as “abode of social contract.” This is what bin Bayyah has said about the 
subject in one of his public speeches: 
 
[W]hen I came to this country, they issued me a visa, and I signed something. 
In the issuance of the visa and my signing of it, a legally binding contract 
occurred which was a sulh [a treaty]. It was an agreement that when I came 
into this country, I would obey the laws and would follow the restrictions that 
this visa demanded that I follow. This was a contractual agreement that is 
legally binding according even to the divine laws. In looking at this, we have to 
understand that the relationship between the Muslims living in this land and 
the dominant authorities in this land is a relationship of peace and contractual 
agreement—of a treaty. This is a relationship of dialogue and a relationship of 
giving and taking.... [I]t is absolutely essential that you respect the laws of the 
land that you are living in.409 
 
An even stronger emphasis on the normative role of tradition is visible in the remarks 
of Umar Abd Allah, another American Muslim theologian who has taught in Jeddah 
and the United States. The following passage, taken from a talk in Birmingham Central 
Mosque in 2006, is particularly revealing: 
 
Extremism often expresses itself in a personal quest for immediately accessible 
knowledge. In other words, pamphlets; we read pamphlets, we read easy 
books.... And often this is in defiance of authority; I mean by that in defiance 
of traditional authority, of the schools, the tradition, the teachers. As one of 
the great scholars that I used to know in Morocco used to say, who was a great 
muhaddith, he would say: “I studied hadith all my life; I studied Islam all my life, 
and a young man who doesn’t even pray goes into the movie theatre, comes 
out, buys a pamphlet, and the next day he’s calling me a kaffir.” So this is an 
example of the quick fix: immediately accessible knowledge and then defiance 
of authority. You, who’ve studied Islam all your life, and your grandfather 
studied it, and it’s like: “I can condemn you in five minutes because I read this 
pamphlet, and I saw that what you’re doing doesn’t suit that. This is typical of 
extremism wherever you find it. The religiosity of extremism is often based 
upon personal experience, and not legacy.410 
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Of course, Yusuf, bin Bayyah and Abd Allah are not present in the UK often enough to 
make an enormous impact, although all three have been published in Q-News and 
spoken on various occasions at RMW events. Nevertheless, there are UK-born Islamic 
scholars who take a similar approach, of whom Murad is the most obvious example. 
Murad’s theological writings contrast the doctrine of al-wala wa al-bara adhered to by 
Wahhabis withwhat he calls “traditional Sunnism,” a doctrine that values the “tree of 
tawhid,” and resists efforts to “tear it up by the root”: 
 
We need renewal, every Muslim accepts that. The religion has become old, 
doddery, cantankerous. The sole source of renewal is that which was good for 
the earliest generations of this Umma; that’s established, nobody will deny it. 
But the difference between ‘alim the and the amateur is that the ‘alim says we’ll 
deal with the tree as it is, we keep it going; alhamdulillah we still have it and 
over the years it has acquired a certain magnificence, that in itself has the right 
to be respected and enjoyed. The amateur scholar says, “No, the best thing is 
to cut it down and we’ll be back in 1453 again, or indeed back at the time of 
the Hijra, in the time of the Prophet, sallallahu alaihi wa sallam.” This is really 
what is at stake. We have a tree that is more intact than the trees of the other 
[major religions]; but we have, given the nature of the age, an increasing 
proliferation of people who misunderstand it, who are not grateful for it, who 
can’t see its current beauty, who have not trained with those who have been 
looking after it, and think that the solution is actually to cut it down. The great 
calamity in our age is not that Islam needs a Reformation or that we need a 
liberal Islam; the great calamity is that we are not being true to our own 
traditions of scholarship.411 
 
The real value in traditional Sunnism, according to Murad, is that it allows Islamic 
traditions to be “embedded” in different cultures rather than radically refusing links 
with surrounding culture. “The tradition’s legal and theological capacity to allow 
conviviality and adaptation has,” he argues, “been demonstrated in many historical 
contexts.”412 As an example, Murad cites Poland, where Muslims fought alongside the 
Christian rulers against the Teutonic Knights between 1409 and 1411, and where Polish 
traditions have influenced mosque architecture, with Polish sonorities even being used 
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in religious ceremonies.413 He also cites medieval China, where Sayyid-i Ajjal (1211-
1279), the Yüan governor of Yunnan, established the province’s first ever Confucian 
temples despite being a Muslim himself.414 He stresses, too, the point that classical fiqh 
traditionally recognised local laws and customs (‘urf)415 if they did not directly conflict 
with Islamic teachings.416 “Islam, as a universal religion, in fact as the only legitimately 
universal religion,” Murad emphasises repeatedly in essays, “also makes room for the 
particularities of the peoples who come into it.”417 
 
This, of course, links into a wider project of developing a form of Islam that fits into 
the UK, or better, blends with it. This argument informs the Cambridge Muslim 
College, and, although Murad himself has been less directly involved, other initiatives 
such as the Muslim College in Ealing and RMW. The Cambridge-based imam has even 
edited a book of Muslim songs of the British Isles, taking traditional British folk songs 
and fusing them with Islamic themes.418 Together these voices represent, in the view of 
Abdul-Rehman Malik, one of the staff at RMW, an attempt by Western scholars to 
“reclaim the classical heritage.”419 This, then, is why some of the new initiatives that 
have emerged in the UK, despite making use of modern technology, do not follow the 
trend toward personalised interpretation and challenges to traditional forms of authority 
entirely: many are engaged in an effort to draw upon the authority of the classical 
period to challenge modern scriptural literalism. 
 
 
5.11. Theological contests and social contexts 
 
It is not easy to say how successful these challenges will be. Such traditional and liberal 
forms of Islamic theology certainly have a number of obstacles to overcome if they are 
to successfully undermine the decontextualised and often literalistic readings of the 
texts preferred by Salafi and Wahhabi groups. The problem is not just that Wahhabi 
interpretations of the tradition are well financed and appealing to young Muslims who 
have suffered racism and economic exclusion and who have been frustrated by the 
foreign policies of the US and Britain in the Middle East. Nor is it just that the Western 
media tend to focus on more puritanical forms of Islam, offering little assistance to 
Muslims trying to counter those interpretations. There is also the problem that in the 
UK, with its fast-paced media culture constantly spewing masses of information, it is 
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hard to transmit and discuss a religious tradition coherently. This is an especially large 
problem given that the Islamic tradition, as Zaki Badawi observed many years ago, does 
not yet contain in its vast corpus many systematic discussions on the subject of how to 
live as a minority.420 It was partly for this reason that the Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 
was first published toward the end of the 1970s.421 There are various areas that are in 
need of discussion, but conditions make it hard. 
 
Many social scientists and political analysts, particularly those, such as Tariq Ali, who 
have links with the secular Left, as a result tend to push to one side all talk of 
theological conflict as irrelevant.422 For them, contests over religious texts are seen as 
less important than the social and historical conditions in which those texts are read. 
This is a view Roy inclines toward, noting that, in general, theological arguments such 
as bin Bayyah’s about whether Muslims should consider British laws binding are not 
really of much relevance. Responding to a debate between Abou El Fadl and Bernard 
Lewis over whether most classical ‘ulama considered it permissible for Muslims to live 
under non-Muslim rule, he suggests: 
 
As is so often the case, the impact of such theoretical and legal discussions on 
current practices is overemphasised by Western orientalists and contemporary 
Muslim fundamentalists. “Real” Muslims act and live without waiting eagerly 
for the ulama’s point of view. The idea that Muslims are reluctant to live as a 
minority is contradicted by the facts.... [This idea] overestimates the impact on 
societies of religion in general and Islam in particular.... [T]here are simply 
Muslims who are negotiating new identities by conflicting means, usually 
peacefully, sometimes violently.423 
 
Clearly, given all the massive structural forces outlined above, one has to concede that 
Ali and others have a point. And obviously, what Roy says in this passage is correct: 
those who came to Britain in the ’50s did not seek the consent of clerics. Just because 
an ‘alim claimed around 1350 that Muslims should not live in a jurisdiction in which 
Islam is not dominant it does not mean Muslims will never be able to live settled lives 
in Western, secular contexts, as some claim. Nevertheless, such commentators can be a 
little too quick to discount the influence of ideas. Marxists such as Ali are not usually 
quite so quick to discount Marxism as an idea, after all; it tends only to be theological 
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ideas, which hints at a minor progressive bias. Roy’s analysis, too, might be improved if 
he recognised that “negotiations” about Muslim identity are generally conducted in a 
theological language. Although the initiatives mentioned above are all small first steps, 
one can nevertheless trace certain ideas being turned into organisational forms. The 
traditionalistic riposte has been influential, and the influence of liberalising theologians 
can also be observed: the inspiration behind Maslaha was actually a presentation by 
Ramadan in London in 2006. These are just hints, and need to be set against the kind of 
long term changes explored in the last chapter, but to say they are of no interest to 
anyone interested in public life is highly unfair. At worst, this attempt to undermine the 
overemphasis on Islamic concepts (by people like Scruton and McRoy above) can lead 
to the insinuation that the arguments and the moral orientations of Muslims do not 
matter and are not worth considering. As Abou El Fadl has suggested in a response to 
Ali, millions of human beings “acknowledge God as part of their moral and material 
universe. This is why theology matters. If theology does not matter, then they do not 
matter, and, ultimately, I do not matter either.”424  
 
 
5.12. Creating new forms of authority? 
 
Intriguingly, a number of Muslim scholars in Europe have responded to the obstacles 
listed above (as well as those challenges mentioned in the last chapter) by calling for the 
creation of new authorities. Ceric has been the most enthusiastic advocate of such an 
idea, putting forward a proposal for unifying Sunni and Shi’a traditions under a single 
European Islamic authority, a development that he regards as necessary to strike a 
decisive blow to the “new Kharijism.”425 Murad, although much more sceptical about 
the idea than Ceric (for reasons to be discussed in Chapter 7), nonetheless admits that 
“the problem generically in the Muslim world is that the very top flight elite scholars 
sometimes are disconnected ... so the middle-range scholar interested in maintaining 
credibility in a congregation that might be fearful and wary of new ideas no longer has 
great scholars to whom he can refer.”426 Even some who are not formal scholars, such 
as Ramadan, have expressed similar views: 
 
Do we need a platform of scholars, at least at the national level? We need 
scholars at different levels. In Britain, we need people who know the country, 
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come from the country, are raised in the country, who know the fabric and the 
culture, the language and the whole collective psychology. We need people 
who come from diverse readings of the Qur’an. We need a platform which 
will give direction.... This is for national issues and we may think of another 
platform for international issues.427 
 
The creation of religious authority is, of course, generally associated with challenges to 
liberal democratic politics. But these intellectuals, oddly enough, regard the creation of a 
platform for the transmission of new, authoritative interpretations as potentially a force 
for liberalisation, or at least for enabling harmonious coexistence between the different 
European moral traditions. The hope is that such an institution might be able to 
formalise and establish an Islamic tradition in Europe based upon the principles of, as 
Ceric has it, a “Muslim social contract.” Indeed, Ceric aspires to something akin to a 
Vatican II-style aggiomamento (“updating”) so that Islam can be turned away from the 
path of scriptural literalism and toward a situation where all Muslims take part in society 
as, as he says himself, quoting Rawls, “free and rational persons concerned to further 
their own interests [who accept] an initial position of equality as defining the 
fundamental terms of their association.”428 
 
 
5.13. “Actually existing” Islamic authority 
 
Whether it will ever be possible to develop such an institution or institutions, either at a 
national level or continent-wide level, is not easy to tell. The dream is certainly a long 
way from the reality at present. The closest thing to a European Islamic authority 
currently is the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), which was formed 
in 1997 and has its headquarters in Dublin. Rather than being a training centre for 
aspiring religious leaders like the Muslim College, Cambridge Muslim College or the 
many Deobandi dar al-ulums, the ECFR’s primary function is to provide judgements on 
such things as (to take examples from its first fatwa book) whether it is permissible for a 
Muslim to settle permanently in a non-Muslim country, whether the traditional 
punishment for apostasy is still relevant, or whether a Muslim woman is required to 
wear a head covering of some sort. It has not yet achieved widespread acceptance in the 
UK, however, for a number of reasons. 
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The single biggest reason is its claim to be a European Islamic authority looks a little 
dubious from the outside. Only half of the thirty-eight ‘ulama that make up the Council 
are actually based in Europe; the remainder are from either the Middle East, Central 
and East Africa, South Asia or North America.429 To add to this, the president of the 
organisation presently is Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the controversial Egyptian ‘alim and 
televangelist. Qaradawi has been widely condemned for his views on homosexuality, 
apostasy (he takes the classical view) and his support for suicide bombers in occupied 
Palestine, as well as his involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian 
political movement.430 In February 2008 he was denied entry into the UK for medical 
treatment, the Conservative leader David Cameron describing him at the time as a 
“dangerous and divisive” preacher of hate.431 One can quibble about the wisdom of this 
judgment given that: 1) Qaradawi condemned in no uncertain terms the attacks on New 
York in 2001 and the bombings in London in 2005; and 2) Conservative leaders have in 
the past had no problem welcoming, among others, Augusto Pinochet to the UK, a 
person whose political record makes Qaradawi’s views seem decidedly tame. Even so, it 
will always be hard for a non-European individual with such views to represent Islam in 
Europe—particularly when that individual is not lawfully permitted to enter one of the 
continent’s most populous countries. 
 
Despite these misgivings, it is worth noting that the ECFR’s judgements usually have 
avoided serious controversy, reflecting the fact that its members hold different views, 
not all as hard-line as Qaradawi’s stances. Its first book of fatwas goes against the 
classical position on apostasy (although its wording is a little unclear), as well as 
stressing that living as a minority is acceptable and that, while Islam does prescribe the 
wearing of a head covering, it should not be forced upon women.432 This does not 
mean the organisation is without flaws, but it is interesting to note that it has proved a 
valuable resource for some clerics: Usama Hasan, for example, the young imam 
mentioned in the previous chapter, cites the ECFR as one of the authorities on which 
his support of religious freedom is based.  
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5.14. Conclusion: tradition and authority 
 
Authority has always been a slippery quality, something that is hard to pin down and 
easy to build myths around. In the Islamic tradition, in present day Britain at least, 
authority is increasingly diffuse and thus elusive, which may be part of the reason why 
so many myths and rumours surround it. There is, in fact, an irony in the way Islam is 
portrayed by many commentators in the UK. As Roy has observed, the more radical 
movements and revivals that have surfaced in the UK are often looked upon as just 
importations of authoritative traditions born in the Middle East or the wider Muslim 
world. In truth, those movements, often influenced by Salafi and Wahhabi thought as 
well as by processes of globalisation and modernisation, have been at the heart of the 
slow weakening of ancient Islamic traditions.433 
 
Weakened as the traditional structures of authority may be, however, the issue of 
Islamic authority is not likely to go away soon. As we have seen in this chapter, a 
number of efforts have been made to create new forms of authority, many of those 
who are involved giving serious thought to how Islam can be reformulated in such as 
way as to ensure protection of personal freedoms (in Ramadan’s case), facilitate full 
participation (in Ceric’s case) or encourage the Islamic tradition to entrench itself in 
British culture (in Murad’s case). These, however, conflict sharply with those forms of 
Islam that have been propagated by the clerics based on the Arabian Peninsula since the 
1970s that have tended to firmly resist any form of political engagement, instead 
retreating into a past reimagined as a golden age. Significant theological contests look 
certain in the future, and not only in Britain. 
 
The outcome of these contests is not easy to predict, for two significant reasons. Firstly, 
they are taking place against a backdrop of economic and political struggles and wide-
ranging social changes. Salafi and Wahhabi forms of Islam may be simplistic, but they 
offer iron certainties and an escape from a hostile world that can be appealing during a 
time of rapid change. They are also, as we saw earlier in the chapter, extremely well 
financed. On the other side, the theologies propagated by the scholars discussed above 
may be more nuanced, but they can also struggle to connect, seeming removed from 
people’s real-life problems. Transforming the wide-ranging vision that they offer into 
institutions and social movements may be difficult, not least because they are easily 
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caught up in political conflicts and co-opted by interested parties. As we shall see in 
Chapter 7, the UK government has taken a keen interest in those forms of Islam that 
are supportive of political participation in Britain. These expressions of interest can 
have the effect of tainting certain perspectives, giving the impression that they are being 
pushed by a secular state for political reasons.  
 
Secondly, there are a number of differences between scholars’ perspectives. In the 
Anglophone world most people have become familiar with attempts to divide Muslims 
into the categories of “radical” and “moderate.” These are, of course, highly simplistic. 
Not only are a whole host of political movements and social formations (from the 
puritanical Saudi élite to Egyptian and Pakistani militants, Turkish political parties and 
young, disaffected European Muslims) usually lumped together in the former group, a 
number of different and often opposed individuals (including liberals and modernists, 
scholarly traditionalists and nominal Muslims with little interest in the intricacies of 
theology) are also placed together in the latter. The emergence of Salafi and Wahhabi 
forms of Islam has prompted a wide variety of theological viewpoints to come together 
in opposition, with traditional scholars from the UK and abroad forming an alliance of 
sorts with large numbers of younger Muslims. Yet there are still differences that will 
need to be worked out. In particular, the attempts to “reclaim the classical heritage” will 
need to work out how to revitalise the Islamic tradition’s language to allow it to speak 
to modern conditions, addressing questions about things such as living as a religious 
minority and women’s participation in public life. The problem is that traditional fiqh 
has serious limitations in these areas: most forms of classical Islamic law prohibit full 
recognition of women and non-Muslims as citizens.434 For that reason, simply stressing 
the normative authority of the classical era in opposition to Salafi literalism, as some do, 
represents at best a partial solution. To move further, it will be necessary to open up the 
tradition to reinterpretation, running the risk of further fragmentation and even schism. 
There is a great deal at stake in these debates over interpretation, and so it is of great 
significance how they are allowed to unfold. 
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6. Debating civil and Islamic law 
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6.1.   Communication breakdown 
 
If there is one thing that unites liberal political philosophers—even many who regard 
themselves as on the margins of the tradition, and who prefer to be thought of as 
socialist, feminist, conservative or communitarian—it is the belief that the tackling of 
injustice and the shaping of progress rely on a constant, engaged public conversation. 
As Nancy Fraser has put it, in liberal states “political participation is enacted through 
the medium of talk.”435 For conditions to improve there must be a space, in Zygmunt 
Bauman’s words, “where private problems meet in a meaningful way—that is, not just 
to draw narcissistic pleasures or in search of some therapy through public display, but 
to seek collectively managed levers powerful enough to lift individuals from their 
privately suffered misery; [a] space where such ideas are born and take shape as the 
‘public good,’ the ‘just society’ or ‘shared values.’”436 This basic belief has been implicit 
throughout this study so far: to argue about whether religious reasons should be used in 
public debates and to examine the negotiation of religious beliefs and identities is to 
presuppose that reasoning and negotiating matter, and that without successful, open 
debates liberal democracy is in serious trouble. 
 
It is precisely because so much hangs on public conversations that it is easy to become 
despondent when they go awry—when, for example, they become no more than 
excuses for outpourings of aggression, or when they are based upon dubious premises 
from the outset. And go awry they frequently seem to do, particularly when those 
conversations are about Islam. A good example of this occurred in 2008 when Rowan 
Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury and the leader of the Church of England, offered 
his thoughts in a public lecture on the relationship between English and Islamic law.437 
During this lecture Williams contemplated, without offering firm conclusions, the 
possibility of incorporating certain aspects of Muslim personal law in the UK with a 
view to remedying the problems encountered by people who have loyalties both to their 
country and to a religious system with its own norms. His talk was by no means perfect 
in every detail—and it was far from media-friendly—but at the very least it hit on a 
significant and complicated problem. Within any religious tradition that has norms of 
action, and particularly those that are (like Muslims in the UK) not well established, 
there is a risk of groups operating semi-autonomously, in effect cut off from the state. 
When this situation occurs, a number of risks emerge: people who fail to register their 
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marriages may find they have no claim to inheritance or compensation payments;438 or 
worse, vulnerable people in the community might be forced to do certain things or be 
prevented from claiming rights. There are two ways of avoiding these problems, but 
neither can be regarded as a panacea. The state could interfere with that group, but then 
there is a risk that religious freedoms will be infringed, with consenting members of the 
group being seriously hindered. Or it could formalise the norms of the religious 
community within the civil system—that is, delegate authority to its leaders so that 
religious rites become recognised in civil law. Then, though, there is a danger that any 
oppressive practices will become entrenched. All this was acknowledged in Williams’s 
lecture, which advocated an open conversation working toward “mutual questioning 
and ... mutual influence towards change.”439 
 
This conversation was, however, cut short just a day or so after the lecture took place, 
the discussion giving way to paroxysms of rage that paid little attention to the content 
of the lecture and even less to the lives and beliefs of the Muslim communities based in 
the UK. The prelate was ridiculed,440 and calls were made from across the political 
spectrum for him to resign as the head of the Church. Approximately seventy articles 
were published on the subject of the lecture in the two weeks that followed in the 
broadsheet press alone, around nine tenths of which were relentlessly hostile.441 The 
following excerpt from Charles Moore in The Daily Telegraph gives a good indication of 
the kind of thing that was said: 
 
“Shari‘a,” says Dr. Williams, “is not intrinsically to do with any demand for 
Muslim domination over non-Muslims.” Actually, under Shari‘a, Jews and 
Christians have only what is called “dhimmi” status, a sort of protected, but 
second-class citizenship. But in a way, he is right. Shari‘a does not “demand” 
domination; it assumes it.... Islam, like Christianity, is a religion of conversion. 
Its Shari‘a, unlike the teachings of Christianity, is a programme of law to be 
turned into a political reality, if possible everywhere. Poor, dear Dr. Williams 
mutters into his beard about a “market element” of taking a bit of Shari‘a, and 
a bit of this and a bit of that, as if these things were herbs to spice our 
multicultural soup. People who want Shari‘a do not see it like that. For them, it 
must be the only dish on the table.442 
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It is hard to convey briefly how wide of the mark this passage is, and it will be one of 
the aims of this chapter to show the distance. To borrow Wolfgang Pauli’s quip, not 
only is this statement not right; it isn’t even wrong. To be called “wrong” it would have 
to have read the situation right and then made an unwise suggestion. But this passage is 
barely more than a paranoid fantasy: it is completely unrelated to the character of and 
the debates about Islam in Britain. To begin with, it is worth mentioning that, although 
the medieval dhimma system of citizenship that Moore mentions had a place in classical 
fiqh, it has not been transformed fully into a formal political reality anywhere since the 
Tanzimat period443 of the Ottoman Empire. The only recent attempt to institute the 
model was made in the 1990s by the Taliban in Afghanistan, and even that stammering 
effort resulted in the almost total isolation of the regime and its condemnation by 
Muslims the world over. (Taliban rule, it is worth noting, was only recognised by four 
of the more than forty-four Muslim-majority countries in the world.)444 In the UK I 
have never seen the concept mooted apart from one off-the-cuff remark from a radical 
cleric quoted in a far-Right publication.445  
 
The real problem with this situation is that it has made it almost impossible to work out 
any kind of solution to the problems mentioned above, all of which, as this chapter will 
try to show, are entirely relevant in the UK. There have certainly been problems with 
Muslim communities bypassing the civil system and of vulnerable young Muslims being 
subject to forms of coercion, but these problems have become much harder to resolve 
because the debate has been skewed by those who appear to think that Islam poses a 
mortal threat to Western civilisation. (The Sun’s Whitehall editor, playing to these 
perceptions, asserted that Williams had claimed Britain “must accept the strict Islamic 
code” and thereby “handed victory to al-Qaeda.”)446 It has become the case that the 
flimsiest research examining on-line fatwas that have, in some cases, not even been 
made in Britain can make front page news,447 while careful ethnographic work on 
Islamic legal councils goes ignored by the press. 
 
To try and make some headway on this subject, this chapter will do two things. The 
first is simply clear the way for a sensible debate about Islamic law in the UK by 
outlining some significant information about the issue. To do this it will draw on both 
primary and secondary research to offer an account of what the Islamic legal tribunals 
in the UK (and specifically the London area) do, and of when and why they emerged. 
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This will give a rough sense of the challenges and questions they present for liberalism 
in Britain. The second is a little more unusual. It will seek to articulate some of the 
internal debates on the subject, highlighting the different interpretations that have been 
put forward on Islamic law and looking at how these are being discussed with a view to 
reconciling Islamic norms and the civil system. Even in the academic sphere there is not 
a great deal of discussion of this. This is a shame, because these debates offer one of 
only a few sources of hope in the confusion. Over the previous two chapters I have 
been looking at some of the changes that have been taking place within the Islamic 
communities and traditions in Britain, and at some of the new theological voices and 
perspectives that have been emerging. In this chapter my main interest is in illustrating 
how some of these emerging debates open up possibilities and even hint at solutions to 
these extremely complicated problems. As will become clear, some of the initiatives 
outlined earlier in the thesis fulfil a useful function as spaces to work through complex 
questions, offering a location where many different perspectives on Islam can be put 
forward without immediately being misread; they may even offer lessons on how to 
improve public religious debate in the UK as a whole. 
 
 
6.2.  The genesis of Islamic legal tribunals 
 
The Islamic legal tribunals in the UK occupy an unusual position within British Islam. 
Most are, like the mosques in Britain, run by the older generation of British Muslims. 
Indeed, many emerged under the guidance of mosque leaders, some being established 
because the existing imams were finding that far too much of their time was being 
taken up with marital disputes. For this reason the largest councils, established in the 
early to mid-1980s primarily to deal with marriages and divorces, can be seen as part of 
the process of community formation discussed in Chapter 4. However, the tribunals 
differ from institutions such as mosques and dar al-ulums in important respects. As we 
saw in Chapter 4, most mosques in Britain have links with traditions from abroad due 
to their being established to cater for the specific needs of an ethno-religious group. 
The largest tribunals, by contrast (on which I focus here), aim to cater for all Muslims 
regardless of ethnic or sectarian affiliation. They are a product of internal community 
dynamics, but reflect gradual changes within Islam in Britain and the overcoming of 
certain ethnic and sectarian boundaries.448 
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In fact, internal change has been central to the emergence of the legal councils in the 
UK. While most mosques and educational institutions attempted, initially at least, to 
maintain particular Islamic traditions for Muslim migrants and their offspring, the 
tribunals emerged partly as a way of negotiating between Islamic traditions and the 
English legal system. Although, as we shall see, they do have an awkward relationship 
with English law, they did not just emerge as a challenger to it, or as part of an effort to 
undermine or circumvent it. Indeed, what is particularly interesting about the legal 
tribunals is that they do not simply operate according to the norms of the (mainly South 
Asian) legal traditions with which their founders were familiar. Werner Menski and 
David Pearl, in their work on Muslim law Britain in the 1990s, coined the term “Angrezi 
Shariat” (“English Shari‘a”) as a way of trying to highlight the fact that during the last 
few decades forms of Islamic law have emerged that have been clearly distinguishable 
from the legal traditions in the regions from which most British Muslims originate. 
Certain legal practices have emerged, they write, that have “built the requirements of 
English law into traditional legal structures.”449 
 
There is one particularly significant reason cited as why Islamic legal tribunals were 
created. In many traditional forms of Islamic law men are given the right to initiate 
divorce unilaterally without recourse to anyone. All he needs to do is declare talaq three 
times, usually in three consecutive months, and the marriage is ended (although in many 
Muslim-majority countries today, such as Pakistan, a man pronouncing talaq has to 
register it in writing at the earliest opportunity).450 A woman seeking to obtain a divorce, 
by contrast, has traditionally needed either to ask for it from her husband or, if her 
husband does not give his consent, appeal to some kind of formal authority.451 A very 
similar situation applies in some traditional conceptions of Jewish law, where the 
husband has to grant his wife a get.452 The argument made in the UK therefore is that 
because no legal tribunals were established Muslim women were encountering serious 
difficulties. A civil divorce might be obtained by a woman, but because the divorce had 
not been consented to by her husband she would still be considered by her relatives and 
peers to be married “Islamically,” making remarriage difficult. In the Jewish context 
women in this situation are usually called agunot, literally meaning women who are 
“chained” to a marriage, unable or unwilling to remarry and have children who might 
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be deemed illegitimate.453 Referring to the British Islamic context, Menski and Pearl 
describe these as “limping marriages.”454 
 
 
6.3.  Claims about emancipation 
 
Quite the extent to which this was a problem twenty-five or so years ago is incredibly 
difficult to determine with precision, but there is no real reason to doubt that it was and 
may still be an issue in some cases. The majority of the fifteen-hundred or so cases that 
the Leyton-based Islamic Sharia Council (ISC), arguably the largest tribunal and one of 
two that I shall be focusing on in this chapter, dealt with in the first decade of its 
existence centred upon a husband who had not recognised his wife’s divorce for some 
reason.455 Since then legislation has been passed to deal with the issue, namely, the 
Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act of 2002, which allows anyone whose spouse is 
refusing to offer or accept a religious divorce to apply to the court handling the civil 
case for an order stalling a Decree Absolute.456 Even today however, as research by 
Samia Bano has shown, by far the most common reason Muslim women have for 
making contact with Islamic legal tribunals in the UK is to obtain an Islamic divorce.457 
Because of this, the clerics in charge of the tribunals have sometimes tried to portray 
themselves as interested mainly or even exclusively in the emancipation of vulnerable 
women in Muslim communities. Consider, for example, this statement from Faizul 
Aqtab Siddiqi, principal of the Nuneaton-based Hijaz College and founder of one of 
the Birmingham-based Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, a new institution that does not 
deal with marriages and divorces but offers alternative dispute resolution within the 
terms of the Arbitration Act (1996): 
 
It’s argued that what Shari‘a courts do is subjugate ... women. Nonesense! 
Absolute humbug! You know the reality is that some of these Shari‘a councils 
were created to give women the right to walk away from marriages which they 
were stuck in for decades, so that they could walk away from them with 
certainty and a definitive cut from the past.458 
 
This is an unusually forceful pronouncement, but one of many that could be cited. The 
senior figures in the ISC have made similar claims. Maulana Shahid Raza and the late 
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Zaki Badawi, of the Ealing-based Muslim law (Shariah) Council UK (MLSC), have both 
cited this as their tribunal’s main purpose, with the latter being quoted in both Menski’s 
work and by another legal scholar, Ihsan Yilmaz.459 The MLSC, the second of the two 
tribunals I shall be concentrating on, is affiliated with the Muslim College (outlined in 
Chapter 4), and is for that reason perhaps the best known tribunal in the UK. These 
claims are, I believe, sincere, and to a certain extent truthful too. Even so, one has to 
approach them with caution, particularly when they are used to depict the tribunals as 
institutions that have brought nothing but benefits for Muslim women. In some 
scholarly accounts of Muslim personal law in the UK, particularly those that focus on 
clerics’ views, there is a tendency to take these statements at face value. As a result 
academics have sometimes been sanguine about—even openly supportive of—the idea 
of delegating some form of authority to legal tribunals as a possible future for Muslims 
in the UK.460 However, as Bano, whose research on this topic is the most extensive I 
know of, has noted, these accounts rarely examine the experiences of the women using 
the councils and for that reason sometimes miss some of the serious problems that they 
can encounter. These have to be examined before it is possible to make any detailed 
comments. As we shall see, the tribunals have an ambiguous role, sometimes being 
highly restrictive, at others more positive. 
 
 
6.4.  Tradition, family and nomos 
 
One thing that it is important to highlight is that not all the women seeking to obtain a 
religious divorce via an Islamic legal tribunal have already secured a civil divorce; many, 
in fact, are not even married in English law. This issue of marriage registration is a 
complex one, and I shall return to it again later in the chapter. But one can say with 
some confidence that the failure to register marriages has been a serious problem in the 
British Islamic context. In Bano’s study of twenty-five Pakistani Muslim women who 
had used an Islamic tribunal less than half were married according to civil law, a figure 
supported by other publications on the subject.461 One woman, in the most worrying 
case that she cites, was not even aware her marriage had no legitimacy in English law.462 
The number of mosques registered as approved premises also remains extremely low, 
not only compared to well-established religious groups, but also to recently arrived 
ones. According to the Office for National Statistics, while ninety percent of Catholic 
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churches and seventy-nine percent of Sikh temples are registered as premises in which 
marriages may legally be conducted, only nineteen percent of Britain’s mosques are.463 
This lower figure might be explained partly by marital norms in Islam. There are some 
Muslim religious leaders in the UK who argue that marriage in Islam differs from the 
Christian traditions in which British culture is steeped, it being more of a private matter. 
For example, Usama Hasan, the part-time imam we encountered in Chapter 4, argues 
that while many Muslims in the UK celebrate their marriages in mosques “you don’t 
actually need ... a holy man or an imam to conduct [an Islamic] marriage or divorce.”464 
It just needs, in his view, the two partners and two adult (traditionally male) witnesses. 
Tariq Ramadan has even gone so far as to argue that the French Civil Solidarity Pact 
(akin to a civil partnership in the UK) is closer to the Islamic concept of marriage in 
traditional fiqh.465 It may not always be, then, a case of imams simply being negligent. 
Nevertheless, it seems to be the case that some Muslim communities operate semi-
autonomously, disconnected from the state.  
 
Such detachment can, of course, be related to the process of community formation 
described in Chapter 4, which saw the development of semi-autonomous groups. In the 
original Greek, the word “autonomy” is comprised of two terms: auto (meaning “self” 
or “one’s own”) and nomos (which is usually translated as “law” but can also be taken to 
mean “order,” “norm” or “custom”). Some sociologists, particularly Peter Berger, use 
the latter term to describe the process by which human experience is socially ordered: 
the genesis of roles, rules, habits and standards.466 This sociological interpretation can 
help one understand why the Islamic legal councils came into being and the context in 
which they operate. As the research of Bano and others467 demonstrates, it is common 
among South Asian Muslim communities for marriages to be endogamous, the partners 
being brought together by family members. This practice is commonly influenced by all 
manner of norms, expectations and socially sustained—although by no means 
uncontested—conceptions of male and female roles. The expectation often placed 
upon women is that they will marry early and within the group, their failure to do so 
being seen to cause a loss not just of their own honour (known as izzat in the Pakistani 
context and namus in Turkish and Kurdish contexts), but the honour of their family, 
particularly its male members.468 In some cases this can lead to elaborate negotiations, 
sometimes involving considerable social pressure. There is not the space here to really 
do justice to the sheer complexity of these discussions, much less to the nuanced ways 
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in which individual choices and social expectations interrelate. Yet the following 
passages from Bano’s interviews provide some helpful insights. In the following excerpt 
a Pakistani woman who had contacted an Islamic tribunal about a divorce, and who had 
chosen to marry a person from outside her immediate kinship network (biradari), 
describes the loss of face suffered by her parents: 
 
I did understand where they were coming from because in Asian communities 
it’s the norm to marry in your own biradari and I knew my parents were going 
to get a lot of stick from the community.469 
 
A second excerpt describes the pressure placed on women to marry more explicitly: 
 
I don’t believe it’s just an Asian thing because women from all backgrounds 
face the pressure to get married or have to consider getting married. But in our 
communities, marriage carries the added burden of izzat and so there’s always 
some pressure.470 
 
Bano’s divides her study of twenty-five women into thirteen arranged marriages, eight 
own-choice marriages and four forced marriages. (This sample is of women who have 
used Islamic legal tribunals, it ought to be noted, and is unlikely to be representative of 
British Pakistani or British Muslim women generally.) Yet as she acknowledges, this 
split is rather artificial because the line between freely choosing, choosing with others 
and being forced is often hazy. Within a nomos that has its own set of expectations and 
norms, one’s choices may be influenced by others’ perceptions (so a woman who 
chooses a partner may still seek parental consent). A network of support can turn into a 
means of coercion, with parents who apparently want to do the best for their children 
subtly imposing restrictions. This is hinted at in the research on attitudes to forced 
marriage among Bangladeshis in East London and Pakistanis in Bradford conducted by 
Yunas Samad and John Eade, which indicated that, although older generations tend to 
downplay the extent of forced marriage among South Asians, younger generations 
often report that supposedly arranged marriages feel coerced.471 Another quotation 
from Bano’s work offers a vivid illustration of this complexity. This excerpt is from a 
woman who had been forced into a marriage, but who nonetheless stated that parental 
input remains important in her plans to re-marry: 
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Having an arranged marriage was the only option for me and I never thought 
about challenging my parents. Getting married the way I got married was like 
for... well, for keeping the family together; you’re meant to be keeping the ties 
together. It’s meant to be like this, you know, some sort of guarantee that if 
anything goes wrong, then you’ve got the family there to help sort things out. 
I’d have another arranged marriage.472 
 
 
6.5.  Aside on individuals, groups and liberal theory 
 
Before returning to the Islamic legal tribunals and examining how they fit into this, it is 
worth relating these accounts to discussions in liberal theory that deal with group 
identification and group rights. Liberalism, of course, is generally regarded as ethically 
individualist in the sense that everything that matters morally, matters because of the 
impact it has upon individuals. Taking the lead from Kant, the tradition tends to view 
dignity and individual autonomy as intimately linked. However, in recent years a vast 
literature has emerged473 that had tried to engage with the idea that certain goods are 
social—that is to say, that there are some experiences, forms of meaning, emotional 
bonds, standards and virtues that are only accessible within a specific social context, 
outside of which they become unavailable.474 A particular act may only possesses the 
significance it does when it is placed in a specific setting, and when certain meanings are 
shared. In fact, it has been suggested by some, such as Victoria Harrison, that certain 
goods are acquired only through personal formation and that “without a certain degree 
of ... inculturation, a person will be unable to express, and, hence will be incapable of 
having, certain kinds of religious experience.”475 One of the main propositions that this 
literature has debated at length is that, if some goods can be found only within a 
particular social context, then there may be some good reasons for the state to offer 
protection to cultural groups, or to nomoi.  
 
Keen research such as Bano’s has significant implications for these debates. Her 
account does not refute the idea of a social good; it is clear that many of the women she 
studied value at least some of their religious and cultural inheritances and would be 
damaged if they disappeared. However, there are two challenges that emerge. First, it is 
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clear that there are, as Lois McNay has observed in her critique of communal rights, 
power relationships at the heart of nomoi, intricately woven into their systems of 
meaning and value.476 Izzat, for instance, is a “social good” in a sense: it represents an 
idea of what is right and wrong and it is socially constructed and sustained. But it has 
caused women to be ignored, pressured and in the very worst cases (of so-called 
“honour killings”) murdered.477 Secondly, it presents a challenge to one of the most 
common suggestions about how a liberal state can preserve cultural or religious groups 
while also protecting individual autonomy. This is to say that different social forms and 
institutions—Islamic legal tribunals are a very good example—can be allowed to 
function and even be supported by the state if those who use them are offered an 
overriding right to exit a community. Williams relied upon this right in his lecture on 
Islamic and English law, saying that “no ‘supplementary’ jurisdiction could have the 
power to deny access to the rights granted to other citizens or to punish its members 
for claiming those rights.”478 Bano’s research highlights one obvious difficulty with this, 
namely, that exiting a social system is no simple task; it can mean wrenching oneself 
from every financial and emotional support one has, and having to redefine one’s self-
understanding. A fourth quote taken from Bano’s interviews on the subject of an 
arranged marriage illustrates this superbly:  
 
I couldn’t just leave; I knew everyone would turn their backs on me. And 
anyway, where would I have to go? I do feel constrained at home but I know 
being on the outside isn’t all it’s made up to be. I know some girls who’ve run 
away and they’re really alone and with no support. I couldn’t do that cause... 
well I just couldn’t live that way.479 
 
It is precisely because of these difficulties exiting a nomos that Ayelet Shachar, one of the 
most sophisticated theorists of group rights, has argued that the right to exit a group is 
unlikely to be enough on its own. If a religious community makes demands of a person 
he or she might choose to leave it. But that, Shachar comments, might simply throw 
“upon the already beleaguered individual the responsibly to either miraculously 
transform the legal-institutional conditions that keep her vulnerable or to find the 
resources to leave her whole world behind.”480 Anne Phillips, similarly, argues that 
states concerned with respecting equally people’s different interpretations of the good 
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life need to be aware of the role of voice as well as exit.481 This is an argument I would 
like to look at in greater detail at the end of this chapter. 
 
 
6.6.  The role of the legal tribunals 
 
The UK’s Islamic legal councils can be regarded as one actor in this complex and 
always changing process of negotiation. They could be viewed as one conversation 
partner, although they occupy an unusual role. They are privileged and powerful in 
some ways, yet possess no magic wand to alter traditions and customs within Muslim 
groups they disapprove of. They follow certain traditions (sometimes stubbornly, as we 
shall see), yet are not simply conservative. They appear in some cases to offer assistance 
to women who are trying to find a decisive way out of a failed marriage without having 
to exit a particular kinship network, yet also—and this is a crucial point—impose their 
own procedures, or hoops to jump through. 
 
There are many norms common among British Muslims that the leaders of legal 
tribunals have expressed frustration at. For example, Shahid Raza at the MLSC, which 
is the more flexible of the two tribunals discussed here and which aspires to remove 
antagonisms between Muslims in the UK and the English law (details to follow), is 
strongly critical of those clerics and lay Muslims who do not register marriages with the 
state, a habit that makes his own role much harder: 
 
I would say that almost eighty percent of mosques and imams are still 
conducting Islamic marriages without conducting civil marriages first.... [W]e 
have seen ... girls who are on some occasions vulnerable.... They go and marry 
according to Shari‘a law, and maybe after three months the man walks away 
from the marriage. Then the girl comes here crying, cursing God, cursing 
Islam, cursing the Shari‘a Council and cursing Muslim custom. “Who the hell 
are you?! You are not helping me; my husband has thrown me out.  What are 
my rights? Where shall I go?” She has no rights. Nothing is protected 
according to the law of the country. We have been referred so many cases of 
that nature.482 
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Another frustration voiced by some scholars at the tribunals relates to Muslims who use 
Islamic principles just to further their own interests. Abdul Kadir Barkatulla, who is one 
of the more open-minded of the muftis at the ISC, has complained about Muslim men 
who leave their partners without granting an Islamic divorce and then take a second 
wife on the grounds that Islam permits polygyny. He has also expressed frustration at 
divorcing couples who attempt to rearrange their finances to fall in line with what is 
taken to be Islamic tradition rather than accepting the rulings of civil divorce courts. In 
response to this, he has developed the argument that both monogamous marriage and 
the property rulings of civil divorce cases in the UK can and should be considered ‘urf 
by British Muslims. ‘Urf, as we saw in the last chapter, is an Islamic legal term denoting 
a custom that, whilst not necessarily “Islamic,” is seen as acceptable. This except from a 
debate at City Circle gives an indication of his views: 
 
People think that polygamy is the first principle of Islam.... [But it is not as if] 
by not doing it we are committing sin. Voluntarily we can forgo the right, and 
anywhere by accepting citizenship and by accepting residence in any country, 
you tacitly undertake to abide by the law of the land. So for me the property 
rights of women, if you are living by the Shari‘a and you have the law of the 
land, then [such things] become your ‘urf, ‘urf meaning local custom, a local 
custom that is one hundred percent enforceable by the Shari‘a.... [The same 
applies for divorce law.] I still, I get asked, a woman asked after being awarded 
by the court fifty percent [of property in a divorce], she said: “Is it allowed for 
me to take this?” That lady, I advised her, “Of course!” We are constantly 
bombarded by “scholars” who just open the book and say there is no place for 
common property rights in Shari‘a.... Those who say women do not have 
property rights are really robbing them. And I have to convince them of this. 
That is the hardest thing, I find.483  
 
Even the most conservative clerics in the councils also accept, in principle at least, that 
Islamic marriages are not valid unless both husband and wife give their consent, and 
thus are strongly opposed to coerced marriage.484 In this case though, as in various 
other areas, the further that one gets into the matter the more complex problems 
emerge. Although both the tribunals are steadfastly opposed to forced marriage 
(particularly when it is bound up with cultural practices such as arranging marriages 
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within kinship networks), there remain a number of Islamic norms that can play a 
highly restrictive role. The approval of the wali, or the “bride guardian,” is particularly 
relevant here. In most traditional interpretations of Islamic law the consent of the 
bride’s guardian—the father usually—has been regarded as a necessary element for a 
nikah contract to be considered legitimate.485 In theory, this is only in addition to the 
consent of the bride: all four of the traditional Sunni madhhabs agree that the wali may 
not decide on behalf of his daughter, whose views are supposed to be taken very 
seriously. However, given that there can be, as we have seen, a blurred line between 
consent and coercion it is hard to be sure that this norm is always innocent. While I 
know of no clerical figure who has publically attempted to justify forced marriage in the 
UK, a number do insist upon the wali’’s consent—although, as we shall see later in the 
chapter, this principle has been fiercely debated in the UK in recent years. 
 
 
6.7.  Negotiating within the tribunals 
 
The ambiguous role played by the tribunals is best demonstrated by examining the way 
negotiations are conducted within them. In general, when a woman contacts one of the 
tribunals to obtain a divorce the first thing the scholars do is send a notice to the 
husband of the woman’s intentions to see if he will give his consent to the divorce (in 
the form of a talaq nama). If he does not reply after being contacted a number of times 
over a series of months the council will usually offer the women a certificate (khul‘) that 
declares that the marriage is ended. During this process, though, the councils do their 
best to reconcile the parties through mediation—which follows advice contained in the 
Qur’an on marriage and divorce486—and try to establish the grounds on which the 
divorce is to be based. It is in relation to these processes of mediation and evidence 
gathering that the most concerning data emerge. 
 
In some instances, details negotiated within civil divorce courts such as custody of 
children have been renegotiated in Islamic tribunals under very different conditions. 
One case file Bano cites from the MLSC illustrates the problem particularly well. The 
case refers to a young Muslim woman who was seeking an Islamic divorce at the same 
time as going through a civil divorce. The woman apparently had no desire at all to 
enter into any mediation process, and after speaking with her the scholars concluded 
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that reconciliation was unlikely to be successful. The husband initially refused her 
request for an Islamic divorce, but at some point during negotiations his solicitor sent a 
letter to the MLSC stating that if the woman would be willing to meet for mediation 
sessions and allow him access to the children—which seems to have been denied by the 
civil courts, possibly due to violence and emotional abuse487—then he would grant her a 
quick Islamic divorce. Thus the council, even though it defers to the authority of the 
state, nevertheless seemed to function in this example as a place where the husband 
managed to negotiate a more favourable outcome.488 
 
The mediation sessions themselves are also a matter for concern, particularly at the ISC, 
where it appears women have been in some instances pressured into participating in 
reconciliation sessions when they were highly reluctant to do so; some women have 
even been pressured into meeting with husbands against whom they had obtained 
injunctions on grounds of violence or abuse. A deliberate attempt is made to ensure the 
parties try to resolve their differences in the presence of a religious scholar because that 
is viewed as the scholar’s duty.489 The interviewees’ accounts of these reconciliation 
sessions in Bano’s study vary markedly. In some cases the women view the mediation 
process as useful and constructive, but some of the accounts are far more troubling, 
revealing some serious intra-group inequalities: 
 
They were right from the beginning on his side; they didn’t even listen to what 
I was saying. I mean I do read books. I don’t go into it that much but do know 
the basics, you know, what a husband has to do. I was really disappointed with 
the [imam] because he just wouldn’t blame my ex-husband and I was blamed 
for everything. 
 
It was weird but it felt as though I was the one being told off and when I tried 
to put across what I thought was wrong … it’s as though [the imam] didn’t 
want to hear it. 
 
I told him that I left him because he was violent but he started saying things 
like, “Oh, how violent was that because in Islam a man is allowed to beat his 
wife”! I mean I was so shocked. He said it depends on whether he really hurt 
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me! I was really shocked because I thought he was there to understand but he 
was trying to make me admit I had done wrong.490 
 
(In Bano’s account the councils these quotations refer to are not named. They may 
refer to tribunals that are not discussed here.) Consequently, Bano concludes, one 
ought to acknowledge that at least some tribunals “construct boundaries for group 
membership that rely upon traditional interpretations of the role of women in Islam, 
primarily as wives, mothers and daughters.”491 
 
 
6.8.  Debates and prospects for change 
 
Clearly, there is evidence enough to show that the proposal of formally recognising 
religious scholars and legal tribunals has to be approached with extreme caution, even if 
one might not rule out such an idea completely. It also casts in a completely different 
light the claim made by Siddiqi earlier that the idea that Islamic legal councils restrict 
women’s rights is “nonsense.” Yet despite these sobering details, there are numerous 
other points to make, many more positive. In the rest of this chapter I will outline these 
by looking at prospects for change. One of the most striking findings in Bano’s study is 
the willingness of the interviewees to contest both norms of family honour and the 
processes within the Islamic tribunals. Many contended that currently Muslim women 
are being denied rights given to them in Islam, and were very keen to explore the ways 
in which marriage and divorce norms could be reformed.492 To explore these prospects 
for change one needs to go beyond the councils, looking at differences not just within 
and between them, but also examining the debates that are going on beyond them in 
other arenas. City Circle has been a particularly important space for debating these 
questions, frequently bringing Islamic scholars, barristers, academics and activists on 
women’s issues in Islam into contact. It was also closely involved in the launch of a 
campaign to change marital norms in British Islam. I draw on these debates, as well as 
other sources, in the following sections. 
 
One intriguing possibility for future reform is in the area of divorce, particularly the 
disparity between women’s and men’s access to it. One way in which this has been 
remedied in certain Muslim-majority contexts has been via a process called talaq al-
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tafwid, where the husband “delegates” his right to unilateral divorce at the start of the 
marriage. Talaq al-tafwid is a centuries-old Islamic norm that has been included in the 
standard marriage contracts of Pakistan and Bangladesh since the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance 1961. It is also recognised in some form by the governments of India, the 
Philippines and Morocco.493 At present, of the two tribunals based in London only the 
MLSC recognises talaq al-tafwid, with its marriage contract giving the woman the option 
of initiating divorce.494 (Of course, because there is no standard or authoritative Islamic 
marriage contract that is recognised by all Muslims in the UK, and because the tribunals 
usually have little direct involvement in the marriage process, the use of this contract is 
left to the couple’s discretion. So while the MLSC encourages delegation, it has limited 
influence.) The ISC, though, takes a very different stance on the matter of talaq al-tafwid, 
although there seem to have been significant internal disagreements over the validity of 
the norm. During the summer of 2008 Barkatulla, who works with the ISC, was 
involved in drawing up a new marriage contract that made talaq al-tafwid the default 
form of Islamic divorce.495 It was created by the Muslim Institute (MI), an organisation 
that grew out of the Rushdie affair and that was once politically extreme (see Chapter 
7), but which in recent years under its current director, Ghayasuddin Siddiqui, has 
moderated its political stance significantly. The new contract was drafted by three 
people primarily: Barkatulla, Ghayasuddin Siddiqui and Cassandra Balchin, an activist 
and journalist who has worked with Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML) 
and the Muslim Women’s Network. As Balchin explains in the following excerpt from a 
debate at City Circle, one of its main aims is to introduce into Islam in Britain the kind 
of norms that, she maintains, are standard in many Muslim majority contexts, but that 
have not yet been accepted within the UK:  
 
In Muslim contexts there are many forms of divorce which are recognised, 
and which are intrinsically a woman’s right to divorce. So this myth that khul‘ 
is the only form of divorce available to women I find very surprising—it is 
certainly not the case in many, many other Muslim contexts, including, for 
example, Pakistan. Also interesting is [the idea] that ... khul‘ is something that 
the woman has to ask for from the man: [that] is certainly not the law that 
operates in Algeria, in Egypt, in Pakistan, in Bangladesh, in Nigeria—those are 
the ones that I can immediately think of.496 
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She continues in another public discussion, also at City Circle:  
 
[So] what [the MI contract is doing] is something that is very much reflected in 
the Muslim communities and countries across the world. It’s not just in 
Britain. In fact, I would say in many instances Britain is lagging behind.... The 
world’s largest Muslim population, Indonesia, has a law; their marriage law 
specifies equal rights and responsibilities in marriage. And as I mentioned, the 
Algerian code—you wouldn’t necessarily regard Algeria as the, sort of, most 
progressive, most forward thinking—their new law insists upon harmonious 
cohabitation and mutual respect.497 
 
Interestingly, when this contract was launched the ISC’s most senior figures reacted 
badly, swiftly producing a stern denunciation of it.498 Some of the ‘ulama at the ISC, it 
seems, were hostile to Barkatullah’s stance regarding talaq al-tafwid and the other norms 
found in the MI contract, resulting in a schism. 
 
 
6.9.  Different attitudes toward the state 
 
The details of this dispute will be outlined in more detail later in the chapter, but first it 
is helpful to summarise some of the differences one finds between Muslim scholars in 
their attitudes to English law. Again, there are differences between the two councils on 
this question. There are also other opinions one can find among ‘ulama who do not 
work in any of the tribunals. I divide these positions into three different options, 
although, as we shall see shortly, this division is too simple, implying a sharper divide 
between the scholars than one finds in reality. 
 
 
6.9.1.  Overlapping consensus 
 
The first position—and this tends to be, for reasons that ought to be fairly obvious, 
advocated most strongly by Islamic scholars who are not involved in any tribunal—is to 
give the civil legal system theological legitimation, so when a couple obtain a civil 
marriage or divorce certificate they are regarded as being immediately married or 
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divorced “Islamically.” This option is seen by some supporters as potentially offering a 
solution to the problem that Muslims in the UK encounter of having to marry and 
divorce twice, both religiously and civilly. Usama Hasan, the son of one of the ISC’s 
senior figures (see Chapter 4), is a particularly keen supporter of this stance. Muslims, 
he says, should regard a civil marriage 
 
as nikah because all the essential elements are there, the consent of both 
parties, two witnesses minimum.... They’re equivalent, and having conducted 
myself fifty to one-hundred weddings, you know, the processes are the same. 
And the same with divorce, the grounds, the way of divorce.... You’ve got to ... 
make [Muslims] realise that British law actually works on the same principles 
as Shari‘a, of justice and fairness, and you’ve got to include them and make 
them feel more integrated.499 
 
Notably, one of the things that frustrates Hasan at present is the fact that civil marriage 
ceremonies are not allowed to feature hymns, religious readings or prayers, which he 
believes makes it far harder for religious minorities to connect themselves emotionally 
with the civil system. “I think you should allow for a civil registration with hymns or 
Islamic songs, the recitation of the Qur’an,” he says. “If people are saying that religion 
is dividing everyone into the mosques and temples and things, I would say that this is 
one way of bringing them back together.” 
 
 
6.9.2.  Complementary law 
 
The second option is to support a system of Islamic law that operates within the UK 
alongside the civil system but not formal recognition of that system. This is the stance 
taken by both Shahid Raza and, before his death, Badawi, both of whom work(ed) at 
the MLSC. Badawi had two main reservations about recognising Islamic law officially. 
The first was that, beyond sloganeering, the process of actually delegating authority to 
legal councils would be incredibly difficult. (Asked once whether he would support 
state recognition of Islamic law he responded simply with: “Which Islamic law?”500) The 
second was that legal pluralism could potentially place political equality in serious 
jeopardy. “[U]niformity of the law is central in ensuring that justice is served to all 
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members of society,” he once stated, concluding that therefore “there should be just 
one legal system which should be applied to all.”501 The ideal role of Islamic tribunals, 
then, is to complement English law, although what this means exactly is not always 
completely clear. It can mean that the Islamic tribunal plays a role in supporting the 
state, trying to act essentially as an intermediary between the civil system and British 
Muslims’ religious and cultural traditions while deferring to the civil authorities on 
important matters. This is illustrated by Shahid Raza’s insistence that the MLSC will 
only proceed with a divorce after the relevant civil certificates have been obtained. The 
MLSC was formed after a meeting of a collection of Islamic religious authorities from 
all over the UK, which the organisation’s founders took as a mandate to adjudicate on 
certain civil matters. But Shahid Raza and Badawi do/did not see themselves as 
undermining the civil system, as the former explains: 
 
Our understanding is very straightforward. When we insist on the civil 
ceremony we do so because it is in the best interests of the community. It is 
only because for the safeguard of our daughters. There is nothing [in this] 
which may be [interpreted] as making a compromise. And at the same time, 
we live in this country; we have made it home. This is our country. The courts, 
the institutions, the system—it’s ours. We are part of it. Why should we try to 
undermine it? I don’t understand this attitude at all. And similarly with 
divorce: [this] Shari‘a council, as far as I know, we are the only legal council 
who will insist that we will not issue an Islamic divorce until the woman has 
first obtained a civil divorce.502  
 
There is, though, another dimension to this “complementary” approach. In addition to 
mediating between the Muslim custom and English law, the MLSC regards itself as 
helping the Muslim communities in Britain to “live up to” the Shari‘a.503 While it is not a 
legal regulator then, it does do its best to encourage Muslims to live in a certain way and 
so it acts, in a sense, as a moral regulator. This is where some of the problems seem to 
emerge, as we saw earlier in the case of the divorcing husband and his solicitor using 
the MLSC as a forum for negotiation. 
 
 
6.9.3.  Legal pluralism 
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This leaves one further option, which the ISC has advocated for many years. That is for 
Muslim personal law to be officially recognised by the English legal system. This 
position has been justified on the grounds that, as the late Sheikh Syed ad-Darsh, one 
of the founders of the ISC, has suggested, “when a Muslim is prevented from obeying 
his law he feels that he is failing to fulfil a religious duty. He will not feel at peace with 
his conscience or the environment in which he lives and this will lead to 
disenchantment.” 504 In the eyes of its supporters this approach is the best way to avoid 
confusion over whether or not Islamic marriages and divorces have any kind of legal 
standing in the UK. Maulana Abu Saeed, who is currently the Chairman of the ISC, has 
offered the following argument on the subject: 
 
We think and hope that if concerned Muslims from legal and socio-political 
spectrum of society put their concerted efforts with us to persuade the British 
authority to recognise Muslim personal law as they did in British India ... it will 
be a historic step and [a move toward] a harmonious relationship between the 
host and guest communities.505 
 
This, of course, looks unlikely to become a reality in the UK any time soon, partly 
because of legitimate concerns about the norms by which the ISC and other tribunals 
operate, but also because the hostility currently felt toward Islam makes it all but 
impossible for any politician to consider. This means that in the meantime the ISC and 
the MLSC perform fairly similar roles, the ISC doing its best to encourage Muslims to 
“live up to” its conception of Shari‘a law. 
 
 
6.10. The three stances in practice 
 
While distinguishing between these positions is necessary for purposes of clarity, it 
should be reiterated that separating them out is not easy. Far from being clear and 
distinct, these different positions tend to muddle together and overlap. For example, 
while it is true that the ISC has consistently advocated the delegation of authority to 
(some of) the UK’s Islamic tribunals, it is also true that a number of the institution’s 
senior figures have not only recommended registering all Islamic marriages civilly as a 
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pragmatic measure, but have moved toward the first, overlapping position. Darsh, for 
instance, argued the following in one publication: 
 
A civil marriage—if attended by the guardian of the girl and at least two male 
Muslim witnesses—amounts to a correct Islamic marriage. It is only the social 
aspect which leads to another ceremony in a mosque with an imam, although 
these things are not required Islamically.506 
 
There are, of course, two prominent caveats here, both of which make the situation a 
good deal more complex. Needless to say, no British registrar could or would attempt 
to dictate the faith of the witnesses to a civil marriage or insist that the bride’s father 
must be present; serious questions would rightly be asked if one did. Darsh in this 
passage is certainly not going as far as Hasan does above. Even so, there is still an 
element of convergence. The curious, even remarkable, thing about this statement is 
that it actually works to undermine the very institution that Darsh was involved in 
setting up. After all, if all civil marriages were genuinely considered by every Muslim 
based in the UK to constitute an Islamic marriage then eventually the tribunals would 
lose their raison d’être and become redundant. 
 
 
6.11.  Disputes over the wali 
 
A third area where there is disagreement and perhaps the possibility of reform is in 
relation to the need for a wali. During the medieval period one of the four significant 
madhhabs, the Hanafi, argued that adult women should be allowed to contract their own 
marriages without a wali.507 In the UK this school is influential due to its being the 
prevalent school in Pakistan, yet still the right of a woman to marry who she wants 
without parental consent is vigorously debated. There are many scholars, activists and 
lay Muslims who have argued the Hanafi position should be adopted, particularly in the 
UK given its laws. A number of the women in Bano’s study had argued with their 
parents that they should be permitted to marry who they wish, some claiming that Islam 
gives them that right.508 Sheikh Abdallah bin Bayyah, the renowned Maliki ‘alim from 
Mauritania who was discussed in the previous chapter, has suggested that in the West 
the Hanafi position should be accepted.509 Usama Hasan, similarly, believes the 
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requirement for the wali is problematic, particularly in the UK, as he explains in this 
extract from a discussion at City Circle: 
 
[The practice of obtaining the wali’s consent] was instituted centuries ago in a 
tribal society in order to protect the rights of women. It was a very patriarchal 
society and women were incredibly oppressed. The whole point of [having] a 
father [as guardian] would be to look after the rights of his daughter. But what 
we’ve seen in this country over and over again is walis abusing their right, and 
refusing a good match for their daughter.... [T]hey say, “No, he’s not of the 
right race or caste,” or, “He doesn’t earn enough.” Often it’s a racist issue 
because a lot of this “caste system” has been imported into the Muslim 
community; people are the wrong colour, especially when there are reverts 
involved—that is, black or white converts to Islam. I know a number of 
couples who really should have got married and they are, you know, 
heartbroken; it has ruined their lives.510 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the marriage contract launched by the MI also rejects the idea 
that the wali’s consent is needed. This is based partly on recognition that in the UK 
today there is not a firm division of labour along gender lines. As Balchin explains: 
“You’ve got a situation now where very often husband and wife are earning equal 
amounts, or indeed she’s actually the main breadwinner.”511 Even Darsh, who was by 
no means a liberal cleric (he argued that there is nothing wrong a man in the UK taking 
a second wife, for example), accepted that when a prospective couple’s parents were 
being unfair they could be ignored.512 
 
Nevertheless, there are some scholars who display considerable unease at the prospect 
of the abrogation of this legal norm. I mentioned earlier that the ISC rejected the MI’s 
contract when it was launched in 2008. Initially this contract had carried the ISCs 
endorsement, and also that of the London-based Utrujj Foundation and the Muslim 
Council of Britain. Shortly after it was made publicly available, however, all three of 
these organisations publicly distanced themselves from it. The ISC’s official response 
was particularly critical, claiming that any marriage that was based upon the MI’s 
contract would be invalid in Islam because of its rejection of three crucial principles. 
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First of all, the ISC claimed that the new contract’s complete rejection of polygynous 
marriage in the UK was irresponsible: 
 
Allah allowed a man to marry four wives and no-one has the authority to make 
illegal what Allah has made legal and lawful. Allah states, “Then marry women 
of your choice, two or three, or four but if you fear that you shall not be able 
to deal justly [with them], then only one.”513  
 
Second, it rejected the delegated right to divorce, as noted above: 
 
The reason behind the rejection of this kind of tafwid (delegation) is the fact 
that it goes against the text and the aims of Shari‘a in marriage. Throughout 
the Qur’an, wherever Allah talks about divorce, He addresses men divorcing 
women. It is neither in the Qur’an nor in the Sunna of the prophet that a 
woman divorces her husband. Linguistically, for a woman to even say, “I 
divorced my husband” is an invalid statement.514 
 
Third and finally, it disagreed strongly with the new contract’s contention that a bride 
guardian is no longer a necessity, concluding ultimately that the MI contract amounted 
to “an ideological attack to undermine Islam itself”: 
 
The contract is at fault for taking part of the Hanafi view regarding the issue 
of the wali and ignoring the condition of suitability.... [O]ne must understand 
the Hanafi position properly before using it to justify any agenda. We also feel 
the need to point out that there is a huge difference between “allowing” a 
certain action and encouraging it, let alone promoting it or making it the norm. 
In the Shari‘a, a woman is never to be forced into marriage. What is meant is 
that a marriage should be conducted with a mutual understanding between the 
woman and her guardian.515 
 
This dispute demonstrates, again, the need to exercise caution before advocating the 
integration of the existing legal tribunals within the English legal system. As we saw 
earlier, the legal councils in the UK are usually treated too harshly, with their presence 
being viewed as evidence of the mortal threat that “Islamism” poses to liberalism or 
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British culture. However, there are occasions when they have been treated a little too 
leniently, one suspects as a reaction to the severe and often uninformed criticism to 
which they have often been subjected. Daniel Bell in The Guardian, for example, once 
described the ISC as an institution that is “committed to [a] liberal interpretation of 
Shari‘a.”516 As I’ve been arguing, the word “liberal” is rather malleable and open to a 
variety of different interpretations. Yet describing an institution whose current leaders 
seem to be determinedly opposed to the idea that women and men should be able to 
marry and divorce in the same way as “liberal” is surely stretching it a little. It is worth 
re-emphasising that talaq al-tafwid, in particular, has a long history in Islamic law.517 The 
literalistic reading above cannot therefore even be regarded as an example of a faith 
community resolutely resisting modernity. Rather, this response is best viewed as an 
example of what Shachar terms “reactive culturalism”—that is, where a religious 
minority feels endangered by rapid social changes and responds by clinging doggedly to 
any distinguishing practices as part of an effort to prevent it disintegrating and being 
“swallowed up” by mainstream society.518 This seems to be evident particularly in the 
comments above about the necessity for a wali. 
 
 
6.12. Conclusion: Islamic law and public debate 
 
It should be clear from the discussion in this chapter that there is no simple answer to 
the question of what place Islamic law ought to have in the UK, primarily because 
“Islamic law” is not an uncomplicated, uncontested thing. As long as people in the UK 
are permitted to associate with, worship with and advise one another there will always 
be some space for informal regulation by Islamic legal principles, and trying to 
completely eradicate this regulation seems unhelpful. Not only would that stop the 
established tribunals from supporting and encouraging the use of the civil legal system, 
which they do at least sometimes, it would also give too little consideration to those 
Muslims whose conception of the good is bound up with the principles of Islamic law 
and who follow Islamic norms willingly. Moreover, it would be impossible to do 
without illiberal interference in religious communities, with government needing to 
monitor mosques and community centres. Nevertheless, there are clearly significant 
areas of concern. It is far from certain that the tribunals, as spaces for the discussion of 
marriage and divorce, offer a safe location for women where they will be free from any 
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kind of coercion. Some of the tribunals also play a role in instituting practices that 
conflict quite sharply with British legal norms. 
 
It cannot be the purpose of this chapter to outline in a systematic way how the state 
should approach Islamic legal tribunals. Yet it is possible to make a contribution to the 
debate in the form of two specific points. The first point is that Islamic theology’s 
relationship to the state seems to be far more complex than legal theorists who focus 
on minority religions often assume. Take, for example, the model for accommodating 
minority religious communities that has been developed by Shachar, which she gives 
the name “transformative accommodation.” According to this model, the state should 
remain open to the idea of developing formal links with the nomoi communities that it is 
host to, but should always try to ensure that the relationship is developed in such a way 
that coercive practices are discouraged. To do this, Shachar suggests, it should use 
“external protections” to reduce “internal restrictions.”519 This terminology comes from 
Will Kymlicka’s work, and is used to differentiate between acceptable and unacceptable 
group-differentiated rights systems.520 Kymlicka argues states can pass laws that protect 
cultural groups, but only when they do not restrict group members. Shachar develops 
this idea to suggest that states should offer to officially recognise “private” religious 
traditions but only on the condition that clerics agree to dispense with any practices that 
put people at risk. In this case, this might mean offering to recognise Islamic marriages 
and divorces if those offering them agree to accept certain principles, such as the right 
to exit and full access to divorce for women.  
 
It is easy to see why this approach has appeal for those (like Williams, who drew on the 
idea of transformative accommodation heavily in his lecture) who can see that value in 
minimising the occasions on which a person is forced to choose between their religious 
identity and their legal rights. Nevertheless, Shachar, like many others, assumes rather 
too quickly that recognition of private traditions and norms is what religious minorities 
are after. The most significant point to emerge in this chapter, in my view, is the fact 
that there is not the desire among all the Islamic scholars based in the UK for such 
recognition, let alone among all British Muslims. Indeed, many Islamic scholars in the 
UK, even some of the most conservative, use Islamic principles to support and affirm 
the civil system. There is something odd about supporting the formal recognition of 
Islamic marriages and divorces in Britain given that many British clerics argue that a 
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civil marriage contract amounts to a valid Islamic marriage. This is not to say, of course, 
that the preservation of Islamic traditions is not a concern for anyone; clearly it is. My 
point is that these traditions are nuanced, and leave much space for negotiation. These 
nuances will, I think, need to be appreciated more fully before headway can be made 
reconciling civil and Islamic law. The assumption that living according to “Islamic law” 
means living as part of an isolated group whose rules are determined by conservative 
clerics will need to be challenged because, though not entirely wrong, it is simplistic—
and also dangerous given the legitimacy it gives to narratives about Islam undermining 
British law by gradually instituting the Shari‘a. 
 
The second point, which follows on from that, is that the focus in this discussion over 
civil and religious law may need to shift slightly, away from what the state can do to 
“manage” Islamic scholars and Muslim groups and onto the wider debates about how 
norms are worked out in religious traditions. Earlier in this chapter I mentioned some 
of the problems with the focus that liberal theorists place upon exit as a way of “sorting 
out” the problems religious groups seem to pose. In Philips’s view, this emphasis upon 
exit reflects a degree of intellectual laziness, even bias, among liberal theorists. Although 
she does not contest the idea that individuals should be free to choose their religious 
commitments, she worries that their reliance on the exit principle is not just insufficient, 
but reflects an unconcern for people whose sense of the good is theological. She writes 
that, in the view of many cosmopolitan liberals 
 
cultural outsiders would probably be advised to leave their oppressively 
conformist communities. They will probably always retain vestiges of their 
initial cultural influences ... but basically, these people should move on.... 
[Often] engaging with religious texts or arguments in order to establish the 
basis for a more progressive treatment of women is presented as a bowing to 
necessity, something imposed on people by the fact of living in a Muslim 
country or needing to engage with a Muslim community. The expectation, 
however, is that [those making these arguments] will eventually free 
themselves from this constraint and situate themselves on the terrain of 
secular rights. It is as if religious assertions can only be understood as strategic. 
The implication is that no-one who cared about rights or equality could really 
take them seriously.... [Liberals’ emphasis on the right to exit therefore] does 
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not provide enough protection to those living in oppressive conditions, but it 
also does not offer enough of a solution to those with a strong normative 
commitment to their cultural or religious group.521 
 
The term “exit” was popularised by the American political scientist Albert Hirschman. 
He saw it as one of two ways people may influence the affairs that concern them, the 
other being “voice.” 522 “Voice,” in Hirschman’s work, stands for demanding changes in 
the way things are done; “exit” for turning one’s back and going elsewhere. The 
difference between the two, as Zygmunt Bauman has said, is “between engagement and 
disengagement; responsibility and indifference.”523 In Phillips’s view, emphasis on exit 
in liberal theory reflects an indifference to religious belief, and therefore liberals ought 
to pay more attention to voice. What this means in practice is not, of course, easy to 
work out. It might mean supporting steps taken by the state to empower people who 
are vulnerable and who have been marginalised by religious leaders, making sure that 
their voices are heard. Before being voted out in 2010, the Labour Government had 
actually been trying to do this, albeit a little hesitantly and haphazardly, by giving 
funding to a number of Muslim women’s groups. (I shall say no more on this here, but 
will return to it in the next chapter.) At a more general level, though, it also seems to 
imply a need for liberal political theorists to recognise the importance of negotiating 
norms via a conversation, and to pay attention to and even become involved in the 
normative debates that are at the heart of this issue: those over the value of arranged as 
opposed to individually worked out relationships, and over the value of parental 
responsibility and individual autonomy. More attention needs to be paid to the way that 
conversations on these subjects can be brought into a debate about the shape society 
should take. Indeed, more attention needs to be paid to the ways that theology, society 
and politics relate—as Balchin has in fact said, referring to her understanding of the 
Islamic legal tradition and women’s rights in it: 
 
You may not agree with me. This is fine; this is my interpretation. But ... the 
whole question of [religious] interpretation is a social and political one, and if 
we recognise it as a social and political question then we have to say we need 
to start debating these issues.524 
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7. Emerging Islamic theologies and state 
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7.1.   Old question, new setting 
 
Fihi ma Fihi, the book of lectures delivered by the poet, mystic and scholar Jalal al-Din 
Rumi, opens with the following hadith: 
 
The Prophet, on whom be peace, said: “The worst of scholars is he who visits 
princes, and the best of princes is he who visits scholars. Happy is the prince 
who stands at the poor man’s door, and wretched is the poor man who stands 
at the door of the prince.”525 
 
Rumi’s book, which has been published in English as the Discourses (although the title 
could be more accurately rendered as “In it what is in it”), was composed seven and a 
half centuries ago. The aphorism cited must therefore be at least that old, and it is 
probably much, much older. Indeed, if the hadith is attributed accurately—and I have to 
confess I am unable to comment on this one way or the other526—it must be around 
fourteen-hundred years old. It thus predates the beginnings of what Mark Lilla calls 
Europe’s “Great Separation” of church and state (or, more specifically, the uncoupling 
of political and confessional allegiances within Europe) by four centuries at least, and 
maybe by as much as a millennium.527 
 
It is not hard to find reasons to like this passage. One good reason is it offers a small 
illustration of a point that other scholars528 have argued at greater length: namely, the 
claim that the Islamic tradition has never differentiated between religious truth and 
political power, or tried to separate that which is owed to God from that which is owed 
to Caesar, is inaccurate. This may be asserted by some Muslim polemicists as well as 
many critics of Islam; one of the best known radical Islamic revivalists, Sayyid Qutb, 
played a significant part in spreading the revolutionary idea that “Islam is not merely a 
belief, so ... it is the duty of all believers to annihilate all [secular political] systems.”529 
Yet such arguments are unusual. Of course, the aphorism cited above does not argue 
for a separation of “church” and “state,” and certainly does not suggest that “religion” 
should be kept out of “politics.” It is unlikely these modern concepts would even have 
been recognised by Rumi’s peers.530 What it does argue, though, is that it is necessary to 
maintain a distance between the wealthy and powerful and the learned, clerical classes. 
The message is straightforward: it is best for those with knowledge—as noted in 
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Chapter 5, Islamic religious scholars are generally known as ‘ulama, or literally people 
with ‘ilm, knowledge—to keep themselves separate from those in positions of political 
authority. The most significant questions about what is ultimately good, just and 
meaningful should not be meddled with; there needs to be a realm of truth that is left 
untouched by the powers that be. 
 
This is not the only reason the aphorism is easy to like. One has to admire its precision 
too. It does not say that the actions of the rich and powerful shouldn’t be influenced by 
the ethically wise. What it says, rather, is that the wise person’s ethical position should 
not be influenced by the desire for prestige. Power should not corrupt knowledge; that 
is certain. But knowledge can and should influence those in positions of power. As 
Rumi goes on to clarify, a little captiously: 
 
[T]he worst of scholars ... first applies himself to the pursuit of learning with 
the intention that the princes bestow upon him presents, hold him in esteem, 
and promote him to office.... When, however, the ... scholar has not become 
qualified with learning on account of princes but rather his learning from first 
to last has been for the sake of God ... such a scholar is subject to the control 
and direction of reason.... If such a scholar goes to visit the prince, it is himself 
who is visited and the prince who is visitor, because in every case the prince 
takes from him and receives help from him.531 
 
Perhaps the main reason that the passage is easy to admire, though, is despite the fact 
that contemporary Britain is far removed from thirteenth century Konya, where the 
itinerant mystic died, it is still entirely relevant. There are still examples of “scholars” 
being pressured by “princes.” For instance, in 2009 David Nutt, a professor at Imperial 
College, was sacked as drugs adviser to the government after arguing that alcohol is 
more dangerous than most illegal drugs. In the religious context, and specifically the 
British Islamic context, there are a host of examples one can refer to. Over the last two 
decades both Conservative and Labour governments have developed close relations 
with Muslim scholars and representative organisations, with the latter taking steps to 
educate clerics and shape a specifically “British Islam.” Public funding has been poured 
into Islamic organisations and Islamic education. Indeed, the state has funded precisely 
the kind of initiatives that I have been focusing on in this study, those encouraging 
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interpretations of Islam that prioritise public engagement. This has raised fundamental 
questions about the independence of the forms of theology whose details I have been 
exploring in this thesis. In fact, there is a significant question about the extent to which 
the initiatives outlined in Chapter 4 are the products of internal changes within Islam in 
Britain or whether their existence is actually the result of “state engineering.” In this 
chapter my aim is to explore these specific questions and the wider issues about the 
relationship between Islam and the British state. First, the chapter outlines some of the 
details of the relationship between government and Muslim representative bodies, and 
looks at how their relationship changed between the 1990s and the first decade of the 
new millennium. It then goes on to explore the attitudes of the scholars and activists I 
have examined in previous chapters toward government, and specifically to the funding 
that has been available to Muslim groups. In the closing sections it examines some of 
the issues that government assistance brings up, such as possible tensions between state 
support, religious autonomy, and political dissent. 
 
 
7.2.  Islam goes public 
 
This discussion, as with earlier chapters, requires a certain amount of historical detail to 
place the opinions I quote in context. In this case the most appropriate place to start is 
with the Rushdie affair, which more than any other event spurred government 
involvement with Muslim organisations. As Humayun Ansari has noted, the Rushdie 
affair marked the first time that Muslims in Britain bridged ethnic and sectarian divides 
to enter into national political debates. Muslims had organised to oppose and support 
political developments before, but these were mainly on a local basis, and when they 
did have a wider agenda they were usually mobilised through distinct community 
organisations. The Satanic Verses was published around the time younger generations of 
British Muslims were beginning to realise their lack of political involvement had proved 
detrimental to their interests, and after ten years of a Conservative government that had 
little sympathy toward minorities. The book’s publication eventually resulted in the 
emergence of a broad alliance that, if only for a very brief time, traversed not only 
sectarian but also generational divides.532 
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The precise origins of the protests against the Rushdie’s novel are not simple to trace. 
As Chetan Bhatt has pointed out in his incisive analysis of the affair, the reaction to 
Rushdie’s novel was actually initially fairly muted. Only after Muslim MPs in the Indian 
opposition Janata Party started a campaign to ban the book did protests begin to 
become vocal in the UK.533 Rather than the response to the book being spurred only by 
British Muslims’ aggravation at Rushdie’s irreverent depiction of the Prophet in the 
(in)famous dream sequence,534 the protests had a number of catalysts, one of the most 
significant being transnational activism. The first organisations to mobilise against the 
novel were almost all linked in some way with Jamaati-i-Islami, the radical Pakistani 
revivalist party. The three most significant institutions involved in the campaign (the 
Islamic Foundation in Leicester, the Union of Muslim Organisations in Walsall and the 
Central London Mosque in Regent’s Park) also received Saudi funding.535 According to 
Bhatt’s account, this gave much of the anti-Rushdie rhetoric an anti-colonial twist, the 
writer being pictured as a “pawn” of the colonisers. This was visible in the arguments 
of the most uncompromising organisation to be formed in response to the affair, the 
Muslim Institute (MI, also known as the Muslim Parliament). It considered the book 
tantamount to a declaration of war on Islam and suggested that its publication was the 
consequence of an organised government attack. It advocated a campaign of civil 
disobedience and suggested Muslims should consider British laws illegitimate.536 The MI 
is still in existence today, although it is important to note that after Siddiqui died in 
1996 it was taken over by Ghayasuddin Siddiqui (no relation), under whose guidance 
the institution has moderated its stance significantly. (Ghayasuddin Siddiqui, we might 
recall, was one of the three main figures behind the MI’s liberalising Muslim marriage 
contract, examined in the previous chapter.) 
 
Other, more influential groups were also linked with this transnational activism. 
Individuals close to Saudi patronage became prominent in the UK Action Committee 
on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA), which was formed in 1988 to protest against the book 
and which was convened by the Saudi diplomat Mughram al-Gamdi, who was at the 
time director of the Central London Mosque.537 It was in this organisation that Iqbal 
Sacranie, perhaps Britain’s most prominent and influential Muslim activist over the last 
twenty years, cut his teeth. This organisation was also involved in the initial contact 
between Muslims and the UK government. While at the UKACIA Sacranie, along with 
other delegates, was invited by the then Home Secretary Michael Howard to London 
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for a consultation session.538 There the Conservative MP is reported to have expressed 
some confusion, as Maulana Shahid Raza, whom we met in Chapter 4 and who was 
present on that particular occasion, explains: 
 
I remember that when Michael Howard was Home Secretary we went to see 
him.... And there were fifteen Muslim representatives at the table and he came 
and he said, “Look, I don’t know who the leader is among you. I can speak 
with you and we can agree on something, but the next day my office might 
receive a call saying, ‘They are not the leaders; they are self-made 
representatives. We want to meet you. We are the real leaders.’ We can’t keep 
meeting delegations of Muslims one after the other. We can’t do that. We 
don’t have ministers available for every Muslim who comes and demands a 
meeting. So you must sort out this problem.”539 
 
Based on Howard’s advice, the UKACIA set about constructing a National Interim 
Committee on Muslim Affairs with the ultimate aim of building a national umbrella 
body to deal with “Muslim issues.” The organisation that emerged out of this process 
was the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), which was launched in 1997 a few months 
before the Conservatives were voted out of power. With Sacranie voted in as its first 
Secretary General, the MCB was for many years the immediate port of call for British 
politicians and media representatives. After its election, New Labour proved willing to 
leave a space at the “public table” for religious representatives, and tended to view 
ethnic minorities through a “faith lens.” As the Department of Communities and Local 
Government (CLG) acknowledged in a document published in 2007, at “all levels of 
government—local, regional and national—the contributions faith communities make 
to community life are increasingly being recognised.”540 It happily liaised with Sacranie, 
his immediate successor Yousef Bhailok, and a number of other significant MCB 
figures throughout the later years of the 1990s and the first four or five years of the new 
millennium. The MCB’s leaders were occasionally even invited to Muslim-majority 
countries as part of Foreign and Commonwealth Office delegations.541 For good or ill, 
the MCB still remains today, as the journalist, academic and British Muslim convert 
Yahya Birt has acknowledged, the “primus inter pares among an increasingly large 
alphabet soup of representative bodies.”542 
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7.3.  Community engagement or patron-client politics? 
 
This way of engaging with Muslims is the first of two types of relationship between the 
state and Muslims in Britain I intend to outline. It follows a pattern of community 
engagement that became, while Labour was in power between 1997 and 2010, the 
norm. New Labour tended to depict faith groups in its policy reports543 as repositories 
of “social capital,”544 and accordingly encouraged local authorities to involve nearby 
faith communities in neighbourhood renewal. It regarded faith engagement as a way of 
bringing into the public sphere socially excluded groups (Muslims particularly) whose 
main mode of self-identification seemed to be religious, and invited faith leaders onto 
bodies like the Faith Communities Consultative Council. This pattern of engagement 
was highly controversial from the outset, resulting in long-running disputes between 
sympathisers545 and vehement critics.546 Academics who have defended the strategy 
have contended that, at its best, it enabled the building of bridges between religious 
traditions and inspired new forms of civic participation.547 Scholars who have been 
more critical, by contrast, have highlighted occasions where the reality of New Labour 
policy appeared not to match up to the affirmative rhetoric. Philip Lewis for example, 
who has been by no means the harshest critic of government policy, has pointed out 
that over the thirteen years it was in power New Labour—sometimes knowingly, at 
other times possibly out of a misplaced sense of cultural sensitivity—allowed a pattern 
of patron-client politics to develop in towns such as Leicester and Bradford, with elders 
consolidating “ethnic vote-banks.”548  
 
A particularly vexed aspect of this debate, particularly as far as Muslims in Britain are 
concerned, is over representativeness. Here the MCB does seem to have had a large 
problem. Even Adam Dinham, one of the most favourable analysts of Labour’s stance 
regarding faith groups, has commented that after 9/11 the UK government found out 
that, “despite its claims to the contrary, the MCB at the time represented only a limited 
constituency of Muslims.”549 The MCB did not, he argues, manage to cover all the 
ethnic and sectarian differences within British Islam, even despite its protracted 
consultation process and its, as of 2004, four-hundred or so affiliates at local, regional 
and national level.550 Those less sympathetic to Labour’s strategy have argued that this 
lack of representativeness has had deleterious consequences. According to Bhatt, the 
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courting of activists at the centre of the protests over The Satanic Verses (with their links 
to Saudi funding) led to marginal sympathisers for parties such as Jamaati-i-Islami 
working themselves into positions of political influence that ought to have remained 
inaccessible.551 More generally, Bhatt and others have contended that New Labour’s 
faith engagement resulted in the strengthening of reactionary religious elders and the 
disciplining of “wayward” community members, particularly South Asian women.552 It 
also seems likely that, as Lewis has argued, Labour policy played a role in frustrating 
young Muslims in Britain whose voices were ignored in favour of intermediaries from 
the older generation.553 Labour’s efforts to be inclusive and foster social cohesion, then, 
appeared to generate serious social isolation. 
 
Criticisms of New Labour involvement with the MCB and other religious bodies have 
come from Muslim, South Asian women’s and antiracist groups as well as from 
academics. Women Against Fundamentalism (WAF), a group that opposes almost all 
public recognition of religion and that was created in response to the protests against 
The Satanic Verses, consistently opposed New Labour’s strategy regarding religious 
communities. Cassandra Balchin, the Muslim activist and journalist we encountered in 
the previous chapter, has also been critical, arguing that the British government has 
tended to pay attention only to “the most conservative people imaginable.”554 Abdul-
Rehman Malik, an activist working for the Radical Middle Way (RMW), is sceptical too. 
With Birt,555 he regards the MCB as not open and accountable enough given its 
ambition of being the voice of all of the UK’s Muslims:  
 
Ultimately [the MCB] should be appealing to its constituency, and if they have 
the support of what they think their constituency is and they feel confident 
then they should go out there: let the battleground of ideas and perspectives 
be public, let it be transparent; let us all put our cards on the table and say, 
“Who do we claim to represent? On what basis? And what do we do with that 
representation?”556 
 
He is just as critical of what he calls the Labour government-fostered “Islam industry,” 
which he regards as similar to colonial India: 
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With questions of integration, cohesion, and multiculturalism now deeply 
connected to the “war on terror” and the prevailing concerns over security, 
governments have sought to find representatives to speak to. It is a 
communitarian approach the Raj would have been proud of. The “take me to 
your leader” school of community relations cuts out the majority of Muslim 
voices, particularly those who have little clout within their communities—
namely women, young people, and minority ethnic communities present 
within broader Muslim communities.557 
 
Much of the confusion and controversy surrounding the representativeness (or not) of 
the MCB can be traced to its unclear relationship with Islam. The MCB was formed in 
the wake of religious protests and out of a perceived need to bring Muslims together as 
a religious group. New Labour also, as we have seen, tended to view communities 
through the prism of religious belief, recognising and respecting their status as Muslim 
or Jewish. Despite this, though, there has always been a haziness about the MCB’s 
relationship with the Islamic tradition. It takes as its model the Board of Jewish 
Deputies, a federation of Jewish organisations that is a communal partner to, but 
independent of, the British state. Its leadership, like that of the Board of Deputies, 
consists of laypersons whose aim is not to articulate religious teachings but to represent 
“community interests.” It has never claimed to represent Islam but “British citizens 
with an Islamic heritage,” implying the full range of Muslims, from the devoutly 
religious to those who do not identify with any theological vision. Scholars more 
sympathetic toward the MCB, such as Tariq Modood,558 regard this as a good thing, as 
it lessens the influence of religious authorities. Yet the problem is that MCB’s religious 
influences are still there, but beneath the radar. When it argues that, say, Muslim 
children have certain needs that state schools ought to accommodate559 their arguments 
are based upon an interpretation of good conduct that has roots in religious tradition, 
yet the religious interpretations are not articulated, which means they cannot easily be 
made the subject of broad public debate. 
 
This is at least part of the reason why the array of Muslim representative bodies in the 
UK can be so confusing, particularly for someone trying to work out the way that Islam 
and liberalism in Britain relate. Shortly after 2001 a number of competitors to the MCB 
began to gradually surface. Some of these, such as the British Muslim Forum (BMF) 
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and the Sufi Muslim Council, appeared be linked with sectarian differences.560 Others 
though, like British Muslims for Secular Democracy (BMSD), Progressive British 
Muslims (PBM) and particularly the Council for Ex-Muslims appear to have emerged in 
part as a reaction to the MCB’s attempt to represent even nominal Muslims whose faith 
is private, unorthodox or none-existent. They have not been nearly as keen to stress the 
different “cultural needs” of Muslims.561 Indeed, in some cases the aim of mobilising 
Muslim identity seems to have been to make the rather paradoxical point that not all 
Muslims want to be looked upon as Muslims. 
 
 
7.4.  Government relations with “Islamists” 
 
The most uncompromising of the criticisms directed at the MCB, unsurprisingly, have 
come from the British media, particularly from journalists on the Right and Leftists 
who, like Nick Cohen and Martin Bright, have turned against the mainstream Left in 
the UK, claiming it has become tainted by its “affair with Islamism.”562 This criticism 
has tended to focus almost exclusively on the apparent links between organisations like 
the MCB and Islamic Right movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaaat-
i-Islami. Jamaati-i-Islami is a party whose supporters have been accused of numerous 
acts of violence and religious hatred, particularly during the bloody conflict that led to 
the founding of Bangladesh in 1971,563 and there are undoubtedly supporters of the 
movement with links to the MCB. The Islamic Foundation, an educational institution 
based in Leicester that is affiliated with the MCB and whose publications have been 
endorsed by many British MPs,564 was founded by Khurshid Ahmad, the one-time vice-
president of Jamaati-i-Islami in Pakistan.565 (Khurshid Ahmad is not to be confused, 
incidentally, with the BMF’s Chairman Khurshid Ahmed, an entirely different person 
with very different opinions.) One of its main roles early in its history was to translate 
the writings of Maulana Mawdudi, the party’s founder, into English. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, journalists in the UK such as Bright have sought to highlight these links and 
question the involvement of the British government with an organisation whose leaders 
appear to be seriously compromised. 
 
There is nothing to be gained by denying these links, which neither of the institutions 
would contest. Nevertheless one can, without by any means suggesting that the MCB or 
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the Leicester-based institution are perfect, criticise the way that Bright, Cohen and other 
people in the UK media have depicted them. For example, in November 2009 Cohen 
made fierce criticisms of Inayat Bunglawala, the MCB’s media secretary, for an article 
he wrote apparently defending Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the prominent ‘alim whose 
views were outlined in Chapter 5. Why, Cohen inquired, is Bunglawala entertained by 
MPs when he defends a cleric who supports the “murder of apostates and 
homosexuals”?566 Now, one need not have much sympathy either for Bunglawala or for 
the MP, John Denham, who “entertained” him (or of course for Qaradawi himself) to 
see something wrong with this. The positive comments that Bunglawala has made 
about Qaradawi have focused on the fact that he 1) condemns al-Qaeda and 2) should 
be allowed into the UK just as the anti-Islamic Dutch MP Geert Wilders should. More 
significantly, Bunglawala is one of only a few prominent Muslim commentators who 
has openly argued not only that freedom of religion should be secured for all,567 but also 
that “discrimination based upon sexuality is as wrong as that based on religion,” and 
that the MCB should take a gay Muslim support group as an affiliate.568 Too often the 
criticisms of Cohen and others, loosely based on fact, have been used to distort the 
views of British Muslim representatives. 
 
The same problem can be identified in discussions of the Islamic Foundation. It was 
ruthlessly criticised in a BBC Panorama documentary in 2005 and described as an 
“outpost of militant Islamist ideology” for its links with Jamaat-i-Islami. These links are 
not fictitious, but what the media reportage has generally failed to see (or has wilfully 
ignored) are the internal changes that have taken place in the organisation since it was 
founded in 1973. As Seán McLoughlin has shown in detail, the Islamic Foundation 
began to alter its output toward the end of the 1980s, possibly due to the streams of 
Saudi funding beginning to run dry. During the 1990s and early 2000s—precisely the 
time the media turned against it—it started to “de-emphasise” its original goal of 
“counter-cultural Islamisation.”569 Its publishing arm has moved away from revivalist 
literature and into other areas. (The one time I visited the institution myself, the book 
that was most prominently displayed was called Hilmy the Hippo Learns about Vanity.) 
Ahmad also welcomes the fact that it no longer imports its staff from abroad, many of 
whom have become prominent advocates for less oppositional forms of Islam such as 
Dilwar Hussain, Sughra Ahmed and Birt.570 As McLoughlin is careful to point out, it 
has not simply transformed into a liberalising institution; many of its books still take 
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what he calls a “particularistic” approach, stressing the need for Muslims to mix only 
with coreligionists wherever possible.571 It is not, though, correct to view the institution 
as part of a concerted effort to somehow subvert democratic politics in the UK, as is 
sometimes implied. It is an institution in which many different outlooks coexist, and in 
which more open-ended approaches are becoming more influential. A similar form of 
coexistence has been identified in other institutions, such as the largest Deobandi dar al-
ulum in Bury.572 Hussain actually worries that these liberalising transitions could be 
stalled or even turned in the opposite direction by media coverage that portrays these 
institutions merely as “Islamist outposts”: 
 
[Media criticism] actually works against what those people are trying to do 
because it pushes you into a corner. If there are organisations that we think 
have the potential for going in different directions and one of those is going in 
a more sinister, dangerous direction, if anything you should open up a space 
with them to stop them going in that direction.... [B]uild connections with 
them so that they can move out from where they are. You know, you don’t 
want to push them even further.573 
 
 
7.5.  Government engagement post-7/7 
 
Whatever the rights and wrongs of these criticisms of the MCB and the other 
institutions that New Labour worked with while it was in power, it is undeniable that 
the party’s choices—always attentive to the public mood—altered markedly after the 
attacks on London in 2005. After the bombings opinion turned sharply against New 
Labour’s faith engagement,574 which led to the party’s connections with the MCB being 
downgraded in 2006 and to party leaders searching, largely in vain, for a new set of 
favoured interlocutors. More significantly, under pressure to do something about 
religious extremism, New Labour developed the “Preventing Violent Extremism” (PVE 
or “Prevent”) agenda. Announced in February 2007 by Ruth Kelly, the then Secretary 
for Communities and Local Government, the agenda’s explicit aim was to develop a 
“British version of Islam.”575 This mirrored the remarks of Nicolas Sarkozy in France, 
who has favoured a more “corporatist” approach to state engagement with Muslims576 
and who has stated on various occasions that what he would like to see is an “Islam de 
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France” rather than “en France.”577 At the time of its launch five-million pounds were 
dedicated to Prevent, money to be spent training foreign-born imams and, Kelly said, 
inducing a “step-change in the role of madrasas in teaching about citizenship.”578 The 
strategy progressed at a high speed: in 2008/2009 one-hundred and forty million 
pounds were earmarked for Prevent-related community initiatives.579 It was completely 
Muslim-centred too: when the plan was announced to local authorities by CLG it was 
requested that only authorities with a Muslim population of more than five percent (the 
national average is three) bid for the money.580 Other forms of extremism, such as white 
supremacism, were entirely neglected.581 
 
The emergence of Prevent, as part of a much wider sea change, brought about a slightly 
different relationship between the state and Muslims in the UK, and posed a number of 
complicated new questions. The funding of Muslim groups increased and at the same 
time broadened. Prevent money was offered to a bewildering array of community 
initiatives, some very different to the others. The Preventing Violent Extremism 
Community Leadership Fund was offered out to organisations such as, in 2007/2008: 
the Muslim Youth Helpline (£35,000); Khayaal Theatre Company (£38,450); the 
Muslim Youth Development Partnership (£40,000); the Sufi Muslim Council (£58,500); 
the Luqman Institute of Education and Development (£30,000); and the Fatima 
Women’s Network (£10,000). At the same time, funding pots like the Community 
Leadership Fund were made available to groups such as the BMF, BMSD, the Sufi 
Muslim Council (again) and the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board 
(MINAB), which received just over £75,000. Finally, money was targeted specifically at 
Muslim women’s projects such as the Muslim Women’s Network with the aim of 
“enabling [women’s] voices to be heard and empowering them to engage with Muslims 
at risk of being targeted by violent extremists.”582 This broadening of funding brought 
about a number of challenges, explored below. 
 
 
7.6.  Counter-terrorism and community engagement 
 
As the title clearly indicates, Prevent funding was closely connected with government 
efforts to forestall terrorist attacks. The PVE strategy was, in fact, one part of Labour’s 
counter-terrorism strategy, known as CONTEST. This led to it becoming incredibly 
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divisive, to the extent that when Prevent was dropped following a parliamentary report 
in March 2010583 and the general election in May there was what could only be 
described as a collective sigh of relief among Muslim organisations—and among a 
number of secular organisations too.584 In theory, there are a number of possible 
benefits to the state offering funds to Muslim organisations. One, which was put 
forward by Zaki Badawi at the Muslim College as early as 2001,585 is that training imams 
and offering Islamic education is a costly exercise, and Muslims in the UK, as some of 
the country’s least well off, are rarely able to fund it themselves. As we saw in Chapter 5 
and earlier in this chapter, funds from Islamic institutions abroad—particularly the 
Middle East—can result in the importation of specific worldviews and traditions that 
have little awareness of the character of UK society. Money from the state can 
therefore seem a sensible alternative. In August 2009 the student Muslim organisation 
Campusalam, itself the recipient of public funding, held a debate about government 
funding at City Circle. At the event the following case was made by Omar Faruk, a 
lawyer and founder of the organisation Ecomuslim:  
 
I don’t think there’s a government conspiracy. Anybody who’s worked in 
government, central or local government, will realise that rather than 
conspiracy it’s actually cock-ups; most of the time it’s cock-ups.... Anybody 
who thinks that they can socially engineer the Muslim community to do x, y 
and z is barking mad, absolutely barking mad.... And the other thing about 
government funding: we are very happy to accept funding from outside of 
government, be it Saudi, Kuwaiti, Qatari—that’s fine. But God—I’m going to 
take something from my own government?!586 
 
Yet, as this quote hints, there is a good deal of apprehension linked to government 
funding—and though Faruk light-heartedly brushes it aside, it is understandable at the 
very least. To illustrate, consider MINAB. MINAB, as noted in Chapter 4, is an 
institution that tries to act as the central organising body for all the mosques in the UK, 
both Sunni and Shi’a. Officially it is independent, but it was heavily funded by the 
Labour Government, which pushed hard for its creation. Maulana Shahid Raza of the 
Muslim College, who is also Chair of MINAB, is adamant that this government interest 
has not been linked to surveillance (see below). Yet Paul Goodman, the former Shadow 
Minister for Communities and Local Government (who stepped down at the 2010 
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general election) has openly stated that the best reason for creating MINAB is to allow 
the public authorities to “monitor the masjids and madrasas.” The state, he proposes, 
needs to “[i]nspect them, regulate them, control them and subject them to the blizzard 
of best practice and quality standards guidance.”587 With MPs making such suggestions 
it easy to see why there may be concern. 
 
This is far from the only illustration to which one can refer. Arun Kundnani in his 
study of Prevent funding gives numerous examples of community organisations that 
received funding and that subsequently discovered that, in the words of one youth 
worker based in London, they were 
 
supposed to report back information to the Prevent Board, such as mapping 
movements of individuals. You have to provide information if an individual is 
at risk. But you also need to give information about the general picture, right 
down to which street corners young people ... are hanging around on, what 
mosques they go to, and so on.588 
 
With this being the situation, it is not hard to see how there could be a breakdown of 
trust. To give a clearer indication of the difficulty, consider one further example. One 
setting where there has been particular anxiety about extremism is in higher education 
institutions, particularly since Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a young Nigerian who had 
attended university in the UK, was charged with placing a destructive device on an 
aircraft shortly after Christmas 2009. In response to this anxiety the now defunct 
Department for Innovation Universities and Skills (DIUS) produced guidelines for 
universities in 2007.589 Some of this advice, taken in isolation, is entirely sensible. DIUS 
suggested increasing provision for Muslim chaplaincy, for example, which (if one leaves 
aside any qualms about religious professionals working in secular educational 
institutions) is something that could be positive. This was set, though, against a 
background of other guidelines recommending, among other things: that clear policies 
regarding acceptable use of university facilities be developed, including Internet access; 
that procedures be put in place to ensure that any publications or literature being held 
or distributed on campus can be translated quickly into English; and that clear reporting 
mechanisms be set up for staff and students to register any concerns within the 
institution, with senior staff identified to act as official contact points with the authority 
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to make decisions about when to contact the police. Set in that context, the suggestion 
that chaplaincy provision for (just) Muslims should be increased seems like a narrow 
measure to stop Muslim students from being “radicalised”—or worse, to monitor what 
Islamic societies might be up to. In light of cases like that of Hitcham Yezza, the 
University of Nottingham student detained under terrorism legislation before narrowly 
avoiding deportation for doing nothing more than conducting postgraduate research on 
al-Qaeda, some wariness is surely reasonable.590 
 
 
7.7.  Suspicion of government and new Islamic initiatives 
 
These kinds of concerns have been expressed by a number of prominent figures in a 
variety of Muslim organisations. At the City Circle/Campusalam debate mentioned 
above, for example, the MCB’s Deputy Secretary General Daud Abdullah offered the 
following view, disagreeing with Faruk: 
 
All of this spending is not inspired by the principle of social justice but rather 
the expediencies of security needs. What we have is a number of projects 
supported to deliver certain security goals—mapping of communities, delivery 
of information, and intelligence, as it is claimed, though the back door. What is 
the effect of all of this? Well, instead of integrating Muslims it has isolated the 
community. Most of these projects are based on the premise that we have a 
“problem community,” a community that is a “threat” to society. They have 
been isolated.591 
 
Abdullah is among the most politically outspoken and controversial members of the 
MCB. Indeed, he is part of the reason why the organisation’s relationship with Labour 
soured. He was asked to step down from the MCB in 2009 by Hazel Blears, the then 
Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, after he signed a Global 
Anti-Aggression Campaign declaration following the Israeli government’s incursion 
into the Gaza strip in February 2009 (known as Operation Cast Lead). That document 
offered support for Hamas, condoned violence against Israel and, Blears alleged, any 
Jews in any location.592 It was Abdullah’s signing of the document that led to Blears 
withholding her usual invitation to the MCB to consult with CLG at its regular Faiths 
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Communities Consultative Council meetings. Nevertheless, Abdullah’s sentiments on 
this matter are shared by many others, including Kundnani, who argues that Prevent 
“constructs Muslims into a ‘suspect community,’ in which the failure of Muslim 
individuals or organisations to [mobilise against extremism] makes them suspect in the 
eyes of the counter-terrorist system.”593 The problem was even acknowledged in the 
parliamentary report on the policy, which, while arguing that information gathered 
through the project was never used to combat crime or prevent terrorism, expressed 
concern at finding out that a number “of our witnesses ... felt that Prevent had been 
used to ‘spy’ on Muslim communities.”594 
 
One of the significant effects of these perceptions is that they have caused major 
problems for emerging Islamic initiatives, including many of those explored over the 
last three chapters. Tehmina Kazi, currently Director of BMSD, observed shortly after 
Prevent was abandoned that one of its main effects was to make the work that BMSD 
does appear inauthentic and inorganic: 
 
Muslim civil society organisations, like mine, which advocate universal justice, 
and openly speak out against discrimination and violence committed in the 
name of religion, are assumed to be “parroting the government's line” on 
every issue under the sun. They are also assumed to be in receipt of Prevent 
funding at any given time, even when they are not! This gives greater 
credibility to hard-line groups, who are seen by certain Muslims to be 
promoting a more “authentic” form of Islam.595 
 
The same problem has been acknowledged by others. Maslaha, for example, decided 
for this reason not to look into obtaining Prevent funding, despite the fact that the 
project was initiated shortly after it became available and money was for a long time in 
short supply, with the project’s manager, Raheel Mohammed, being at times only weeks 
from losing his income. This is how Mohammed explained his reluctance to access 
Prevent funding to me in an interview, stressing the importance, both to him and 
others, of the autonomy of the initiative: 
 
RM: I remember I was ambivalent about not going for [the PVE money] for a 
while. But so many of the people I’ve been talking to have been so very 
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supportive; they’ve agreed it was the right thing to do. Generally the feeling 
has been that taking it would compromise the project. We were just... we 
wanted to be doing something without help. 
 
SJ: Oh, OK, so it wasn’t just... You wanted it to be a “sisters doing it for 
themselves” kind of thing? 
 
RM: Exactly, that’s exactly it.596 
 
Similarly, Malik at RMW, which receives public funds but not through Prevent, admits 
that there is in UK Islam at present “a big trade-off in terms of fighting for credibility 
and fighting for the money to operate.” “We fight that credibility battle,” he notes. 
“You can see it on-line; it’s all there.”597 Abdal-Hakim Murad, the historian, theologian 
and Chair of Trustees at Cambridge Muslim College, is equally wary of government 
funding, describing the funds offered as a “poisoned chalice.” “You have,” he argues, 
“to be very sceptical of religion building”: 
 
The only significant impact it has is to generally discredit those liberalising 
points of view that have been presented, because everyone assumes that point 
of view is being pushed for political reasons by the same politicians that 
support Israel and smashed up Iraq. Anybody else apparently independent or 
sincere who comes along with the same views, to them it’s kind of the kiss of 
death. This is why I oppose any kind of state interference in the internal 
conversations of Muslim communities—firstly because politicians are 
generally illiterate in their own religion, let alone Islam, and so they are likely 
to make disastrous errors of judgement; and secondly because even when they 
have the right idea the fact that they are giving that idea their blessing is going 
to alienate further precisely those alienated youth who are the only ones one 
should really be worrying about.598 
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7.8.  “Empowering Muslim women” 
 
One of the hardest things to comprehend about government approaches to Muslims 
and Islam post-7/7 has been the unusual conflation of preventing terrorism with other 
issues, with everything from chaplaincy provision to funding for artistic productions 
being justified in terms of the ability to forestall extremism. This is perhaps clearest—
and most difficult to fathom—in government efforts to enhance the voices of British 
Muslim women. This is another area where it is possible to put together a fairly 
plausible defence of some kind of government assistance. The last chapter explored 
some reasons why amplifying the voices of women who may not have much power and 
influence might be helpful; and one could argue that, even if it did at times pay too 
much attention to older “community representatives,” New Labour’s willingness to 
provide funding for Muslim women’s organisations such as the Fatima Women’s 
Network and the Muslim Women’s Network allowed opinions that might not have 
otherwise found a platform to be articulated.599 In June 2009 City Circle hosted a debate 
about Muslim women’s civic participation in the UK where one of the participants 
expressed a deep sense of frustration at being marginalised by religious elders and 
prevented from setting up a women’s group at her local mosque. Safia Ahmed, an 
author and one of the members of the panel at the discussion, responded with the 
following suggestion. It is hard to say how widely shared her views are, but it does show 
that at least some people value public funding: 
 
The problem we [Muslims] have is just power-hungry, misogynistic mosque 
leaders. I’ve experience; I just got sick of them. Just ignore them. Have you 
approached the government for funding? You know, I don’t want to sound 
like I’m just advertising New Labour, but the Labour Government have been 
very willing to help Muslim women’s groups.600 
 
Regularly, though, decisions to fund women’s groups were justified only by claiming 
that women “can play a vital role in building strong communities and tackling violent 
extremism.”601 This is, one suspects, an exaggeration, and even if not it is troubling, as 
the implication seems to be that New Labour’s efforts to “empower” Muslim women 
were just instrumental measures—that is, Muslim women were engaged with only as a 
means to the end of preventing terrorism.  
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The fact that these social engineering measures have been so often justified only in 
terms of preventing extremism can direct one’s attention away from a general shift 
toward what tends in liberal theory to be called a “perfectionist” approach—that is to 
say, an approach where the state attempts to “improve” a religious tradition, directly 
shaping it.602 This has been visible in many different areas, especially education (more 
on which below), but it is nowhere clearer than in government approaches to Muslim 
women. CLG argued in its Prevent literature that women “have too often been 
excluded” from Muslim communities and that therefore it would take steps to break 
down barriers to mosques.603 To this end, Britain followed France in imposing upon 
some Muslim organisations (such as MINAB and the Conseil française du culte 
musulman [CFCM]) a specific structure, one that included women in positions of 
influence. In the French case, Sarkozy demanded that at least five Muslim women 
should be included in the first general assembly of the CFCM.604 A very similar demand 
was made by New Labour while MINAB was being created, as Shahid Raza explains 
(speaking while Labour was in power): 
 
There is the involvement of government, and recently they have been pushing 
it very hard. There are mainly political reasons behind it because they think 
that before elections they must deliver something.... They want MINAB to be 
something which can be accommodated within the wider agenda... I think that 
there is a ... section of the community, who are suspicious about MINAB; that 
perhaps these four organisations605 have become the tools of the government 
or the intelligence agencies so that through MINAB these imams and mosques 
can be monitored.... But I am sure there is nothing like that. Yes, there are 
certain demands, certain criteria, being demanded. And we should look into 
that—if the demands are fair and in the benefit of the community, why not? 
We have been told that twenty percent of the elected council should be 
women. We know that ... some would ask why it is being imposed upon us. 
But I see it as something good, something good for the community. Why are 
we excluding women?606 
 
Raza is, as one can see from this quote, not too worried about the demand to include 
women on MINAB’s council. Even so, it is worth pointing out that in both the UK and 
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in France this is not something the state demands of other religious traditions. As 
Alexandre Caeiro correctly comments, it is “ironic that the religiously neutral French 
state places greater demands on some traditions than others. Women are absent from 
virtually all the main religious bodies in France and their exclusion is a burning issue in 
French Catholicism and Judaism alike.”607 One imagines that if Sarkozy or Gordon 
Brown had tried to alter the gender balance of these religious communities the outcry 
would be rather bigger then it was in the Muslim case. This makes their actions rather 
inconsistent, but does it make them wrong? Anyone who is frustrated by the gender 
inequalities present in some religious traditions will have at least some sympathy for 
these efforts. Yet, even if one leaves to one side the issue of extremism, the question is 
still a complex and difficult one. In some perfectionist accounts, which are usually more 
popular among “comprehensive” than “political” liberals (see Chapter 2 on these 
terms), academics appear to go too far, implying the state can interfere in religious life 
at will. Gila Stopler, for example, maintains that if religions limit the opportunities of 
women then they ought to be considered “unreasonable doctrines” in the Rawlsian 
sense of the term. Indeed, she suggests that  
 
applying Rawls’s requirement that all comprehensive doctrines be reasonable 
to patriarchal [i.e. orthodox] religions would result in their discouragement and 
indeed their exclusion not only from the political domain but also from the 
non-political (or private) domain.608 
 
It is not hard to see the danger in this passage. For where might the interference with 
religious communities end—with the forced takeover of mosques, or even with the 
disruption of families considered patriarchal? Although Stopler’s view is grounded in 
the value of autonomy, of women especially, there is a serious risk that her position 
could be twisted to support oppressive ends. This is one of the main reasons why her 
stance would scandalise others, such as the legal theorist Stephen L. Carter, who views 
the autonomy of religions as almost sacrosanct. Carter recognises a basic tension in a 
liberal state. “One must come down,” he avers, “on the side of equality or on the side 
of religious freedom, for in this conflict it is impossible to do both.”609 However, he 
tends to come down on the side of religious freedom on the basis that it is a crucial 
bulwark against tyranny. He thus offers reluctant support to, for example, Catholics 
who exclude gays and lesbians from public events.610 Martha Nussbaum is also wary of 
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using state power to “correct” religious groups, but tries to find a path between these 
two positions, suggesting that some minor changes can be made by the state if there is a 
“compelling government interest.”611 This, in my view, is the best path to follow in this 
particular case. As we saw in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, in Islam in the UK there is a 
good deal of frustration at the state of mosques and restrictions placed on women, and 
this, along with the openness of Raza to the change, seems to give reason enough for 
some (gentle) encouragement. While the prevention of terrorism many not give a 
“compelling justification,” this, in my view, does. 
 
 
7.9.  Theological independence 
 
This consideration of perfectionism connects to another issue that has been constantly 
present in this chapter, albeit in the background: namely, the independence, from the 
state, of religious interpretation. As we saw earlier in the chapter, theology was not 
something that often came to the fore in the 1990s when New Labour engaged with the 
MCB. Yet with the creation of Prevent and the expansion of funding for religious 
organisations theology has become more of an issue. The UK government has not just 
done dealings with favoured “representatives” of the UK’s Muslim communities, 
meaning “those with an Islamic heritage”; it has, on occasion, tried to influence the 
production and dissemination of Islamic knowledge, assisting some of the theologians 
and initiatives that I have been discussing. 
 
Of course, there are many different ways in which a government might influence 
theology, and a minimal relationship is unavoidable. Imagine, for example, a religious 
group whose reading of the Genesis story leads to the conclusion that people should 
never wear clothes (as it was in Eden, perhaps). At some point the members of this 
group will probably be arrested, and their beliefs will be challenged and delegitimised in 
that process. Simply by enforcing laws governments are always undermining some 
religious traditions and supporting others, in this case treating the Biblical nudists more 
harshly than, say, the majority of Muslims. Governments can still, though, aspire to 
religious neutrality in the enforcement of law, at least in a certain sense. Clearly, a state 
cannot remain neutral in the effects of its laws: its actions will, as Kwame Anthony 
Appiah puts it, “have differential impacts on people of different identities, including 
209 
 
religious identities.”612 But the state could in this case be completely unaware of the 
religious convictions of the naturists and it would make little difference; those arrested 
could not claim that they had been singled out.  
 
In the UK, however, New Labour did develop a non-neutral approach to different 
Muslim traditions, singling out certain groups for privileged attention. This is what 
certain commentators, such as Bright, had actually suggested, maintaining that the UK 
government ought to seek out partners from the “Sufi majority” in Britain.613 Bright’s 
interpretation of Sufism is more than a little simplistic: he, like many in the West 
(whose opinions have often been informed simply by a few images of whirling 
dervishes), portrays Sufism as private, spiritual, peace-loving, apolitical—everything that 
a religion in a secular state should be, in short. In reality, Sufism and its history are 
much more complex, having taken a variety of forms and influenced all manner of 
movements and traditions including ascetics, libertines and religious martyrs.614 But 
leaving that small objection to one side, what Bright seemed to argue was that the UK 
government ought to seek out Barelwi interlocutors, who make up the largest Islamic 
tradition in Britain and who are generally closer to the mystical aspects of Islam than 
the scripturally-oriented Deobandi and Salafi groups. That is indeed what New Labour 
appeared to do post-7/7, freezing out the MCB and giving funds to the BMF and the 
Sufi Muslim Council and then justifying this by saying it would only now talk with those 
who “reject and condemn violent extremism.”615  
 
In fact, New Labour went further still. Ministers such as Kelly began to quote Muslim 
intellectuals such as Tariq Ramadan, suggesting they offer a vision for a fully integrated 
British Islam.616 In addition to this, Islamic Studies was named by the Labour 
Government as a strategically important subject in 2007.617 This was also supported by 
government-sponsored university-based initiatives such as “Contextualising Islam in 
Britain,” a CLG-funded project based at the University of Cambridge whose main aim 
was to allow Muslims to come together to discuss what it means to faithfully live as a 
Muslim in modern Britain.618 This project did not shy away from talking about theology, 
covering Islamic conceptions of justice, the objectives (maqasid) of Islamic law, and the 
nature of divine sovereignty. It also involved a number of the scholars and activists 
whose names have been mentioned previously: Usama Hasan, Dilwar Hussain, Yahya 
Birt and Musharraf Hussain. Finally, of course, CLG funded the RMW and other 
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similar organisations that disseminate religious knowledge. It is therefore not just the 
case that New Labour privileged certain existing Islamic traditions over others; it also 
sought to develop new traditions, trying to accelerate the growth of organically emerging 
Islamic theologies. This, as Appiah has observed, is what the idea of perfectionism in 
the liberal tradition is really all about.619 Perfectionists want to make people’s lives go 
better by making people better, by encouraging conceptions of life that, in the view of 
the state, are likely to be conducive to human flourishing. In this case, the perfectionist 
might want to see more intelligent forms of religious faith fostered, forms that are more 
culturally and philosophically literate. 
 
From what has been said above, the dangers of this kind of enterprise should be already 
fairly clear. Firstly, the notion of a nominally secular government engaging in the 
promotion of particular theologies seems to imply a danger to religious liberty, to 
religious autonomy and, most significantly of all, the ability of religions to offer 
principled dissent on political matters. (It has been suggested that part of the reason 
links between the MCB and Labour were cut may have been because of the former’s 
“failure” to support the war in Afghanistan in 2001.)620 It seems to imply an attempt to 
alter what it is Muslims believe, to intrude upon their religion. Moreover, it appears to 
imply that Islam is all that needs to change: it implies that there is not an issue with 
young Muslims encountering difficulties with racism, cultural alienation and social and 
economic exclusion, and that recent political developments such as the invasions of 
Iraq and Afghanistan are not significant—all that needs to change are the doctrines 
being propagated and “cohesion” will ensue. Given this, it is even easier to see why 
some Muslim organisations and intellectuals worry about having their views promoted 
by the state for essentially political reasons. 
 
Yet compelling as these criticisms may all be, the issue is still not a simple one. In itself, 
the fostering of more intelligent forms of faith is not usually considered to be outside a 
state’s remit. Indeed, it would be an unusual form of government that had no role in 
shaping the convictions, religious or otherwise, of its citizens. It does not appear 
unreasonable for universities to discuss Islamic theology, just as few would consider it 
unreasonable for universities to study Christian theology. Wariness of state interest in 
Islam may, then, be sensible, but to quote Appiah, 
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a moment’s reflection will remind us [that] this can’t be the whole story.... 
Autonomy, we know, is conventionally described as the ideal of self-
authorship. But the metaphor should remind us that we write in a language 
that we did not ourselves make. If we are authors of ourselves, it is state and 
society that provide us with the tools and the contexts of our authorship.... 
And so, if the state cannot but affect our souls, we can fairly ask both how it 
does and how it should do so.621 
 
 
7.10. Religious autonomy and religious wisdom 
 
With this point, and the general confusion that surrounds this debate, in mind, I think it 
is worth ending by spelling out as clearly as possible the two values at stake in the UK 
government’s involvement in Islamic theology. Firstly, there is the more obvious value 
of religious autonomy. As I noted earlier, Carter is perhaps the most persuasive 
defender of religions as autonomous entities. He argues, following Toqueville, that self-
governing religious groups are needed in any modern state because they offer an 
“independent moral voice.” They are, he maintains, “sources of moral understanding 
without which any majoritarian system can descend into simple tyranny.”622 For him, 
the main reason that it is necessary to maintain a separation of church and state is not 
so that the state is protected from religion, but so religion is protected from the state, 
which he sees as the far more dangerous entity. That is why he thinks it is wrong for 
states to dictate the gender norms of religions, “just as it would have been wrong, back 
in the days of legally mandated racial segregation [in the US], for the state to press 
racially integrated congregations to ‘reform.’”623  
 
Much like Rumi, Carter believes that it is important that a state is not a person’s first or 
highest allegiance: it is a good thing that religious groups (and secular groups too, of 
course) see particular forms of political organisation as insignificant relative to their 
beliefs, as this helps subordinate the state to ethical principles that transcend it and in 
terms of which it should be judged. To illustrate his point, it is helpful to take two 
contrasting examples of theological arguments. Neither of these can be viewed as 
representative of Islam in the UK, but both are taken from theologians familiar from 
earlier chapters of the thesis. First, consider the following extract from one of Murad’s 
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sermons from 2008, during which he discusses the contemporary meaning of the Sira, 
Muhammad’s biography. For Murad, the Sira illustrates the fundamentally liberative 
message of Islam. To quote from that talk: 
 
‘I am with the broken hearted,’ He says, Subhanu wa T’ala, in the hadith; that’s 
where you expect truth to exist. And in this country that is what a lot of 
people can’t understand. They can’t get that some middle class guy in a big 
cathedral and who goes to church once a year on Easter Day might actually 
not be what God is interested in, and that God is interested in precisely the 
people who the establishment ethos and all of the media are least respectful 
of.... That’s the radicalism of the prophetic vision. 
 
What is notable about Murad’s argument is that, later on, he goes on to suggest that one 
of the difficulties Muslims currently face is attempts to water down that aspect of the 
Islamic tradition. In Mecca before the Hijra religion was, he suggests, “like modern 
Western religion—it’s a civic religion, you have your own faith community and your 
own little festivals ... but what really counts is money.” Muhammad challenged others’ 
beliefs because they were bound up with a social system that was fundamentally unjust, 
and that, Murad argues, is still the case today:   
 
What [the Prophet’s adversaries] want is not for him to stop worshipping his 
god, but just to say: “You can worship your god as long as you’ll just let us 
worship ours.” But their deities are linked inextricably to this oppressive 
system. Their deities are unable to inspire them with the long-term vision and 
the humanity and the softness of heart that enables them to do something 
about the people in the street selling the Big Issue.624 
 
What is heavily implied in Murad’s argument is that, as he has put it elsewhere, “the 
function of prophetic religion is to challenge people, and it would probably be very 
good for modernity to be slapped around and mocked and challenged.”625 It is to 
independently judge the political status quo. 
 
A similar refusal to accept the status quo can be found also in the speeches of Riyadhul 
Haq, the reformist Deobandi ‘alim I looked at briefly in Chapter 4, although his 
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message is quite different. In his sermons, Haq pictures post-9/11 hostility toward 
Muslims as but one part in a long story: 
 
Nothing has changed. The persecution of Muslims ... enmity, hostility, hatred 
of the Umma.... [R]idicule and vilification of Islam [is] part of a constant battle 
between haqq and batil, truth and falsehood, which did not start on 9/11 but 
[was] present from the beginning [of Islam].626  
 
Haq’s message does not sit easily with the UK government’s interest in “cohesion.” He 
argues that this fitna (strife) was sent as a test to Muslims, and those who will pass the 
test will remain steadfastly attached to Islam, not engaging in Western practices and 
culture or keeping company with non-Muslims. Those who stay firm, he insists, will 
benefit when Islam ultimately prevails. Rather than emphasising cordial relations with 
the People of the Book (Ahl al-Kitab), he stresses the superiority of Islam above all 
other religions and ways of living. Like Murad, Haq views the modern West as unjust. 
Unlike the Cambridge-based theologian, however, he is contemptuous of national 
loyalties and political commitments. What has worried some journalists particularly has 
been the hints of anti-Semitism that have appeared in his talks, especially references to 
Jews controlling “usury” and the media.627 
 
These two excerpts help support Carter’s position, but also illustrate some of the 
difficulties with it. Religious autonomy can be a powerful bulwark against state 
oppression, but it is a double-edged sword. In light of this, it is helpful to consider the 
second of the two values at stake in the government’s involvement in Islamic theology, 
what one might call, following David Ford, religious wisdom.628 Carter is based in the US, 
a context where church and state are strictly separated and where religious autonomy is 
so prized that there is next to no religious education in state schools.629 In most of 
Europe, by contrast, the situation is different. In Germany, for example, the state still 
plays a role in funding theological faculties. Indeed the current pope, Benedict XVI, was 
educated at a state-funded religious school in Bavaria. According to Rolf Scheider, this 
involvement of the state in religious knowledge results in “a pay-off for both sides. The 
churches get well trained preachers and teachers from the state and the state makes sure 
that the theology which is taught in the churches is of a high scholarly standard.”630 In 
his view, it reflects a different national attitude: 
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Germans do not believe in the individual’s capacity to take care of his or her 
religious education; instead, they believe that the state is a good institution to 
govern this field. Americans are very suspicious of the state’s involvement in 
religious matters, and they are confident that the individual is able to organise 
his or her [own] religious life.... Germans view religion as potentially 
dangerous; Americans see religion as an important human resource for 
building civil society. Germans want the state to civilise religion, Americans 
believe in the civilising potential of religion.631 
 
This is a rather blunt description of national difference, but even so the comparison is 
illuminating. What Scheider is arguing is that closer involvement between the state and 
religion can help foster more sophisticated forms of belief and act as a barrier against 
religious literalism, which is “not a problem in Germany.” Opening up more space to 
discuss religion, particularly in the education system, gently encourages “[t]he capacity 
for historical and self-critical thinking,”632 On this basis Scheider supports the similar 
inclusion of Islamic scholarship. His argument could be applied to the UK too. There 
are differences between Britain and Germany (in which there has been a direct attempt 
to institutionalise Islam from above).633 Nevertheless, the discussion of Islam in British 
universities, the dissemination of Islamic knowledge and the construction of bridges 
between universities and Islamic educational centres like the Muslim College and the 
Islamic Foundation634 can be looked on not just as attempts to “control” Islam, but to 
facilitate flourishing Islamic scholarship—and, by extension, to encourage more 
thoughtful religious belief. This is certainly how Birt perceived “Contextualising Islam 
in Britain,” saying the following of the project: 
 
One obvious irony was that there are few if any comparable platforms, due to 
internal politics or lack of resources or vision, for sustained reflection on 
pressing theological issues by such a wide theological diversity of British 
Muslims, except for official ones. The fact [is] that British Muslim institutions, 
being perceived as biased in one way or another, would have struggled to 
collect together Sunnis and Shiites, Sufis and Salafis, liberals and conservatives, 
and Deobandis and Barelwis (the latter being British Islam’s most important 
sectarian Muslim division) under one roof.635 
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7.11. Conclusion: balancing competing values? 
 
The real challenge for the British state in future, especially given the recent coming-to-
power of a new Coalition government, may be to facilitate wise forms of religious faith 
without compromising religious autonomy. After all, in theory these two values need 
not necessarily be at loggerheads. It ought to be possible to encourage informed 
religious belief and discourage anti-intellectualism without suppressing principled 
dissent. Being well informed about a subject should, in fact, make such dissent more 
accurate and effective rather than weakening it. Appiah, in his consideration of the 
appropriate influence a state can have upon people’s core convictions, suggests that the 
state might legitimately work to undermine “abhorrent” identities by, for instance, 
teaching that there is not a Jewish élite controlling the media or an organised Western 
conspiracy to destroy Islam. Such encouragement would interfere with aspects of the 
theological vision espoused by Haq and in the MI’s original manifesto, but that is not to 
say dissent would be impeded thereby.636 
 
Unfortunately, however, the record of the outgoing government does not give one too 
many grounds for optimism, and nor do the statements of some Conservative MPs. 
The history of government involvement in Islam and Muslims is littered with mistakes, 
short-termism and excessive overreactions to the threat of violent extremism that, at 
times, have been deeply illiberal. As a starting point, to improve the current state of 
affairs and mollify suspicions it will be necessary to avoid the patron-client relationships 
that have sometimes characterised Muslim identity politics. It would also surely help if 
the new government in the UK could resist the temptation to justify sensible 
measures—such as the provision of chaplains or the administration of mosques—just 
in terms of the prevention of extremism. This helps no-one in the long run, not even, I 
am fairly certain, counterterrorist efforts. If the state is unable to do these things, it may 
be best just to keep at a distance from Islam. 
 
To end on a hopelessly optimistic note, it might also help if, in discussions of the 
relationship between Islam and the state in the UK, the whole of Rumi’s hadith could be 
kept in mind rather than just the first half. For what really makes the hadith easy to like 
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is it recognises that when one talks about the relationship between theology and the 
state, or between scholars and princes, the exact relationship between the two parties is 
not everything: no amount of nuanced negotiation of the appropriate relationship 
between religions and the state will lead to mutually acceptable results as long as more 
serious social, economic and political problems go unaddressed. Facilitating discussions 
of Islam can be helpful, as can ensuring proper relations between politicians and 
religious clerics, but it helps to remember too that: 
 
Happy is the prince who stands at the poor man’s door; wretched is the poor 
man who stands at the door of the prince. 
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8. Conclusion 
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8.1.   Breathing life into old traditions  
 
In 1985 Robert Bellah et al. published Habits of the Heart, a book that, in America at 
least, had an uncommonly large impact for a piece of empirical sociology, appearing on 
the front pages of a number of national journals and getting near to the summit of a 
number of bestseller lists. The book, which was republished for a third time in 2008, 
sets itself an unusual task: to describe what the authors call the “moral ecology” of the 
United States—that is to say, what Americans value, how they think they should live 
and what shape they think society should take. Despite its sizeable flaws, it makes for 
an invigorating read, particularly because it moves skilfully from the lives of the people 
the authors interviewed—therapists, activists, bankers and what have recently become 
known as “community organisers”—to the moral traditions by which they had all been 
influenced: Protestant individualism, expressivism, utilitarianism and (small “r”) 
republicanism. Written in direct opposition to the then nascent free market orthodoxy 
(given the name “Neocapitalism” by the authors) and to the idea of a purely managerial 
state, it ends with a provocative contention: 
 
We need to learn again from the cultural riches of the human species and to 
reappropriate and revitalise those riches so they can speak to our condition 
today.... This would not result in a neotraditionalism that would return us to 
the past. Rather, it might lead to a recovery of a genuine tradition, one that is 
always self-revising and in a state of development. It might help us find again 
the coherence we have almost lost.637 
 
What worried the authors of Habits—and it is not a concern that has gone away—was 
the problem that the vast majority of the people they interviewed no longer seemed to 
be able to relate the narratives in terms of which they made sense of their lives to the 
new political reality of the United States. Instead, they seemed to be retreating either 
into a narrow form of individualism or an aimless nostalgia for times past, causing a 
deep crisis in American public life. What they recommended to address the problem 
was a revisiting and revivifying of America’s most significant moral traditions in order 
to revitalise public engagement and enable the country to renew itself. They suggested 
marshalling the power of tradition (defined, following Jaroslav Pelikan, as “the living 
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faith of the dead”) while avoiding the constant temptation of traditionalism (or what 
Pelikan calls “the dead faith of the living”).638 
 
As I observed above, the book has its flaws. Many of those who criticised it did so for 
the wrong reasons or unfairly,639 but in it the authors affirm a number of warm and 
fuzzy concepts—such as “family values” and “community”—a little simplistically. The 
most glaring problem with the book is that it does not find a way of incorporating 
moral traditions that regard themselves as—or are viewed by others as—outsiders to 
American nationhood for whatever reason. The contemporary reader of Habits finds no 
way of getting a better grasp of the narrative traditions that Rev. Jeremiah Wright drew 
on in the sermons that almost derailed Barack Obama’s election campaign. He or she 
certainly finds no way of addressing the perception that Obama himself is not a citizen 
of the US, or that he is not actually a Christian. The book’s portrayal of nationhood, 
consequently, is too simple, and just a little too cosy. 
 
The flaw of that book can, though, illuminate one of the fundamental dilemmas within 
this thesis. The pretext and point of departure for this study was the premise that Islam 
in the UK is in transition. This is not an insight that I can claim as my own sadly, but I 
have, I hope, managed to add weight to that point. New expressions of the tradition 
and new organisations have been gradually emerging now for twenty to thirty years. 
This transition has been hampered to some extent by traditionally-minded elders, but it 
is ongoing. New platforms, upon which I have been focusing here, have emerged and 
begun to contribute to significant debates about the good in Islam, and indeed the good 
in society at large. Yet this is not a debate that right now it is easy to conduct. As yet, 
no-one has written a Habits of the Heart based in the UK. (It would be an interesting 
project to attempt.) Yet it is not particularly controversial to claim that similar 
confusions are commonplace. At the level of formal political organisation, the 
representatives for the different parties appear less and less in touch, not just with the 
public, but with any kind of programme or moral tradition with which a person can 
identify. The Labour Party has gradually accepted the majority of the maxims of the 
Thatcher years, while the recently-restored-to-power Conservative Party have taken to 
describing their stances as “progressive,” “liberal,” “forward-looking”—in so doing 
emptying the terms of coherent meaning. Politics in Britain increasingly looks like the 
art of effective management rather than of just government, and as a result apathy is up, 
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party membership down.640 Beyond that, anxiety is rife about national identity. Paul 
Gilroy has persuasively argued that the British—the English particularly—have become 
prone to frequent bouts of “post-colonial melancholia.”641 A good portion of social 
commentary has become little more than a lament for an apparently once-proud but 
long since lost sense of English- or Britishness.642 The confusion is perhaps deepest in 
the area of religion: most of the UK population (over 70 percent according to the last 
census)643 seem to believe that Christianity means something to the British, but few 
seem to have a clear idea of what precisely that might be—apart, perhaps, from it being 
a convenient way of marginalising religious minorities. 
 
Placed in this kind of context, it would take a visionary of almost superhuman abilities 
to revivify the moral traditions that are frequently regarded as a fundamental part of 
British national identity, whether socialism, conservatism, Anglicanism or even Millian 
liberalism. What, then, would it take to reappropriate and revitalise the riches of the 
Islamic tradition so it can speak to the UK’s dilemmas, given it is feared by many and 
considered an outsider by most? How does one begin to have a conversation about the 
faith’s relationship with British law and society when the tradition’s core language is so 
often misinterpreted and abused? How should one respond to the enthusiasm of 
politicians and journalists in the UK for a form of Islam that is authentically British, 
when a good number of those same individuals seem often to be faintly suspicious of 
the Islamic tradition, and at worst apparently convinced that “Britishness” can be 
roughly defined as that which is not Islamic?  
 
 
8.2.  Islam as one of the UK’s the cultural riches 
 
In light of this difficulty, my intention is to conclude this study by drawing upon the 
chapters that have gone before to consider one final question. It is a question that has 
particular salience when set against the political discussions about ethnic and religious 
minorities conducted in the UK recently. I sketched an outline of these debates in the 
opening chapter, but it might be useful to spell them out once more. Simplified slightly, 
one could say that, on the one hand, the conservative Right in Britain has tended to 
emphasise the need to, as Roger Scruton has put it, “adjust immigration policies to the 
goal of integration” and to cease “denigrating the national and political culture upon 
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which we depend.”644 At their best, the arguments of individuals located in this camp 
have had the aim of building a political culture capable of including the entire adult 
population in a common civil society. Yet often this is seen to require allegiance to, or 
at least knowledge of, a common history and tradition, and the privileging of that 
tradition in compulsory education.645 Rarely is much consideration given to how those 
whose heritage stands outside of that core historical narrative might bring themselves 
into this political culture, and so many people are effectively asked to abandon their 
history, their identity and even their faith, something that proves not just difficult but 
almost impossible for most people to do.  
 
On the other, a liberal-Left multiculturalism, damaged but still standing after the fierce 
criticisms directed at it post-7/7, has tended to emphasise the need to open space for 
cultural diversity, for many stories. Sceptical of talk of national loyalty, commentators in 
this camp frequently have little or no time for discussions of nationhood, stressing 
instead the syncretic, partial, constantly changing and ultimately fragmentary nature of 
nations, cultures and identities.646 Different scholars have slightly different stances, of 
course. Specifically, one can distinguish between those who doubt the ability of any 
national narrative to include those who are not part of the white, Christian (or post-
Christian) majority647 and those who are cautious but nonetheless willing to argue for a 
“patriotism in fragments.”648 At their best, these arguments expose and undermine the 
exclusivity of the conservative stance, and for that reason I incline toward this camp 
when forced to choose. Yet even those who accept the importance of a national story 
of some form rarely consider in much detail what it might mean to bring about the 
transformation of a once-unfamiliar moral, cultural or spiritual tradition into a basic 
part of a national landscape. So the question I want to consider is this: What would it 
take to create, and what is there to be gained (and even lost) from the emergence of an 
Islamic tradition that the future writers of a UK-based Habits of the Heart might be able 
to count among Britain’s cultural riches? 
 
 
8.3.  Looking to the long term 
 
Some answers to this question come only too readily to mind, the first being time. 
Whatever the future of Islam in Britain might be, one thing that one can be sure of is 
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that changes will not happen too fast. One of the flaws of British governments, noted 
in Chapter 7, has been their desire to push this fourteen hundred year-old tradition too 
far too fast, hoping something called a “British Islam” might be created instantly. 
Deeply ingrained prejudices and misunderstandings, also, do not disappear overnight. 
Even now, despite the obvious easing of European anti-Semitism, it is still hard to say 
how confidently one can speak of Judaism being a “part of” the UK. Of course, today 
the West’s “Judaeo-Christian” heritage is celebrated, and to some extent this does 
reflect a welcome openness to Judaism. Yet as Victor J. Seidler persuasively argues in 
his book on Jewish philosophy’s relationship to Western culture, the tendency in the 
West is to see Judaism just as what came before Christianity. The term “Judeo-Christian” 
only emerged in the middle of the twentieth century, and there is evidence to suggest 
that, rather than being the product of religious dialogue, the linking of the traditions 
was a secular political move aimed at limiting the influence of the Roman Catholic 
Church in the US by stressing the similarities of its opponents.649 As it is used today, the 
term implies a progressive historical transition that moves from Judaism, to Christianity 
to Enlightenment and modernity—which makes Jews, as Pope John Paul II once put it, 
the “older brothers” of Christians. This not only neglects the fact that many of the core 
texts of rabbinic Judaism were written later than the Gospels, but it also prevents 
Jewish traditions from being expressed on their own terms. Seidler, whose Polish father 
was the sole member of his family to survive the Holocaust, thus admits to having 
“always lived with a tension between Jewish philosophies and ‘Western cultures.’” The 
dominant historical narratives and intellectual traditions in the West make, he argues, 
the articulation of ideas influenced by Judaism more difficult.650 Islam, also largely 
excluded from that same historical narrative, suffers similar problems, evident in well-
meaning but usually misguided suggestions that it undergo a “Reformation.” There is 
an urgent need to begin to work through this historical narrative and perhaps, as Bellah 
at al. might put it, open it up to new interpretations.  
 
 
8.4.  Future challenges for Islam in Britain 
 
The second thing that it will take is a good deal of perseverance. When one speaks 
about Islam in the UK one has to remember that, even if one completely disregards the 
negative attitudes toward the tradition that many B
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enormous challenges in what are very difficult circumstances. Firstly, there are a 
number of local or national difficulties. Every longstanding religious tradition in the UK 
is struggling to cohere in a fast-paced, impersonal consumer culture, and one can see 
people from many faiths reacting to this pressure by adopting what Bhikhu Parekh calls 
a “pathological” religious identity.651 Yet these struggles are magnified in the case of 
Islam, where the tradition that parents try to transmit often has its roots in kinship-
dominated rural contexts quite different to modern Britain. Islam in the UK has had to 
undergo an enormous cultural transition, and, as sociologists such as Steve Bruce have 
observed, such processes of cultural transition can frequently result in the defensive 
entrenchment of religious practices and identities, which can have the effect of making 
conversations about reform difficult.652 To add to all of this, one has to bear in mind 
the basic fact that many Muslims in Britain are, relative to most other religious or ethnic 
groups, not at all well off. Young Muslims in the UK are more than twice as likely to be 
unemployed than the national average. The rate for those with no qualifications is even 
higher, at almost 40 percent.653 Needless to say, this varies markedly between different 
ethnicities (as we saw in Chapter 3),654  but it would be foolish to deny that it has some 
impact on religious expression. Marx, in my view, hit on an important point when he 
described religion as the expression of and protest against distress, and as the “sigh of 
the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless 
situation.”655 (This was in addition to describing religion as a “defect” and an “opiate,” 
of course, but I’ll leave that aside.)656 It appears that for some young Muslims espousing 
an aggressive form of Islam forms part of a defence against and escape from their 
unfeeling social and political environment.   
 
As if this were not enough, one also has to factor in the various international issues 
discussed in Chapter 5. The history of colonialism has had a massive impact on Islamic 
thought in many different contexts, and when anti-colonial and Islamic themes have 
fused the results have not always been positive, generating radical movements like 
Jamaat-i-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood whose impact has been felt far beyond 
their nations of origin. The most worrying product of this colonial encounter has been 
the strengthening of Wahhabi thought in Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism has not only shaped 
Islam in Britain directly through international funding, but has, in addition, projected an 
image of Islam as barbarous and reactionary. This colonial disruption has been related 
also to the widespread weakening of traditional Islamic authority. The philosopher 
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Alasdair MacIntyre is well known for his characterisation of the state of contemporary 
moral discourse as a fragmented, incoherent babble, with particular terms now being 
isolated from the contexts that once supplied them with meaning.657 A pessimist could 
argue with some justification that the technical language of Islamic law and theology is 
becoming—perhaps has become—a little like that, with terms such as “jihad” and 
“fatwa” being scattered about without many people having awareness of their precise 
usages in traditions of fiqh. Together all of these difficulties, when combined with the 
general ignorance and suspicion of many non-Muslims, make having a conversation 
about the Islamic tradition immensely difficult.  
 
Given all of this, one could be forgiven for not hoping for a great deal from the 
burgeoning Euro-Islamic public sphere. Yet, as we have seen, a variety of creative 
expressions and unusual alliances have emerged. Indeed, the concentrated focus upon 
Islam may have had a few surprising results. The spectacular emergence of religiously-
justified terrorism has prompted many traditional ‘ulama as well as younger Muslims to 
emphatically state what they believe Islam is against, which in turn prompts the obvious 
question: What, then, is Islam for? Theological arguments are thus now being pushed to 
the fore where previously they might not have been articulated and certainly would not 
have been publicised. The theological debate on Muslims living in non-Muslim lands 
can offer a useful illustration. As I mentioned in Chapter 5, the Muslims who migrated 
to the UK in the ’50s and ’60s did not devise or refer to theological justifications for 
their actions; they just moved. Only when certain radical Muslims and Western 
Orientalists began to claim that in Islam it is not permissible for Muslims to live as a 
non-ruling minority did the question even arise.658 But being forced to respond to such 
arguments can result in an open discussion of the kind of commitments one has to the 
state in which one lives, and a contemplation, conducted in theological terms, of the 
good and bad things about the society one resides in. What is really unusual about the 
Islam in Britain at present is that this need to respond has resulted in an alliance of 
sorts between older, sometimes traditional, Islamic scholars and younger Muslim 
activists dissatisfied with the quality of public debate about Islam in the media and the 
forms of Islamic knowledge currently being disseminated. Organisations such as the 
RMW and Maslaha are good examples of this, as are more traditional establishments 
like the Muslim colleges in Ealing and Cambridge.  
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8.5.  The public ventilation of comprehensive conceptions 
 
The third thing it will take, in my view, is an opening of the public vents to facilitate the 
diverse expression of religious perspectives and the relation of those perspectives to 
questions about the public good, law and national identity. There are sometimes in 
some contexts, as philosophers such as Rawls recognised, good reasons to be reticent 
about the different core convictions people have. But what Rawls failed to see was that 
there are also occasions when refraining from articulating one’s “comprehensive” 
commitments can lead to a stifled public debate, heightened confusion, isolation and 
increases in episodes marked by mutual incomprehension. Such episodes have been all 
too common recently, from the Rushdie affair to the Danish cartoons controversy, so 
perhaps now would be an appropriate time to more openly explore the conceptions of 
the good that underlie people’s immediate moral responses. This might mean exploring 
in a little more depth why freedom of expression is valued, but also, at the same time, 
reflecting more openly on why Muslims venerate Muhammad and why some avoid the 
creation of images (more on this issue anon). 
 
The main reason this is necessary is just because it is hard to see how otherwise it will 
be possible to find a way past the Scylla of a nationalism that is hostile toward all 
supposedly non-European traditions, and the Charybdis of a multiculturalism that has 
little vocabulary with which to address questions of national identity and belonging. To 
illustrate the point, consider a few of the arguments encountered in the previous 
chapters. In Chapter 3, for example, I referred to a theologian who argued that the full 
recognition of Shari‘a law in the UK was not necessary because “as long as there is 
justice in UK law, there is already the Shari‘a.” In Chapter 6 I explored examples of 
‘ulama who argued that Muslims ought to recognise certain English legal practices as 
customs (‘urf) in Islamic law, and that a civil marriage contract ought to be considered 
by Muslims as amounting to an Islamic marriage. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 I looked 
at examples of attempts to weave the Islamic tradition into the cultural and religious life 
of the UK. One can even encounter the argument among certain British Muslim 
intellectuals that to “fight for the Allies [during World War II] was unquestionably a 
jihad.”659 These arguments are all tentative first steps. Much remains to be worked out 
and there are various points of tension between the various positions. They are also all 
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constantly in danger of being appropriated and undermined by UK governments 
seeking to advance narrow policy agendas. Even so, in different ways they all engage 
with questions of national identity and law, challenging both exclusivist nationalism and 
less thoughtful forms of multiculturalism. They all, to put this in different terms, work 
toward a genuine overlapping consensus, the kind of which Rawls advocated but 
couldn’t fully realise because he was ultimately unable to include diverse philosophical 
conceptions in a public, political conversation. 
 
Such a public ventilation of diverse religious and non-religious perspectives will need to 
avoid the kind of double standards that one sometimes encounters among liberal 
philosophers and in wider public debates. For many, Rawls included, offering 
theological support for liberal democratic political norms is acceptable, even laudable, 
yet opposing the liberal status quo is considered improper. British Muslims are likely to 
be applauded for describing the Battle of Britain as a jihad, but not for opposing the 
invasion of Iraq in the same terms. They are likely to be commended for supporting 
civil law, but not for finding fault with civil legal norms. Although obviously it helps 
when political opposition is accurate and expressed in terms that are comprehensible to 
as wide an audience as possible, it is hard to see how this kind of double-standard can 
help in the long run. It implies that liberalism as it currently stands is beyond serious 
reproach, which it is not, and certainly not in the UK at present. It indicates a real 
danger of removing the ethical core from public debates, which only leaves the door 
ajar to the worst forms of national idolatry. Perhaps just as significantly, it is also hard 
to see how allowing the introduction into public life of one side of a theological debate 
but not the other will encourage the creative expressions of Islamic identity outlined 
above to deepen and eventually bear fruit. 
 
 
8.6.  Arguing with the Islamic tradition 
 
This suggestion might, of course, engender unease among certain people, as indeed 
might the general prospect of Islam becoming a more fundamental part of the British 
moral landscape. It seems to imply opening up a space for arguments in favour of, for 
instance, polygyny. One of the best-known figures to have expressed these kinds of 
reservations in recent years is the late Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn, an individual who 
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based his political stances on the argument that wherever Islam becomes a powerful 
moral tradition life is made much harder for people like himself who are openly gay. 
For Fortuyn, as for many in the UK, little was to be gained and much lost from Islam 
becoming one of Europe’s “cultural riches.” Fortuyn is a challenging figure. He was in 
many ways similar to other far-Right figures, such as Geert Wilders, who have offered 
support for bans on mosque construction. Yet his libertarian outlook illustrates how 
ostensibly liberal conceptions of the good can be turned to illiberal ends. What his 
views highlight is the need to find a way of arguing about, and forcefully disagreeing 
with, theological conceptions without unwittingly supporting intolerant sentiments. If 
this path cannot be found it is difficult to see how comity can be maintained between 
the UK’s many different moral traditions. 
 
As a way into this problem, it might be helpful to consider a few of the stances from 
the previous chapters that I personally oppose. In Chapter 6 we saw occasional double-
standards in the way expectations and norms are applied to young Muslim women but 
not to men, for instance. These double-standards may be partly explained away as just a 
product of the particular heritage of South Asian Muslims living in the UK, but there 
remain debates to be had about certain theological perspectives. The idea that a 
woman’s honour is dependent upon her chastity, or that divorce should not be as easily 
available to Muslim women as it is to men, cannot be viewed as just “cultural” issues 
with no “religious” relevance: both of these arguments can be found among Islamic 
texts and scholars based in the UK.660 Although I have not had the space to engage with 
this issue in the detail it deserves, similar comments could be made about the moral 
status of homosexuality in Islam too. I am wary of portraying the tradition as 
undifferentiated on any issue, and there are debates about this, but I am yet to come 
across an Islamic theological argument that goes further than just accepting that what a 
person does in private is his or her business, and argues that an intimate same-sex 
relationship can have intrinsic value. Quite the opposite is argued by many of the 
scholars that I have referred to in this thesis.661 In fact, while survey data indicate that 
there are very few differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in the UK when it 
comes to obviously “political” matters such as national identity and democracy, there 
does appear to be some significant differences of opinion regarding aspects of private 
morality, particularly same-sex relationships.662 
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One traditional liberal way of responding to these differences is to stress the need for a 
clear distinction between public and private morality so that both those who are gay 
and those who view same-sex relationships as morally unacceptable can live with one 
another in relative harmony. This is the position that Tariq Ramadan supports, as we 
saw in Chapter 5, and it does offer a way of going on, a modus vivendi. The position has, 
however, many significant limitations. Some of the positions mentioned above, those 
that relate to women especially, are so severe that there may be good reason for the 
state to intervene. Indeed, in the UK the state has tried to undermine theologies that do 
not support equal access to divorce by taking steps to ensure that a religious divorce is 
granted to any woman who needs one. Even where using the persuasive apparatus of 
the state does not seem appropriate, there will still be many who will feel the need to 
contest conceptions of women’s honour. In addition to this, one also needs to consider 
how the UK’s “operative public values,” to use Parekh’s term, will be worked out.663 In 
Britain, for example, monogamous marriages are recognised but not polygamous or 
same-sex marriages. Personally, I would like to see committed, consensual relationships 
between members of the same sex being given exactly the same recognition in law as 
heterosexual relationships. If I am going to argue for that, I will inevitably come up 
against traditional religious perspectives, including (although of course it will not be my 
only opponent) aspects of the Islamic tradition.  
 
 
8.7.  Careful exploration of the good 
 
How should these arguments proceed, if fundamental antagonisms are to be avoided? 
Two suggestions, I think, can be made. First of all, it would help if reductive accounts 
of religious morality could be avoided, and academics are often as guilty of this as other, 
more journalistic commentators. One sometimes hears the complaint, occasionally even 
from scholars such as Bellah,664 that the modern West is prejudiced toward religion. 
This is sometimes justified by making reference to cases such as the disqualification of 
Rocco Buttiglione as prospective justice commissioner of the European Commission 
for his refusal to denounce the Roman Catholic stance on homosexuality.665 I am 
ambivalent about this suggestion, but I would argue that scholars are not always very 
good at talking about values that are not rooted in the expressivism on which Mill 
based his account of human flourishing. Caricatures of value systems that do not stress 
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the importance of self-realisation are very common. This makes it hard to sensibly 
discuss issues over which there are significant disagreements, such as sexual modesty or 
the difference between chosen and arranged marriages—precisely the things that are at 
the heart of debates about Islam in the West. 
 
There are numerous examples to which one might refer. In 2010, for instance, 
Catherine Hakim published a theory of “erotic capital” which contended not only that 
there exists a thing called erotic capital that attractive people use to their benefit (which 
is uncontroversial), but also that women naturally have more of it and that any 
argument that expresses reservations about the limitless exploitation of it is part of a 
“puritanical” drive to control women.666 According to her account, anyone who believes 
that the commercial sale of sex might undermine the goods inherent in intimate 
relationships is complicit in patriarchy.667 The same goes for people who feel uneasy 
about attractive people being preferred over less attractive people for jobs, not just in 
acting or modelling, but in, say, higher education.668 This is a very odd argument, and 
one that can only hold itself together by being based on a caricature of the moral 
traditions that Hakim does not seem to identify with. There are many objections one 
could raise to it, but two seem sufficient. First, one can object that her stance is not 
conducive to respecting women fully, as that, surely, rests upon recognition of the full 
range of women’s capacities, not just erotic, and their humanity, which is not grounded 
in any capacity at all. Second and more important, it completely neglects power 
dynamics, which are right at the heart of this matter. One is reminded of Alain Badiou’s 
barbed comments about the French “veiling debate”: 
 
Everywhere you hear it said that the “veil” is the intolerable symbol of control 
of feminine sexuality. Is it that you imagine feminine sexuality is not controlled 
in our day and age, in our societies? This naiveté would have made Foucault 
laugh. Never has feminine sexuality been scrutinised with such meticulousness, 
had so much expert advice thrust on it, been subject to such fine 
discriminating between its good and bad uses. Enjoyment has become a 
sinister obligation. The exposure of supposedly exciting parts is a duty more 
rigid than Kant’s moral imperative.669  
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This is perhaps the most obvious scholarly example, but it illustrates a wider tendency. 
Feminist critics such as Gila Stopler and Susan Okin fall into a similar trap, although 
the latter’s position is more nuanced. Kevin McDonald670 cites an argument by Mervat 
Nasser that goes so far as to equate the uncoerced wearing of a veil with anorexia. Both 
the anorexic woman and the veiled woman, Nasser maintains, pursue their “externally 
different but psychologically analogous and culturally approved objective with fanatical 
and compulsive devotion.”671 This argument does at least accept, in a way that Hakim 
does not, that living up to ideals of beauty over which one has little control can be 
damaging to a person, but the stance is hardly any better. Leaving aside the point that 
there is one obvious difference between these two phenomena (anorexia is potentially 
fatal, while wearing a veil is, in itself, not), Nasser fails entirely to engage with the wider 
account of the good associated with modest dress. Veiling is equated with conformity, 
conformity with oppression, and willing veiling is therefore seen by her as a pathology, 
a little like Stockholm syndrome.672 Though Nasser does not state this, she thus gives 
the impression that any moral tradition that justifies veiling—in this case Islam—is 
nothing more than a system of oppression. This kind of assumption, so prevalent in the 
UK, only strengthens Fortuyn and others. This is why, now more than ever, one has to 
insist on exploration of the range of goods associated with veiling, such as, say, the 
association of modesty with, as Badiou says, a “woman’s intangible right to undress 
only in front of the person of her choosing.”  
 
Those who want to lessen the influence of those aspects of religious traditions they 
disagree with need, I would argue, to engage in a more incisive way with the ideas that 
underpin the norms they criticise. If I were to offer criticisms of, for example, the 
pressure put on young Muslim women (but not men) to follow the wishes of their 
parents and to be modest, I would surely be best placed if I were able to distinguish 
quite clearly between the gender imbalance and the other virtues (modesty, respect for 
elders). If men and women are being asked to live up to the same standards of modesty 
(certainly, the Qur’an enjoins both men and women to observe sexual modesty), then 
one can have a conversation about to what extent these standards are conducive to 
human flourishing. Only when men are not being asked to live up to the same ideals or 
when women are regarded as a dangerous temptation does the accusation of gender 
repression appear correct. To be clear, I do not mean by this that forceful criticism of 
Islamic theologies is never appropriate. Some of the literature used in the UK’s dar al-
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ulums indicates that women are congenitally deficient, and that therefore a woman’s 
legal testimony is worth half a man’s.673 Such perspectives ought to be opposed, and as 
forcefully and effectively as possible. My worry, though, is that by presenting religious 
traditions as simply “patriarchal” without any qualifiers or attempt to understand 
religious traditions as they understand themselves (as Okin and Stopler tend to do)674 
potential allies within those traditions are lost, evitable antagonisms occur and criticism 
of Islam is ultimately rendered less effective. 
 
I would also argue, secondly, that a careful exploration and articulation of one’s beliefs 
and moral convictions can actually help to win round one’s adversaries in a way that 
avoids unnecessary tension and conflict. Michael Sandel’s 2009 Reith lecture entitled 
“Morality in politics” can help to show why. The focus of this lecture was the debate 
over recognition of same-sex marriage. Sandel argued in favour of such recognition, but 
he did so in a slightly unusual way. One common argument put forward in favour of 
recognition, he observed, is based on the principle that people should be allowed to live 
as they wish and marry who they wish: the moral status of homosexual relationships, it 
is claimed, does not need to be part of the debate. (We saw in Chapter 3 that Rawls 
defends this kind of view.) Sandel, however, pointed out that this argument does not 
stand up to scrutiny. The state in the UK does not consider disestablishing marriage 
entirely, or letting all associations (with four men and one woman, or with two women 
and three men) pass. The reason for this, he argued, is that marriage is a normative 
institution, honouring virtues. Polygynous cohabitations may be permitted in the UK, 
but polygynous marriages are not recognised because the state does not (currently) 
consider them to be worthy of recognition, presumably on the grounds that they 
encourage the marginalisation of women.675 Those in favour of same-sex marriage thus 
have to accept, he went on, that they are involved in a moral dispute over whether or 
not such relationships are worthy of recognition. Specifically, they need to argue: 1) that 
the begetting of children should not be seen as the sine qua non of civil marriage (not 
least because couples that cannot conceive can still marry); and 2) that the exclusive and 
permanent commitment of partners to one another is a good that is worthy of official 
recognition by the state, regardless of gender.  
 
Now, this seems to imply a more open and antagonistic conflict than the Rawlsian way 
of approaching the issue, as the moral difference is now in the open. I believe, however, 
232 
 
that this appearance is rather misleading. If one argues for the recognition of same-sex 
marriage just by saying that people should be allowed to live as they wish and marry 
who they wish then finding common ground with one’s opponents will surely be 
extremely difficult, particularly if they are traditionalistic opponents concerned about 
declining moral standards and commitments. If, however, one takes the second option 
one can show that, much like one’s opponents, one cares for human commitments and 
for moral relationships. The difference will remain, but one will have a shared interest 
around which to organise the discussion. The challenge for those who oppose socially 
conservative stances, then, may be to offer their critique in such a way that reaches out 
to the concerns of the people they disagree with. This, in my view, is the best way to 
avoid slipping into a Fortuyn-like polemic. This is a view I share with Sandel, whose 
conclusion is, I think, worth quoting in full: 
 
In recent decades, we’ve come to assume that respecting our fellow citizens’ 
moral and religious convictions means ignoring them, leaving them 
undisturbed, conducting our public life insofar as possible without reference 
to them. But this stance of avoidance makes for a spurious respect. Often it 
means suppressing moral disagreement rather than actually avoiding it. This in 
turn provokes backlash and resentment, as we see in the rise of religious 
fundamentalism. A more robust public engagement with our moral 
disagreements could provide a stronger, not a weaker, basis for mutual respect. 
What would that look like? Well, rather than avoid the moral and religious 
convictions of our fellow citizens, we should attend to them more directly—
sometimes by challenging and contesting them, sometimes by listening and 
learning from them. It is always possible that learning more about a moral or 
religious doctrine will lead us to like it less, but we cannot know until we try.676 
 
 
8.8.  Asking the right questions 
 
I have been trying to sketch out in this concluding chapter a way forward that might 
allow the Islamic tradition to flourish in the UK, and think about how to debate those 
aspects of it some people find objectionable. With a little bit of time, perseverance, 
openness and robust but thoughtful argument I believe that it will be possible for the 
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Islamic tradition to flourish in the UK, particularly because one can already see it 
happening, despite the many challenges. What I have not said anything about though, 
and what I did mention in my initial question, is what might be gained from having an 
Islamic tradition in Britain that is comfortable with diversity and capable of 
contributing to public debates. This is a question that academics do not often spend a 
great deal of time discussing. This may be because such an enterprise seems just a little 
bit speculative. It may be because it is thought that Islam has nothing to give, that all 
the tradition needs to do is “catch up” with the West. It may also be because of a 
reluctance to talk about what one values about a religious tradition, which can seem 
inappropriate, particularly for a sociologist whose supposed role is, as Bruce says, to 
describe and explain, not to regret or rejoice. The first and the third of these reasons—
if not the second—do have some merit. Nevertheless, I would like to end by spelling 
out what my views are about what the Islamic tradition may be able to bring, in a 
personal and, I stress, not entirely scholarly way. 
 
To do this I need to place myself more fully than I have up until now. I was born into a 
practising Christian family and belong to a sizeable cohort677 of essentially lapsed 
Anglicans, people who are not confirmed and are not observant but who still have a 
loose attachment to the tradition. In my case, that attachment extended to being, by the 
age of around sixteen onwards, angered by any attempts by the BNP to make a claim 
upon Christianity and frustrated by the one-dimensional portrayals of Anglicanism in 
the media, but not a great deal further. It meant being sceptical of doctrines such as the 
Incarnation and the Trinity, but impressed by the uncompromising commitment to the 
downtrodden found in the Gospels. At its best, the Christian tradition presents a view 
of the cosmos in which an ethical demand is placed upon every person, a demand that 
is absolute, that comes from something far higher than oneself, and that is woven into 
very the fabric of reality in such a way as to render every form of social status or 
hierarchy utterly insignificant. The clearest expression of this is perhaps the vision 
presented in Mathew 25, where God states that “That which you do not do for the least 
of those among you, you do not do for me.” The same uncompromising demand can 
be encountered in the writings and sermons of a number of the early Christians, such as 
Basil of Caesarea (330-379), for example: 
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That bread which you keep, belongs to the hungry; that coat which you 
preserve in your wardrobe, to the naked; those shoes which are rotting in your 
possession, to the shoeless; that gold which you have hidden in the ground, to 
the needy. Wherefore, as often as you were able to help others, and refused, so 
often did you do them wrong.678 
 
This aspect of the Christian tradition has always stayed with me, even despite the fact 
that I grew up with little interest in religion. Christianity was not something I felt the 
need or the desire to seriously interrogate. Indeed, only reluctantly did I begin to study 
theological ideas, having eventually been convinced to do so by the suspicion that 
Islamic theology was being dangerously misrepresented and that public conversation 
about the tradition was going seriously wrong. I came to Islam, then, from a specific 
Christian-influenced background. For someone from such a background, some aspects 
of the Islamic tradition are easy to recognise. The ethical demand that is placed upon 
human beings is very similar, for example:  
 
Goodness does not consist in turning your face towards East or West. The 
truly good are those who ... give away some of their wealth, however much 
they cherish it, to their relatives, to orphans, the needy, travellers and beggars, 
and to liberate those in bondage; those who keep up the prayer and pray the 
prescribed alms; who keep pledges whenever they make them; who are 
steadfast in misfortune, adversity and times of danger. These are the ones who 
are true, and it is they who are aware of God.679 
 
Yet it is the differences that are worth highlighting here. Stephen Prothero argued 
recently that the social study of religion has encouraged the mistaken view that there is 
a basic unity beneath religious variety, and that all the religions can be regarded as 
traditions that address similar problems.680 Religious traditions are frequently portrayed 
as different routes up the same mountain, which means that the only issue that has to 
be worked out is whether that mountain is worth climbing (as Ghandi argued) or not 
(as Richard Dawkins argues). One of the problems with this is that it can lead to people 
taking a particular aspect of a familiar (read: Christian) doctrine or tradition and turning 
it into a universal attribute of “religion.”681 As we saw in Chapter 5, for example, it is 
fairly common for people to assume that Islam and Christianity have similar structures 
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of authority. In a similar way, it tends to be assumed that “religion” is against sex, when 
really this is a medieval Christian notion. The Islamic tradition, although it has tended 
to advocate a degree of restraint, has not generally regarded sexual desire as a thing to 
be thwarted or recommended celibacy. On account of these differences many of the 
attacks on or attempts to subvert or escape religion that have been popular in the West 
misfire when they are applied to Islam. For example, when Rousseau published Emile it 
scandalised the Church at the time by asserting that humans have an inner nature or 
light that is inherently good. The book was publicly burnt because it was (correctly) 
seen as an attack upon the notion of original sin. The Islamic tradition does not contain 
a comparable doctrine. To be rightly placed in relation to the good is to be in balance 
with nature (fitra). Islam does not regard itself as “above” nature as both Christianity 
and humanism have done at different times.  
 
By making this point I do no mean to imply that Islam is beyond criticism, but rather 
that to engage with it is to be forced to recognise that the category of “religion” covers 
more fertile philosophical terrain than many people—including, before I began this 
thesis, myself—tend to think. What I began to see as I looked into the tradition was 
that my understanding of religion was rather truncated, and that in fact complex ideas 
lie behind many religious norms. Consider, for example, the prohibition on images in 
the Ten Commandments, which Mark Lilla in his book on religion cites as evidence of 
theism’s inherent irrationality.682 This demand seems baffling, and yet the humanist 
psychoanalyst Erich Fromm explains its rationale deftly in his account of the historical 
evolution of the devotional love of God: 
 
[The historical evolution of religion] goes in the direction of transforming 
God from a figure of a father into a symbol of his principles, those of justice, 
truth, and love. God is truth. God is justice. In this development God ceases 
to be a person, a man, a father; he becomes a symbol of the unity behind the 
manifoldness of phenomena, of the vision of the flower which will grow from 
the spiritual seed within man. God cannot have a name. A name always 
denotes a thing, or a person, something finite. How can God have a name, if 
he is not a person, not a thing? 
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The most striking incident of this change lies in the Biblical story of God’s 
revelation to Moses. When Moses tells him that the Hebrews will not believe 
that God has sent him, unless he can tell them God’s name ... God makes a 
concession. He tells Moses that his name is “I am becoming that which I am 
becoming.” “I-am-becoming is my name.” The “I am becoming” means God 
is not finite, not a person, not a “being.” The most adequate translation of the 
sentence would be: tell them that “my name is nameless.” The prohibition to 
make any image of God, to pronounce his name in vain, eventually to 
pronounce his name at all, aims at the same goal, that of freeing man from the 
idea that God is a father, that he is a person.683 
 
The norm, Fromm continues, can be seen as part of an effort to transform faith in God 
into “faith in the principles that ‘God’ represents,” so the religious person “thinks truth, 
lives love and justice, and considers his life only valuable inasmuch as it gives him a 
chance to arrive at an even fuller unfolding of his human powers.”684 Recognition of 
this deeper complexity can do a number of things. It can make one realise that the 
immediate association of theism with foundationalist philosophies (or philosophies of 
being and truth rather than of becoming) may be too simple. It can also make one 
aware of the different ways of reading a religious tradition. In Christianity, of course, 
the idea of God as father is prominent, which is part of the reason why “God” tends to 
be associated with a bearded man in the clouds. Yet the example Fromm gives is a basic 
part of the Christian, Jewish and Islamic traditions. In fact it is perhaps not just a 
coincidence that Islam, which has the strictest prohibition on the image, also contains 
as a central component the doctrine of the Names, in which God is conceived of as the 
Just, the Good, the Merciful and the Loving.  
 
I remain, I should stress, an agnostic as I was before. Nevertheless, the encounter with 
Islam is what enabled me to consider my own Christian inheritance in a new light, to 
open it up as an area for philosophical reflection. This is what engaging with another 
tradition can do, and this is what, I think, Islam might be able to do in the long run for 
the UK and perhaps Europe too. The tradition is often portrayed by people on the 
Right and far-Right of the political spectrum as the major challenger to the West, the 
thing that threatens its cultural foundations. Such perceptions are, as I have been trying 
to argue in this thesis, deeply misguided. Nevertheless, in a sense Islam can be seen as 
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presenting a challenge. That challenge is to wrestle with it, engage with it, argue with it, 
learn from it and where necessary disagree with it. Where there is a point of moral 
difference—even over something minor, such as whether one should drink or not—the 
challenge is to take the other person’s view seriously, and to consider in depth why it is 
that one’s own argument is preferable. This may mean having to uncover buried goods 
or re-examine old philosophical traditions. Indeed, it may mean having to reappropriate 
and revitalise neglected cultural resources. In the current atmosphere of hostility it is 
difficult to be too optimistic about the future, but I nevertheless believe that the Islamic 
tradition can assist a much-needed cultural renewal—not because the tradition has all 
the answers, but rather because by casting Western traditions in a new light it might 
enable us to start asking the right questions.  
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Appendix 1: Glossary of Arabic/Urdu terms 
 
Ahl al-Kitab – literally the “People of the Book,” usually refers to Christians, Jews and 
Sabeans, although the classification has been applied to many other traditions 
over the course of Islamic history 
 
Al-Azhar – a university in Cairo established in the tenth century, considered by many to 
be the chief centre of Sunni Islamic learning despite it coming under the partial 
control of the Egyptian state in the 1960s 
 
Alhamdulillah – “thanks be to god” (a cognate of “hallelujah” in English) 
 
‘Alim – an Islamic religious scholar, literally meaning “one who knows” 
 
Al-wala wa al-bara – literally the “doctrine of loyalty and disassociation,” stating that the 
loyalty of Muslims should be only to the approved imam and not to any kind of 
“man made” political authority 
 
Ayatollah – a word that literally refers to the “signs of God,” also an honorific title in 
Shia Islam 
 
Barelwi – a Sufi-influenced religious tradition originating in Bareilly in Northern India  
 
Bid‘a – usually translated as “innovation” or “accretion,” refers to deviant or heretical 
practices introduced into Islam 
 
Biradari – literally meaning “brotherhood,” refers to patrilineal kinship networks that 
predominate in Pakistan 
 
Dar al-ahd – the “abode of covenant,” a territorial classification in early Islamic law 
 
Dar al-dawa – the “abode of witness” or “testimony,” a territorial classification in early 
Islamic law, recently popularised by Muslim intellectuals in the West, 
particularly Tariq Ramadan 
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Dar al-harb – the “abode of war,” a territorial classification in early Islamic law 
 
Dar al-Islam – the “abode of Islam,” a territorial classification in early Islamic law 
 
Dar al-sulh – the “abode of treaty” or “contract,” a territorial classification in early 
Islamic law 
 
Dar al-ulum – literally “house of knowledge,” refers to centres of Islamic learning 
 
Dawa – “witness” or “testimony,” usually denotes preaching or a call to Islam 
 
Deobandi – a religious movement named after the Dar al-Ulum Deoband in Uttar 
Pradesh India, strongly focused on scripture 
 
Dhimmi – term used to describe non-Muslims given protected (but usually unequal) 
status in mediaeval Islamic territories 
 
Faqih – Islamic jurist, practitioner of fiqh 
 
Farangi Mahall – a centre of Islamic learning established in what is now Lucknow in 
Uttar Pradesh, India 
 
Fard ‘ayn – an Islamic legal term referring to an individual obligation, and specifically to 
the five pillars of Islam 
 
Fard kifaya – an Islamic legal term referring to a collective obligation 
 
Fatwa – a legal opinion 
 
Fiqh – Islamic jurisprudence 
 
Fitna – usually translated as “strife” or “discord,” refers to periods of conflict among 
Muslims, particularly those following Muhammad’s death 
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Fitra – the natural or primordial state, implies harmony and balance 
 
Fuqaha – plural of faqih, an Islamic jurist 
 
Furu – literally, the “branches” of Islamic law, its procedures and norms (contrasted 
with the usul) 
 
Ghadd al-basar – the “lowering of the gaze,” or restraining oneself in front of members 
of the opposite sex 
 
Hadith – the sayings of Muhammad, recorded in a variety of hadith collections (there are 
six main Sunni collections, sometimes called the “Sound Six”) 
 
Hawa – base impulses 
 
Hijab – a term that in the Qur’an refers to a curtain used to protect privacy, but that 
today tends to be used to describe either women’s modest dress in general or a 
head covering in particular  
 
Hijra – the migration of the early Muslims from Mecca to Medina, marks the start of 
the Islamic calendar 
 
Hizb ut-Tahrir – “Party of Liberation,” a radical sect committed to the reestablishment 
of the Caliphate; has supporters in many parts of the world 
 
Ibadat – ritual, worship or liturgy in Islam, contrasted in Islamic law with mu‘amalat 
 
Ijaza – a traditional certification authorising a person to transmit a particular form of 
Islamic knowledge 
 
Ijma – consensus, traditionally one of the traditional “roots” (usul) of Islamic law 
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Ijtihad – literally meaning “effort,” refers to reasoning from first principles in Islamic 
law 
 
Imam – a person who leads Friday prayers, almost always male 
 
Iman – a concept usually translated as “faith” or “belief,” indicates secure conviction 
 
Islah – a term meaning “repair,” sometimes used by Islamic reform movements seeking 
to restore the tradition 
 
Isnad – a term used to describe the chain of transmission of a particular hadith, can be 
either strong or weak  
 
Izzat – an Urdu term that refers to “honour,” particularly family honour, derived from 
the Arabic izzah, meaning “glory” 
 
Jamaat-i-Islami – a radical Islamic party originating in Lahore, founded by Maulana 
Mawdudi 
 
Jihad – derived from the term jahada (“struggle”), refers to strenuous effort in God’s 
cause (includes both personal vices and armed conflict) 
 
Kaffir – usually translated as “infidel,” “ingrate” or even “truth concealer,” refers to 
those who reject Islam 
 
Kalam – formal Islamic doctrinal theology 
 
Kharijites – literally “the seceders” or “those who went out,” refers to the opponents of 
Muhammad’s first successors  
 
Khul‘ – a traditional form of divorce available to women in Islam  
 
Kufr – refers to deviance, heresy or knowing concealment of the truth (see also kaffir) 
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Lubb – a concept in the Islamic tradition that denotes an inner “core” or “seed,” and 
specifically the part of the self that inclines toward the divine unity behind the 
manifoldness of phenomena 
 
Madhhabs – a school of Islamic law, of which there are four in the Sunni tradition 
(Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Shafi’i) 
 
Madrasa – a school, and in the UK an Islamic religious school 
 
Maqasid – the objects or goals of Islamic law, traditionally understood to be the right to 
life, mind, religion, lineage and honour 
 
Masjid – a mosque 
 
Maslaha – Islamic legal term referring to the “common good” or “public interest” 
 
Mu‘amalat – the aspect of Islamic law that deals with public affairs 
 
Mufti – a person qualified to offer a legal opinion 
 
Mujahedin – those who perform jihad 
 
Mujtahid – a person qualified to perform ijtihad 
 
Muhaddith – and expert in the hadith literature 
 
Muslim Brotherhood – known also as the Ikhwan, a radical revivalist movement that 
emerged in Egypt in the 1920s, founded by Hassan al-Banna 
 
Mustad’afin – the oppressed 
 
Nafs – usually imperfectly translated as “self,” “soul” or “ego,” refers to the selfish or 
base aspects of the human character 
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Namus – Arabic term derived from the Greek nomos (“law”), refers to “honour,” and in 
particular to family honour 
 
Nikah – an Islamic marriage contract 
 
Pir – a Sufi master or teacher 
 
Purda – a term referring to the seclusion of women 
 
Rahma – God’s mercy or grace 
 
Ridda – apostasy, conversion from Islam to another faith 
 
Sahaba – the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad 
 
Salafism – a movement referring to the pious “predecessors” (salaf) of the Muslims, 
initially linked with Islamic modernism but today more often associated with 
scriptural literalism and political radicalism 
 
Salat – prayer, one of the pillars of Islam  
 
Sallallahu alaihi wa sallam – “peace and blessings be upon him,” a statement that 
conventionally follows all references to Muhammad 
 
Sawm – fasting, one of the pillars of Islam  
 
Shahada – the core Islamic testimony (“There is no god but God and Muhammad is his 
messenger”) and the first pillar of Islam 
 
Shari‘a – literally refers to the “path to the source” and usually taken to mean God’s will 
for humans; the term has a variety of nuances and is highly contested, indicating 
the entire corpus of Islamic law as well as at the same time being a symbol of 
authenticity, justice and legitimacy in Islam 
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Sira – an abbreviation of Sira Rasul Allah, a phrase used to refer to the traditional 
biographies of Muhammad (or “God’s messenger”) 
 
Subhanu wa T’ala – “glorious and exalted is He,” a statement that conventionally follows 
all references to God 
 
Sufism – a term that referring the inner, spiritual dimension of Islam as well as to 
specific mystical sects, orders and practices  
 
Sunna – a term referring primarily to the life and actions of Muhammad; it is also used 
to refer to the specific ritual practices that Muhammad instituted and to things 
that are prescribed by Islamic law 
 
Sura – a chapter in the Qur’an 
 
Tablighi Jamaat – a largely apolitical, transnational proselytising sect associated with the 
Deobandi movement 
 
Talaq – a traditional form of divorce available to men in Islam, conventionally declared 
verbally three times, usually over three months 
 
Talaq al-tafwid – the delegation of the right to unilateral divorce 
 
Tawhid – a term referring to the one-ness of God 
 
‘Ulama – plural of ‘alim 
 
Umma – the spiritual community of all Muslims 
 
‘Urf – a legal term used to denote a local custom that is acceptable in Islam without 
necessarily being “Islamic” 
 
Usul – literally, the “roots” of Islamic law, its foundational elements (usually taken to 
mean the Qur’an, Sunna and ijma) 
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Wahhabism – a literalistic revivalist movement originating in Saudi Arabia, now the 
dominant form of Islam in the country 
 
Wali – the guardian of the bride in an Islamic marriage 
 
Wilayat al-faqih – the guardianship or jurisdiction of the jurist (faqih) 
 
Waqf – a private endowment given to an Islamic legal school 
 
Zakat – obligatory charity, one of the five pillars of Islam 
 
